

VOLUME VI

MARCH, 1929

NUMBER 3

SOCIAL FORCES

A Scientific Medium of Social Study and Interpretation

AN APPRAISAL OF THE COMMUNITY MOVEMENT BY JESSE
FREDERICK STEINER

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THE "SCIENTIFIC-HUMAN" IN SOCIAL RESEARCH BY HOWARD
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ARE SOCIAL STUDIES SCIENCES? BY WITT BOWDEN

SPEAKING IN TERMS OF DOLLARS BY JAMES H. S. BOSSARD

THE 1929 CONTENT OF THE COMMUNITY CONCEPT BY LEROY
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THE CONCEPT OF THE CULTURE-AREA BY RUSSELL GORDON SMITH

RACE IN POLITICS BY T. J. WOOFER, JR.

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SOCIAL FORCES

March, 1929

AN APPRAISAL OF THE COMMUNITY MOVEMENT

JESSE FREDERICK STEINER

ONE of the striking aspects of the recent interest in social reconstruction has been the increasing emphasis upon the community as a social unit of real significance. The term, community, is by no means a new invention, for in its original meaning of common life it has long been a familiar concept descriptive of the natural grouping of people in small, local areas, a characteristic type of association handed down from the earliest historical times. The tribal community among pre-literate peoples, the village commune in mediaeval Europe, the Utopian communities of the nineteenth century, bear sufficient witness to the long history of this term and the common sense meaning that was ordinarily attached to it. Prior to the opening of the present century, there was occasional reference to the community in the literature of the social sciences but for the most part only in a casual way, and it was not ordinarily deemed of sufficient importance to be given special mention in an index or table of contents. Among the first English books to use this term in their title were Sir Henry Maine's *Village Communities* published in 1871 and F. Seebohm's *The English Village Community* which appeared in 1890.

The gradually evolving interest in the

community as a suitable unit for serious study received great impetus from the publication in England of such books as Booth, *Life and Labour of the People in London*, (1892); Rountree, *Poverty: A Study of Town Life*; and Besant, *East London*, both published in 1901. In America, this interest in social problems centering in the congested quarters of great cities found expression in two volumes of Riis, *How the Other Half Lives* and *The Battle of the Slum*. While these books, published in 1890 and 1892, were impressionistic descriptions lacking Booth's zeal for statistical facts, they were none the less revealing and convincing. Another landmark in these early community studies was *Hull House Maps and Papers* which was published in 1895 by residents of Hull House. An unusual feature of this volume was a colored map showing graphically the location of the different nationalities in a downtown section of the city, a type of study which foreshadowed the more elaborate ecological studies undertaken many years later. The first beginnings of the utilization of the statistical method in American books in this field are seen in Weber, *The Growth of Cities in the Nineteenth Century: A Study in Statistics* (1899), and in the volume by Hunter, *Tenement Conditions in Chicago: Report by the Investi-*

gating Committee of the City Homes Association, which appeared in 1901.

These volumes, which grew for the most part out of the advancing interest in social and civic reform, were paralleled by publications in the academic field under the auspices of university departments of sociology. One of the first of these, Small and Vincent, *Introduction to the Study of Society*, which was published in 1895, embarked on the unique experiment of devoting considerable space to a detailed analysis of an anonymous community under the heading of "A Natural History of a Society." Although this attempt of Vincent to give concrete reality to Small's abstract generalizations apparently did not convince his colleagues of the value of utilizing community studies as an aid in their formulation of social theory, it did stimulate the preparation of descriptive studies of small towns in connection with undergraduate courses in sociology. Professor G. P. Wyckoff, who had come under the influence of Vincent as a graduate student, states that his students in sociology at Grinnell College between 1895 and 1900 prepared a number of such studies as a part of their class room work. At the University of Chicago, however, Dr. Vincent's pioneer excursion into the field of the community does not seem to have made a deep impression during the years immediately following. The first Doctor's thesis in the department of sociology at that University based definitely on the study of a community was Bushnell's *Study of the Stockyards Community at Chicago* in 1901, and this stands alone among Chicago theses in this field until McKenzie's *The Neighborhood: A Study of Local Life in Columbus, Ohio* was completed twenty years later.

It is to Columbia rather than to Chicago that we must turn for what seems to be

academic recognition of the value of such studies during the period when social workers were making their first efforts to build up a technique for the social survey of communities. Jones, *The Sociology of a New York City Block*, (1904); Williams, *An American Town*, (1906); Wilson, *Quaker Hill, A Sociological Study*, (1908); and Sims, *a Hoosier Village: A Sociological Study with Special Reference to Social Causation*, (1912), were doctor's dissertations written at Columbia University, all of which furnish some evidence of the nature of the academic contribution to the development of community studies.

The influences, however, that gradually brought the community into the foreground of attention had their chief development not in universities but in social movements interested in practical reforms. At first, leadership in this field found its most favorable soil in the social settlements which in the closing decade of last century grew rapidly in public favor. *The City Wilderness*, (1898) and *Americans in Process* (1902), both of which were settlement studies by residents and associates of South End House, Boston, under the direction of Robert A. Woods, stand out as pioneer efforts in American studies of local communities and did much to fix the form of the social surveys that were then in the early stages of their development.

To a large degree, the first writings of the social settlement leaders centered around social conditions and problems characteristic of congested city districts. The community idea was without doubt implicit in their work from the start but real emphasis upon the community did not come about until a much later day. Their interest was in a more effective democracy in building up helpful social relationships and in developing a public sentiment that would insist upon an im-

provement of social conditions. While the territory around the settlement house was spoken of as a neighborhood, the emphasis was not at first on the neighborhood as a geographical or social unit but upon the people who lived near enough to profit by its service. The settlement was to be the center of a radiating culture rather than the center of a natural community. The neighborhood was accepted as it existed with no attempt to mark off its boundaries or study critically the forces that determined its growth. Neighborness was the goal of the settlement leaders. Many years before Cooley pointed out the important rôle of neighborhood groups in the process of socialization, the social settlements had set for themselves the task of reconstruction of city neighborhoods as the best means of approach to social problems. It is easily apparent now that one of their chief difficulties has been this insistence upon a philosophy of neighborhood and local community against which the forces of modern life have been increasingly arrayed. Nevertheless, they blazed the way for the community movement at a time when almost the entire trend of social thinking was turned in an opposite direction.

The gradual emergence of what is now called the community movement can perhaps best be traced by glancing through some of the published papers of civic and social work leaders from the beginning of the present century. The National Conference of Charities and Correction had in 1902 for the first time a section on Neighborhood and Civic Improvement. The two papers in this section that year discussed housing reform and management of tenement houses. During the next seven or eight years the Conference program included intermittently a section of this nature called at different times Neighbor-

hood Improvement, Neighborhood Work, Needy Families, their Homes and Neighborhoods, and Families and Neighborhoods. The family case workers dominated this section of the Conference with the result that there were few important papers dealing with such matters as housing, playgrounds, and settlement activities, the typical subjects of discussion among the neighborhood and community workers of that day. It was not until 1910 under the presidency of Jane Addams that the National Conference program gave real recognition to the growing interest in community affairs. That year a new section on The School and the Community was established and the section on Families and Neighborhoods, contrary to past precedent, was turned over to the settlement group. While the standards set by the 1910 Conference in its emphasis on community problems was not maintained the next few years, the earlier neglect of these topics was a thing of the past. Papers began to appear on the "Coördination of Civic Efforts in Small Communities," "Organizing the Neighborhood for Recreation," and "Rural Recreation." Apparently by common consent, the section on The Family and the Community was assigned to the case work group and those interested in the community movement developed sections of their own. In the National Conference program of 1917 there were two important sections bearing the titles, Community Programs and Rural Social Problems, which gave full opportunity for the discussion of a varied assortment of community activities. It was at this Conference that Robert A. Woods and Mary E. McDowell read two important papers on "The City and Its Local Community" and "The Significance to the City of its Local Community." It was also at this meeting that the financial federation leaders for the first time found

a place on the program for the discussion of problems of joint-finance of social agencies. These papers supplemented by the discussion of rural community problems by those interested in the growing country life movement firmly established the community as a vital subject for the consideration of the National Conference of Social Work. Beginning in 1918 the settlement workers and the country life interests joined in supporting a section on the Local Community, while the financial federation group took charge of a new section of their own designated The Organization of Social Forces. From this time the influence of the community movement is apparent not only in the number of papers presented in these two sections, but also in the fact that papers written from the community point of view began to appear in the other sections on The Family, Children, Public Agencies and Institutions, and Mental Hygiene.

Prior to 1915, in the index of *The Survey* the term, community, was rarely included. The articles in that magazine dealing with community affairs were listed under such headings as neighborhood, playground, social survey, and social settlement. In the first twenty-five volumes of the *American Journal of Sociology* there appeared a few more than one hundred articles which may be broadly classified under the heading of the community movement. These were fairly evenly distributed over the twenty-five year period (1895-1920), the peak being reached in 1915 with the publication of seven articles. It is significant that only twelve of the articles published in the Journal during this period used the term, community, in their title.

At the present time when community is referred to on every hand, it is well to recall that this term began to come into common use only a little more than a

decade ago. Community centers originated as social and civic centers, community studies were first developed under the name of social surveys, community chests were first known as financial or welfare federations, community councils had an earlier history as councils or federations of social agencies, and community churches supplanted the institutional churches of an earlier day. While this recent introduction of the term, community, into general use may be regarded as the logical culmination of forces at work for many years, this process was undoubtedly facilitated by the exigencies of the war situation. The local community took on a new significance for a democratic people unaccustomed to the inevitable centralization of the war period. At the same time the organization of the local community became the most effective means of mobilizing the people for the support of war activities.

Consequently, those who had been trying in vain to bring the community into the foreground of attention suddenly found the current running swiftly in their direction. Powerful national organizations swung into line and by the adoption of this new terminology gave the community a prestige and status that it had never had before. The American Red Cross, War Camp Community Service, and the Council of National Defense, three organizations widely representative of the social and civic welfare interests of the nation during the war, became the chief sponsors of the war-time community movement.

Fortunately, along with this enthusiastic and somewhat blind allegiance to the community as a kind of magic talisman of value in dealing with social problems, there developed in academic circles an effort to define the community more accurately and gain a better conception of its

rôle in social organization. In 1915 two papers appeared that brought in their train far reaching changes in the popular conception of the community as a social unit. One was Galpin's "The Social Anatomy of an Agricultural Community," published as a research bulletin of the Agricultural Experiment Station of the University of Wisconsin; the other was Park's article on "The City: Suggestions for the Investigation of Human Behavior in the City Environment," which appeared in the *American Journal of Sociology*. Galpin raised questions concerning the nature of the rural community and set forth a technique for the study of its structure and functions. Park called attention to the fundamental inquiries that must be made in order to understand the varied forces inherent in city life and pointed out the value of utilizing the city as a laboratory for the study of human nature and social processes. These two papers laid the foundation for the ecological approach to the study of the community and stimulated new methods of inquiry into its real nature and functions. Their publication has been followed by a rapidly growing list of monographs analyzing both rural and urban communities from different points of view and encouraging the development of an objective and critical attitude that was not characteristic of the community movement in its earlier stages.

This growing alliance between scientific study and practical experimentation has called attention to the need for more accurate definition of the nature of the community movement as well as an evaluation of its various activities. Under the designation of community work it has been possible for many different kinds of programs to find congenial shelter. To such an extent has this been true that community work is sometimes defined so

as to include all efforts to improve social conditions. It is spoken of as preventive work rather than ameliorative, the implication being that social case work picks up the wreckage of the social order, while community work strives to make life more wholesome and secure. This is, of course, an inaccurate dichotomy, entirely unfair to both groups concerned. Case workers on their part have been aggressive leaders in social and civic reform, while community workers have not been primarily interested in such preventive work as social legislation, governmental reform, and character building. The modern community movement is essentially an insistence upon the community as a social unit to be given first consideration in dealing with social problems. On the one hand it may be regarded as a protest against the segmental attacks upon social ills by specialized agencies. From another point of view, it is an effort to preserve local autonomy threatened by the encroachments of standardized programs of state and national organizations. In all cases, however, its chief aim is to keep the interests of the whole community in the foreground. Its distinguishing feature is its emphasis on the community as the point of departure in determining policies of social reconstruction.

When subjected to this simple test, much that is now going on under the name of community work is found to be inadequate and ill in accord with its fundamental purpose. A community chest in actual practice may be little more than a money raising device for the benefit of traditional social agencies, with very little power to adjust their budgets in accord with the best interests of the entire community. A group of delegates from selected agencies and institutions establish a community council, although in no real sense may they be thought of as representa-

tive of all the chief interests of the people. A central meeting place becomes known as a community center in spite of the fact that only certain groups find it convenient to make it their headquarters. A church interested in a social program advertises itself as a community church without freeing itself from the denominational traditions that make community-wide support impracticable. In these days it has become fashionable for specialized programs to appropriate the term, community, as an expression of their desire to gain a wider constituency. A great deal of confusion about the community movement can be traced directly to programs of this kind which supposedly represent the community, but for one reason or another fail to work effectively in behalf of its interests.

A difficulty of another kind appears when we turn to that phase of the community movement which champions the cause of neighborhood reconstruction. Here there is no question of the sincerity of the programs undertaken, but they nevertheless encounter obstacles that seem to make success impracticable. This is true not merely of the discouraging efforts to build up neighborhood life in the midst of the disorganizing forces of great cities. In the open country also, in spite of its more simple social order, community solidarity is becoming more and more difficult of attainment. Improved means of transportation have brought in their train the disintegration of small communities and the breakdown of many promising schemes of rural organization.

As a matter of fact, the fundamental difficulty in the community movement inheres in the nature of the task itself. The community cannot easily be made the unit of social administration at a time when deep-seated forces are working toward its disintegration. The community

movement, it might be said, was ushered in a generation too late. Or perhaps, a more accurate statement is that the modern community movement is a direct product of this conflict with the forces that are undermining the traditional position of the simple community of the past. Under the pressure of this conflict, the older ideals of the community movement are undergoing rapid change. The back-to-the-neighborhood philosophy no longer can be given serious consideration, although many of the earlier group of community leaders are still clinging to this illusive hope. Our eyes are now turned toward the outer world of larger contacts instead of seeking satisfaction within a narrow circle. We are not willing to obtain the old neighborhood values at the price of isolation. From the modern point of view, the most satisfying neighborhood is the one that has many inter-relationships with the outside world. The limited opportunities of the neighborhood and the small community with the provincialism and conservatism that were the natural products of its restricted life make no appeal to the present generation.

Along with this urge for wider contacts is an insistent desire for association on a selective basis. A new era has arisen in which the fact of living side by side carries with it less necessity for intimate association than it did in the past. Communal responsibilities in which all must share are more and more carried out on an impersonal basis. The urgent need for intimate association and friendship tends to find its satisfaction in companionship secured over an increasingly wide territory. This does not make less necessary local centers where people can gather together for various purposes. The emphasis, however, is not upon a community center which must unite the people regardless of social status or congenial tastes. The

modern world demands a variety of group relationships to which will be attracted likeminded people from all accessible places. This applies not merely to recreation and social intercourse, but to other phases of communal life as well. In this dynamic country with its traditions of freedom of thought and action, divisions into various groups are inevitable. Whether in politics, religion, education, or in civic and philanthropic activities, we insist on individual points of view and resolutely refuse to be regimented in any arbitrary manner in support of a stereotyped program or institution.

It has been this implied rigidity in the community movement, the assumption that people living in the same neighborhood should minimize individual differences in the interests of a unified program, that brings it into conflict with existing conditions. There is just enough truth in this older conception of the community movement to make it seem plausible and worthy of support. Many of the inescapable functions of society can be best attended to on a local community basis, and where division of effort is carried too far disorganization is an inevitable result. A satisfactory escape from this dilemma is not yet clearly apparent, but one way out may be found through recognition of the rôle of community inter-relationships as well as of community solidarity. The new conception of the community is that it is a segment of a larger integrated unit. Under existing circumstances the successful operation of the older community ideal would be possible only in connection with a policy of segregation inconsistent with our social and political traditions. It might possibly have succeeded 50 years ago, but today with the open doors of the world before us we choose the alternative of wider association. The com-

munity movement of the future must adjust itself to changing conditions which involves the conception of a wider and more flexible unit inseparably inter-related with surrounding areas.

Attention should also be called to the fact that in the administration of modern programs of social reconstruction the trend is in the direction of the natural area as an ecological unit of great value. The distribution of people through the operation of such forces as land values, physical barriers, and cultural factors tends to build up within a city or rural region natural areas characterized by similar types of institutions and a similar outlook on life. These natural areas, in so far as they can be accurately defined and given general recognition, seem to give promise of greater usefulness than local neighborhoods or arbitrarily determined political districts not merely in analysis of the processes of community change and growth, but in facilitating the united action of the people in support of matters affecting their common interest.

Since the World War much of the discussion of the community movement has centered around the field that is now generally known as community organization. Unfortunately, this latter term has been loosely used to include a large variety of programs and activities, and as a result there is little agreement as to its precise nature or its methods of procedure. This confusion does not merely grow out of the difficult nature of the problem of community organization. A more serious problem arises from the fact that much that is included under that name is nothing more than group organization masquerading under a different guise. This failure to distinguish group organization from the more fundamental problem of organizing the community has been to a large degree inevitable, because both types of

programs were in the early stages of the community movement regarded as closely identical. It has only been through a more accurate definition of the community and an emphasis upon it as an ecological unit that their differentiation has appeared to be necessary or even possible. This confusion of terms has been unfortunate for it has prevented proper attention to group work technique and has retarded the adaptation of the community movement to present conditions.

If one excludes, therefore, those quasi-community activities that really belong in the field of group organization, the most important phases of the community movement fall into two main fields; the correlation of social agencies at work within the community; and the development of programs designed to promote community solidarity by building up activities in which all the people may participate. Perhaps it is in this first field of federation, which has been the device for dealing with the problem of the multiplicity of specialized agencies, that the community movement has made its farthest advance. The first efforts to bring order out of this chaotic situation took the form of a central council of social agencies which provided machinery for coördination to be administered by the members of the council on a voluntary basis. Later this developed into welfare federations with the added function of joint-finance, a form of organization that gained favorable recognition during the World War through experience with war chests. Under the name of community chests these financial federations of social agencies have increased rapidly in recent years and now are widely accepted means of unifying the social service activities of a city. During the early years of these community chests, which owe their rapid growth to the influence of business men

rather than of social workers, the fear was frequently expressed that they would enable powerful financial interests to dominate social service policies. Others claimed that their successful growth would mean a dangerous centralization of power in the hands of a few people. Present experience seems to indicate that these fears were not well founded. On the contrary, these organizations have shown a surprising unwillingness to interfere with the status quo of existing social agencies. While there has been abundant evidence of the wastefulness of overlapping and inefficient agencies, the money raising power of the community chest has been so intimately bound up with existing traditions and practices that its leaders have usually preferred not to take the risk of enforcing radical reorganization of social work activities. Outside of a few cities, it has been their weakness as a coördinating function rather than their strength that has been most plainly evident. Because of the constantly mounting budgets of their constituent agencies, their attention has necessarily been directed to the problem of developing a larger clientele of contributors. As far as the general public is concerned, the community chests are frequently thought of as an annual drive for funds, dominated by the ideals of the business world and characterized by such methods as strong emotional appeals, sensational advertising, heavy pressure upon individuals to contribute in accord with arbitrarily assigned quotas, and even efforts to bring into line the lower economic classes with the contribution of a day's wages to be deducted from their pay envelope. Their chief contribution, therefore, has been in the field of finance and business efficiency, rather than coördination, and to the extent that they succeed, the private social agencies gain financial security and be-

come more securely entrenched in complete control of the whole situation. While such a result has much to be said in its favor, this strengthening of the vested interests of private philanthropy may unduly retard the growing trend toward increased governmental assumption of responsibility in this field, thus postponing a much needed step in the reorganization of the social welfare programs of the community. One of the aims of the community movement must be a proper division of responsibility between private agencies and governmental departments, a problem to which the co-ordinating machinery of the community chest has as yet made very little contribution.

The principle of federation, however, has gained wide popularity and has come to be the accepted method of coördinating community programs. Centralized control through amalgamation of various agencies presents a more direct solution of the problem, but many objections are made to it on the ground that it runs counter to American democratic traditions. Social workers seem to have overlooked the drift toward centralization in other fields, the value of which is no longer questioned. In industry, business, government, and education, it has been found advantageous to provide for a greater centralization of responsibility and control. Federation is a step in this direction, but its technique includes no device for reconciling widely divergent interests or unifying those who have no will to coöperate. This limitation inherent in the nature of federation narrows its field of operation to similar types of programs and makes impracticable the goal of a comprehensive community federation embracing all its interests. The principle of federation is now in favor because there is no widespread desire to organize the

community in any unified way that would seriously encroach upon current practice. When the need for more effective unity becomes more deeply felt, federation will be forced to give way to some new plan better fitted to achieve the desired results.

The other phase of the community movement, which may be termed the direct approach to community organization by means of activities and programs in which all the people are to participate, touches very closely the interests of the wider public and has made a strong appeal for popular support. Its programs, which have fallen largely in the field of leisure time activities, are of group as well as community interest, and hence the effort to develop recreation on a distinctively community basis has led to considerable confusion. Its chief difficulty, however, as has already been mentioned, has come about through the gradual breakdown of community solidarity occasioned by the increasing number of social contacts outside the local community. While this tendency has not yet gone far enough to sound the death knell of community programs of this nature, it has weakened their appeal and is bringing about the necessity for a restudy of this phase of community organization from the point of view of inter-community dependence and relationship. Recent beginnings in the promotion of regional studies point the way to an approach to this problem. With the inevitable widening of the unit of organization from the neighborhood to the region, the problems confronting the new community movement challenge the best efforts of its leaders.

In conclusion, may I state briefly the implication of this discussion for the future program of the National Community Center Association? This Association, which was established in 1916 by a group

of enthusiastic promoters of the school community center, has emphasized a phase of the community movement which at that time was not widely supported. During the twelve years of its history much progress has been made. Today, while school centers are by no means universally established, this plan of organization has gained wide acceptance. The National Education Association has made provision on its annual program for a discussion of school centers since 1918, and there is increasing evidence that school center programs will soon be regarded as a vital part of the educational system. At any rate, the pioneering period of the community center is a thing of the past. At the present time the interest of leaders in the community movement is shifting in a new direction. The broadening of our conception of community, a vision of the possibilities of inter-community co-operation, and the necessity of adjusting community programs to the requirements of a period of great mobility, bring into the limelight new problems for which no solution is at hand. The papers read at

the recent annual meetings of the National Community Center Association indicate that its leaders have been conscious of this new development and have been endeavoring to adjust its program to the changing situation. During this past year, serious consideration was given to a proposed change of name of the Association, so that it would be more expressive of its new outlook and wider responsibilities. Such a step would not be a turning away from the past nor an abandonment of a goal only partially won. On the contrary, it would be a more adequate recognition of changing conditions that demand new programs and methods of procedure. If this Association would adopt such a title as The National Association for Community and Regional Organization with emphasis on studies and experiments in inter-community as well as local community relationships and programs, it would more securely entrench itself in a strategic field in line with its past traditions and thereby strengthen its position of national leadership in the community movement.

THE COMMONWEALTH FUND

Appropriations totalling \$2,083,621.80 were made by the Commonwealth Fund last year in furthering a wide range of public health, mental hygiene, child welfare, and educational activities, according to its tenth annual report made public February 4, 1929. Eight major enterprises administered by the Fund through its several divisions and committees received \$1,675,191.45 during the fiscal year ending September 30, 1928, while the remainder, \$408,430.35, was distributed among forty outside organizations, hospitals, and universities in the form of grants for special purposes.

ADOLESCENT STRAIN AND SOCIAL PRESSURE

ERNEST R. GROVES

THERE is in the foreword of Margaret Mead's *Coming of Age in Samoa* a challenging statement written by Professor Franz Boas: "When we speak about the difficulties of childhood and adolescent life," he writes, "we are thinking of them as unavoidable periods of adjustment through which everyone has to pass. The whole psycho-analytic approach is largely based on this supposition." Not only do these words aim the attention of the reader as he starts the book, they also have for the student of modern youth a special pertinence, for they bring into the open some social questions of major importance. In spite of the qualifying adverb "largely," these words suggest two implications: First, that the psycho-analytic writers have created the idea of human nature inherently faulty, a sort of modern personification of sin, which causes, because of the impulses it originates, problems of maladjustment, second, that the freedom of Samoan youth from social tension reveals by contrast the point where our young people, the products of a highly developed civilization, experience their strain.

In her first chapter Miss Mead shows us that this difference between the two cultures centers about sex, and the reader is given the theme of the book in the expression of the author's hope that "from this contrast we may be able to form a newly and vividly self-conscious, self-critical judgment and perhaps fashion differently the education of our children."

In the effort to check up the teaching of psychoanalysis we naturally turn first to Freud, the father of the movement. In his writings, especially in his earlier ones, there is much that seems to justify the

statement of Professor Boas. This appears especially in his "Three Contributions to the Sexual Theory" (*Nervous and Mental Disease Monograph Series No. 7*). Perhaps the following quotation defines as clearly as any his disposition to load upon organic sex the responsibility for the beginning of conflict between impulse and social inhibition:

It is during this period of total or at least partial latency that the psychic forces develop which later act as inhibitions on the sexual life, and narrow its direction like dams. These psychic forces are loathing, shame, and moral and esthetic ideation masses. We may gain the impression that the erection of these dams in the civilized child is the work of education; and surely education contributes much to it. In reality, however, this development is organically determined and can occasionally be produced without the help of education.¹

Later, however, we find a willingness to admit the influence of individual experience:

No intelligent person, however, will dispute that in such a coöperation of factors there is also room for the modifying influences of accidental factors derived from experience in childhood and later on.²

This is given still stronger expression by Dr. Putnam in his introduction to the translation, when he interprets the situation as the struggle of instinct and social coercion:

The instincts with which every child is born furnish desires or cravings which must be dealt with in some fashion. They may be refined ("sublimated"), so far as is necessary and desirable, into energies of other sorts—as happens readily with the play instinct—or they may remain as the source of perversions and inversions, and of cravings of new

¹ Page 38.

² Pages 83-84.

sorts substituted for those of the more primitive kinds under the pressure of a conventional civilization.³

In addition to Freud's doctrine of the censor, which is certainly socially constructed, we find definite statements that reveal his insistence that conflict is not a mere unfolding of inadequacy, biologically determined, but a collision of individual and society. For example, in his discussion of the future of Psychoanalytic Therapy, he says:

I said that we had much to expect from the gain in authority that must fall to our share in the course of time. There is no need for telling you much about the meaning of the authority. Only the smallest number of civilized people are able to exist without the support of others, or to pronounce an independent judgment. You cannot form too bad a conception of the mania for authority and of the inner instability of humanity. The extraordinary increase in the neuroses since the depotentialization of religion may furnish you with a standard for the same. The impoverishment of the ego through the great expenditure of repression which civilization demands of every individual may be one of the chief causes of this condition.⁴

In his *Introduction to Psychoanalysis*, he writes:

We believe that civilization was forged by the driving force of vital necessity, at the cost of instinct-satisfaction, and that the process is to a large extent constantly repeated anew, since each individual who newly enters the human community repeats the sacrifices of his instinct-satisfaction for the sake of the common good.⁵

There is surely in our literature no more perfect disclosure of adolescent conflict revealing the two factors of sex impulse and social convention than *A Young Girl's Diary*, and of it Freud affirms:

never before, I believe, has anything been written enabling us to see so clearly into the soul of a young

girl, belonging to our social and cultural stratum, during the years of puberal development.⁶

It seems unfair, therefore, to charge Freud with largely ignoring the social origin of sex conflict.

The importance of the social factor in adjustment problems is certainly recognized by the leaders in psycho-analytic literature. Although for reasons of limited space quotations cannot be given, there are a multitude of citations that reveal that these authors do not treat human impulses as evil propensities expressed without a social background. Jung, in his explanation of the difficulty of the neurotic whose "apparently individual conflict is revealed as a universal conflict of the environment and the epoch," writes:

His increased demands upon life and the joy of life, upon glowing reality, can stand the necessary limitations which reality sets, but not the arbitrary, ill-supported prohibitions of present-day morals, which would curb too much the creative spirit rising up from the depths of the darkness of the beasts that perish.⁷

No one has expressed the significance of social experience more clearly or forcibly than Kempf in his *Psychopathology*:

The nature of the biological struggle of the individual is determined by what the wishes or autonomic cravings need in the form of stimuli and what the social environment offers. The problem thus reverts to the conditioned qualities of the autonomic cravings, and, since this conditioning can only occur through experiences, it emphasizes the influence of associates (family, school, community, race).⁸

Adler, White and others⁹ abound in statements that show that they see in the con-

³ Page 7.

⁴ *Analytic Psychology*, p. 374.

⁵ Page 118.

⁶ See Adler, *The Neurotic Constitution*, pp. 35, 52, 55, 306-307; White, *Mechanisms of Character Formation*, especially ch. 7 "The Family Romance;" *Foundations of Psychiatry*, pp. 37, 90; Stekel, *Conditions of*

³ Page vii.

⁴ *Papers on Hysteria and Other Psychoneuroses*, p. 211.

⁵ Page 8.

flicts of the individual both impulsive and social factors.

It is of course true that there are differences in the quantity of adolescent conflict characteristic of unlike cultures because of variation in the amount of social coercion resulting from customs and conventions. To a great extent the social pressure is relative to the complexity of social experience. This fact explains the long-demonstrated interest that the students of psychoanalysis have taken in primitive experience. Their writings show constant desire to get from anthropology greater insight for dealing with the problems of their patients by an understanding of the thinking and practices of people of simple culture. Indeed, this interest characterizes the entire psychiatric group and there is no body of scientists, outside the anthropological specialists, that has taken more seriously the literature that interprets primitive behavior.

Valuable as these comparisons between relatively simple and very complex social experiences are, they offer no hope of the civilized adopting habits and attitudes characteristic of savage peoples. Any program that bears promise of reducing adolescent conflict among modern youth must be built with recognition of the existence of the social values of present-day culture and cannot borrow one element out of the total configuration of primitive ways of living. Occasionally we have advocates of coarser and simpler diet, who credit all our present physical ills to our wrong food and urge us to adopt the menu of savages. Food habits must not, however, be separated from other habits. The savage, nearly always out-of-doors, using his muscles constantly, living in rude shelters, free from competitive wor-

ries born of a highly organized industrial society, is one kind of individual and the desk-chained clerk in New York City hurrying back and forth in the subway from lodging to office, beset with economic uncertainty, is another. Merely changing the diet will not give the second the advantages of the first.

This is equally true of social conflict among adolescents. It is a complex problem in which sex has a prominent but not exclusive part. Indeed the sex element is itself complex and experience soon proves that by merely removing existing conventions and their coercion we cannot produce the freedom from strain found among many primitive peoples. Sex has to reflect the entire social situation and cannot be treated as an isolated element that can be changed as if something independent of the entire setting. Even the extreme Freudians have been forced by their experiences in dealing with concrete difficulties of maladjustment to recognize this. Rank states this with extraordinary clearness in the following words:

Just here the opponents of psychoanalysis, and the laity who are not yet sufficiently versed in it, fear a harmful influence from psychoanalytic enlightenment. Unfortunately the impression is still wide-spread that psychoanalysis teaches or furthers freely giving rein to all one's previously suppressed impulses, without consideration for the well-being of one's neighbors or of society. What psychoanalysis really strives for is a better, in the sense of a conscious, mastery of the impulses that through repression produce devastating effects. This holds good especially for sexual ethics, whose undermining by analysis the authorities fear. But as a matter of fact psychoanalysis is in a position to found and create a real sexual ethics, which will clear away the hypocritical and even harmful repression of our generation.

Certainly this reconstruction of ethics by the analysis of the social guilt feeling at first, of course, must start with the freeing of the individual. From that it will have to lead on to a new conception of the task of education before it will be in a position to reform legislation and the administration of justice

in the light of the new knowledge of the unconscious psychical life.¹⁰

Adolescent conflict as we now have it as a characteristic cultural experience of our time is a composite in which we find at least four major interests that demand new adjustment in the individual's life-attitude: physical sex, the effort to find a life-partner, the breaking of home ties, and a new concern regarding future vocation. The position each of these takes in any individual's adolescent experiences naturally varies from person to person, depending upon the social background of the past and the present situation of the individual.

In addition to these four interests that appeal to the adolescent crisis, the individual also faces a considerable emotional disturbance which has a body origin. The changes in body structure that characterize puberty, especially as they have to do with a new adjustment of the endocrine glands, cause tension in more or less degree, so that the adolescent experience, even if it were entirely free from the necessity of reconstructing the behavior program, would be for many a considerable ordeal. It is doubtless true that even these physiological disturbances are magnified by the conditions of a highly civilized culture, from which the Samoan escapes. However, nothing but the most radical revolution in our educational program at the time of puberty for the boy and especially for the girl would make possible any considerable decrease in the adolescent strain that originates from body changes.

At present there is nothing that promises the complete reversal of educational policy that would be required to permit physical interests to predominate in the

educational program during puberty. The biologists have comparatively little influence upon educational practice, and there appears to be on their part, as is true of the doctors also, little disposition to insist that the education of the adolescent shall be primarily the development of the body as a foundation for health and racial vigor. An educational policy absolutely committed to biological values would require freedom rather than discipline, out-door activity instead of the study of words and ideas, and the elimination of the supervision, testing, grading and competitive pressure characteristic of school life as the average adolescent finds it today. Such a program would mean the removal of nearly everything that the pedagogical specialist and the ordinary citizen consider education. It is doubtful, however, whether such a radical change, even if it were possible, would reduce physiological strain to the point experienced by the adolescent savage, for whatever the school conditions, modern youth would still face along many lines the complexities, tension, and speed which accompany our machine culture.

There is a third aspect of adolescent strain that needs to be distinguished from the others and this may best be defined as social stress. The young person's attitude turns from the problems born of impulses and vocational interests to the effort to win group approval and prestige. Sex and eagerness to get mated for life are easily incorporated with these social desires. In a recent case a young attractive college girl who had been so shy as to become a victim of a tradition that she did not care for men, surprised and flattered to get attention from a man soon after entering her life work, gave herself quickly and fully to him, although she found sex experience itself most distasteful. She admits that her feelings of inferiority

¹⁰ O. Rank, "Psychoanalysis as a Cultural Factor," *Mental Hygiene*, October, 1926, p. 728.

were so strong that she was more than willing to pay for attention by giving her body to the first man who seemed interested in her. This she repeated with several men, thereby decreasing her feeling that she was unattractive, but never finding pleasure in physical sex experience itself.

Elaborate fictions of courtship and engagement have been worked out and told to friends by young women who have had no male admirers and who have felt a loss of social prestige in comparison with their more fortunate friends. Individuals have, more frequently than is often supposed, married to escape the feeling of social inferiority of being undesired. Matrimonial competition is, however, only one of the various forms of rivalry that come to the adolescent from motives of prestige and security. Modern society cannot provide, as is so often true in the cultures of primitive peoples, a certainty of marriage for every normal male and female willing to accept it.

It is interesting to discover that Miss Mead in her excellent book furnishes a quantity of evidence that even under the simpler conditions of Samoa, there is adolescent strain. "Within many households the shadow of nobility falls upon the children, sometimes lightly, sometimes heavily, often long before they are old enough to understand the meaning of these intrusions from the adult world" (page 58). There is also some sex segregation. We read, "The little girls are just beginning to 'be ashamed' in the presence of older brothers, and the prohibition that one small girl must never join a group of boys is beginning to be enforced. The fact that the boys are less burdened and so can range further afield in search of adventure, while the girls have to carry their heavy little charges with them, also makes a difference between the sexes"

(page 59). We are told that when a girl is eight or nine years old she never approaches a group of older boys. Two or three years later we find the boys becoming "shy, embarrassed, taciturn, and avoiding the society of girls in the day-time" (page 87). The "girls of noble birth are carefully guarded." For them there is not the freedom permitted to the daughters of parents of lower birth (page 100).

Although parental discipline is easy-going, we learn that on the dance floor conduct is permitted for which little boys under other circumstances "would be rebuked and possibly whipped" (page 116). Although inferiority feeling is rare in Samoa, it is not entirely absent (page 119). We read that the function of informal dancing has its chief value "in the development of individuality and the compensation for the repression of personality in other spheres of life" (page 121). The adolescent surely experiences some strain from living under the shadow of a gossip that suggests the life of an isolated rural neighborhood. "Privacy of possessions is virtually impossible. In the same way, all of an individual's acts are public property. An occasional love affair may slip through the fingers of gossip, and an occasional *moetotolo* go uncaught, but there is a very general cognisance on the part of the whole village of the activity of every single inhabitant. I shall never forget the outraged expression with which an informant told me that nobody, actually nobody at all, knew who was the father of Fa'amoana's baby. The oppressive atmosphere of the small town is all about them; in an hour children will have made a dancing song of their most secret acts. This glaring publicity is compensated for by a violent gloomy secretiveness" (page 125).

On page 137, we are told of prohibitions

that govern children which, in spite of lack of privacy or shame, create an active interest in the salacious, especially on the part of boys and men. In chapter eleven, we are introduced to some cases of adolescent conflict among the girls. There are "outbursts of wrath and summary chastisements" even if there are not "consistent and prolonged disciplinary measures" (pages 158-159). Within the family group there is also more serious conflict between young people of the same age. "The life of the only young girl or boy in a Samoan house, in the very rare cases when it occurs, is always very difficult" (page 178). These statements and others scattered through the book demonstrate that even in Samoa, childhood and adolescence bring to the individual a taste of the conflict more strongly experienced by our own youth.

No matter how simple a culture is or how near the people live to nature, adolescence brings a degree of social strain since it is the point of departure from the freedom of childhood to the responsibilities of adult life. Society cannot exist without prohibitions and obligations, and adolescence is the time when these are felt seriously. Since sex inhibitions and restrictions accompany social organization, and sex impulses become conscious in a new way at puberty, much of the adolescent strain centers about sex, but not exclusively.

In our time adolescence awakens not only new impulses that originate from sex development, but also cravings for independence and individual initiative which make the passage from childhood for many stormy in the extreme. The various forms that adolescent conflict can take are impressively brought out by Dr. William Healy and others in their clinic work for delinquent boys and girls. These studies show that the adolescent responds

to pressure that comes to the individual from many different directions. Sex is outstanding because tied to it are so many social values that the mores, as soon as they come into being, attempt to restrict and control it even in the simplest society. An example of this is the regulations that protect against incest. As society matures and grows more complicated, sex regulations multiply and generally become more restrictive. In social decay we usually find as one of the most prominent expressions of the degeneracy a new attitude regarding sex conduct and a widespread laxity.

The elimination of all social pressure along lines of sex in modern adolescent experience is impossible, because civilization cannot produce the simple conditions of savage culture along one line, even if it tries, while at the same time maintaining at other points the complexities of a highly evolved and artificial way of living. The results of the policy of savages must be estimated in its totality. What we learn from the experience of the adolescent in simpler society than our own is not methods that we can imitate with success, but the fact that we must attempt to accomplish the same elimination of strain, so far as this is possible, by policies consistent with the social values that we have inherited and developed and the complex standard that we maintain. Whatever the success of the savage in dealing with the adolescent, the cost of his program becomes too great for us to think of attempting to imitate it, since this would mean ridding ourselves of much that makes civilization possible. Childhood freedom and adolescent policy must be tested eventually by the influences they have upon the adult who must deal with the world that now is.

Adolescence cannot be made an isolated experience of one particular period in the

growth of the individual. The only escape from strain in the passage into adult responsibility is to have meager social possessions for the individual to share. It is, therefore, useless to eulogize after the fashion of Rousseau the conditions of primitive people. Progress in decreasing adolescent strain depends upon the working out of a saner group attitude, a lessening of unintelligent coercion, and a more reasonable educational training for life. In such a modern procedure it follows, of course, that sex must have special attention. Fortunately the time has come when, more than ever before, educators have the opportunity to include sex in their life-preparation program. To some extent parents also are recognizing the necessity of taking a different attitude toward sex as it shows itself from time to time in the life of their child than was taken by most fathers and mothers in the previous generation.

Evidence of the disposition among many of our young people, especially in the cities, to take advantage of their knowledge of contraception to separate satisfaction of sex desire from their effort to find a legitimate forces forward a problem the significance of which most parents do not at present appreciate. The youth who are determined to free themselves from restrictions that they hold responsible for unnecessary physical and nervous tension are beginning to find in practice the unexpected difficulties of their policy. They face life with a multiplicity of needs and they soon discover that their sex code cannot be divorced from other interests especially from that profound craving that sooner or later is felt by most of them, the urge to find someone of the opposite sex to whom they can commit themselves unreservedly for life-fellowship and with whom they may pass into the experiences of parenthood.

It is not, however, merely the youth who are being tested. Conventions and the educational policies which society enforces are under examination also. A problem has been brought into the open from which society cannot run. It cannot turn backward to the practices of simple people nor can it any longer force the individual adolescent to deal secretly and ignorantly with the energy and the cravings that are awakened with the maturing of his body and his entrance upon puberty. The period of sex taboo is at an end.

Although the great majority of parents and most social leaders appear either indifferent or insensitive to the ordeal that our adolescent in the midst of greater freedom, changing code, breaking conventions, and much sex stimulation are facing, there is nevertheless some encouragement in the prevailing conditions. For one thing, we have a better organized child study interest than ever before, and a very alert minority of mothers and fathers who do realize present difficulties and are trying to master the art of parenthood.

Prostitution, at least in its most obnoxious form, is rapidly passing. The social hygiene movement was never stronger nor better managed. Here and there we discover the faint beginnings of education for marriage and for parenthood. To the thoughtless and to those who are not quick to detect the predicament in which modern youth finds itself, courses in preparation for marriage and for parenthood naturally seem ridiculous and out of place in a college program. Youth sense the situation better and respond to the opportunity for information of which they realize their need. Indeed it is from them in several instances that the idea of such courses has originated, and they have even gone so far as to petition the college administration to provide this instruction.

These courses are significant not primarily because of the value of their content, but because they represent a new attitude toward a problem as old as human nature itself. The new approach has been born of social necessity.

The adolescent cannot be greatly helped by any program that confines itself to the college campus or the high school building. The newspaper, for example, is, in the right use of the term, an educating influence second to nothing, in the power it has to establish new ideas or buttress old ones. At present this powerful educating agency is far too often satisfied to exploit the universal interest in sex matters by opening its news columns to the most suggestive and stimulating of social occurrences, while at the same time refus-

ing to lend its aid in establishing rational attitudes with reference to sex in its various expressions; it utilizes sex scandals and shuts out the scientific treatment of sex. The newspaper, however, is not the only sinner. Men of authority along every line are trying to perpetuate the ostrich program in dealing with sex, and in so far as they are successful, are adding to the load that the youth of our time are forced to carry. In a period like ours, we may look longingly toward those of simple culture who have lighter adolescent burden, but the insight needed to construct an adequate program for our own problems must be gathered by a study of contemporary experiences and we need to recognize that adolescence as well as civilization has become complex.

THE "SCIENTIFIC-HUMAN" IN SOCIAL RESEARCH¹

HOWARD W. ODUM

TWO major problems of social research will be considered in this paper as underlying next steps in current significant progress. One is the problem of synthesis, unity, and interrelation among the various approaches and methods, and the other is the problem of inaugurating and establishing upon a firm basis the scientific method in research into human affairs. Each of these problems

presents unusual difficulties and reveals numerous aspects to be considered. At the same time the weight of our evidence indicates that neither problem has been worked out with any large degree of success, although important beginnings have been made. An examination of the general meaning, scope, and application of general science, and a similar examination with reference to the social sciences,

¹ This paper is a part of one of the twenty-four units of a general survey of the whole field, concept, methods, and problems of social research. Most of these will be published subsequently. The present discussion should be considered in the light of previous reviews of the general situation with reference to modern science, the physical and social sciences, the range and inter-relation of the social sciences and social research; the several "approaches" to the study of society in the past, such as the philosophical, the analogical, the biological, the psychological, the anthropological, the politico-juristic, the eco-

nomic, and the sociological; various "methods" such as the historical, the case, the survey, the experimental, and the statistical; and in the light of various procedures in the exploration of sources, the utilization of resources and mechanical aids and the analysis and interpretation of results. It should be viewed especially in connection with further consideration of the experimental and the statistical method, of personnel, of a final section on "social analysis and the social denominator," and of the paper by Katherine Jocher on "The Case Method" in the December *Social Forces*.

has indicated clearly a lack of any uniformity and dependability. The methods of science simply have not yet been applied to the study of human society, whether in the discovery and measurement of phenomena, in their analysis and interpretation, or in initiative and inventiveness required for the development of method and technique themselves. The characterization of the scientific-human, therefore, as a fundamental concept in method and approach is not merely an exercise in terminology or an effort toward literary phraseology. The scientific-human method and approach is in reality, for the time being, a synonym for attainable standards in social research. It is, as it were, an equivalent of the concept of a new period of coöperative socially scientific experimentation. It may be compared to an hypothesis in synthesis and methodological inventiveness. It is, for illustration, Wesley C. Mitchell's way of doing a thing, John Dewey's truth only if it is permanent and works out, Franklin H. Giddings' social theory, as theory, only if it works, Edmund Day's positive scientific work, in which the way, the truth, and the theory and the work apply to the whole field of human phenomena and social relations. It is, in other words, the problem of successful social research in whatever way attained. Some of the special considerations involved in this problem of synthesis and method include those of diversity and antagonisms in the social sciences, the appraisal of the telic character of social research and social science, the recognition and treatment of social phenomena and forces as essentially distinctive entities, the appraisal and mastery of the human factors in social research, the recognition and mastery of essential relations and differences between the physical and social sciences, the development and training of personnel ade-

quate for the problem, the adaptation and utilization of common-sense methods and mechanical means to the purposes of social research, and the mastery of the larger problems of analysis, interpretation and presentation of the products of social research through institutions, agencies, and applied disciplines. These have been examined or will be in varying degrees in other parts of this appraisal of the whole concept and process of social research.

DIVERSITY AND ANTAGONISMS

Alongside a brief analysis of the several approaches we have noted certain tendencies of the social disciplines toward coöperative research and toward agreement in general viewpoints and methodology. Actual status, however, shows great lack of agreement among the representatives of each discipline and among the several disciplines themselves. This has been observed in the approaches which tend to utilize social philosophy, social biology, social psychology, social anthropology, political science, jurisprudence, economics, sociology, human geography, in the study of society in its various aspects. Similar diversity will be found in other approaches: the scientific aspects of education, of religion, of public welfare, of social work, and of various phases of literature and "humanism." What is startlingly concrete is the fact that in no one of the social sciences does there seem to be unanimity or even general agreement concerning definition, scope, method, or objectives of its own research or concerning the appraisal of other social sciences. Alongside this diversity is found also a certain amount of antagonism, thoroughly out of accord with the scientific attitude and method. Furthermore, this status is accepted as a rather matter of fact corollary of the present stage of development of the social sciences. Appraisal of the social

sciences by the physical scientists and of the physical sciences by the social scientists shows similar diversity and lack of sympathetic understanding or of the scientific spirit. Manifestly there is here a real problem underlying the future development of science as applied to human phenomena and to the products of physical science upon human culture.

Evidence in support of this thesis will be found in various types of approach and method. Other examples to bear out the above observations are abundant in prevailing textbooks, learned periodicals and conference discussions. Citation is a matter of choice and limit. It is interesting, for instance, to note so wide a divergence of concept in so old a discipline as history. "History may be known and read of all men," suggests A. T. Olmstead,² "but its definitions and its content are still matters of earnest discussion," in support of which one need only witness vigorous writings and voluminous literature on the "new" history, on history as science, and many other current points of emphasis. Or take the subject of social psychology which Kimball Young finds it necessary to remind us is "experiencing some especial difficulties in the definition of its scope and method."³ L. L. Bernard repeats that "at whatever point we settle the limits of psychology—and we shall not be able to determine them to every one's satisfaction—our discussion clearly shows that there is no clear-cut distinction between this and neighboring sciences."⁴ And consider the tremendous range of difference between the classical political scientists' concept of politics and Floyd H. Allport's classification of it as a natural science which "makes political science and behavioristic psychology become one and the same thing."⁵ In between these extremes would be A. N. Holcombe's dictum that there is universal agreement among political thinkers that the data of politics are the acts of men, but no agreement as to the source from which the data are derived,⁶ or Allyn Young's conclusion that the behaviour of the political man may well constitute an important field

for scientific inquiry.⁷ Again, A. B. Wolf thinks that any attempt to define sociology is sure to be unsatisfactory⁸ and W. F. Ogburn expresses the same opinion when he says "Definitions of the scope of sociology are likely to be unsatisfactory, for sociology is in a formative state, and its outlines are neither stable nor definite. Most definitions of sociology are what the makers of the definitions think that sociology ought to become."⁹ Likewise John Dewey is sure that there is far from being a concensus of opinion regarding the significance for moral theory of economic anthropology¹⁰ and Franz Boas is sure that there is much grounds for dissent from the ugenist's conclusions based upon his definiteness and concepts of heredity and environment.¹¹ Even more unsatisfactory is the attempt to define the fields of the several social sciences in terms of a single term or objective. Anthropology the science of man, psychology the science of mind, economics the science of wealth, politics the science of government, sociology the science of society, biology the science of life, ethics the science of conduct, statistics the science of numbers—all these and others are unscientific when we note the range of meanings ascribed to mind, wealth, man, and the other concepts. But whether in general definitions and concepts or in concrete methodology the road to the real scientific method will be found in the diminishing antagonisms which arise from the dogmatic insistence upon scope, concept and method which are themselves still in the processive and orientating stage. For, "our work is retarded," says Allyn Young, "and our intellectual energies are dissipated in useless quarrels because of our intolerance of methods and points of view other than our own. There are only two things of which we have a right to be intolerant: first, positive errors of fact or inference; second, intolerance itself."¹²

THE TELIC CHARACTER OF SOCIAL RESEARCH

One of the first fundamental considerations basic to the scientific method in social research is the recognition and appraisal of the essentially telic nature of social science. Manifestly this is not

² "Economics as a Field of Research," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, XLII, 1-25.

³ Ogburn and Goldenweiser, *The Social Sciences and Their Interrelations*, p. 300.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 379.

⁵ *Ibid.*, ch. iii.

⁶ *Anthropology and Modern Life*.

⁷ "Economics as a Field of Research," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, XLII, 1-25.

⁸ Ogburn and Goldenweiser, *The Social Sciences and Their Interrelations*, p. 300.

² W. F. Ogburn and Alexander Goldenweiser, *The Social Sciences and their Interrelations*, ch. iv.

³ H. E. Barnes. *The History and Prospects of the Social Sciences*, p. 157.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 349.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 277.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 189.

merely a matter of superficial distinction between pure and applied science. It goes much more deeply into the organic structure of the whole of social science and the phenomena with which it deals. It has to do with the very nature of the phenomena themselves, which are determined, conditioned, and characterized often by the changing processes of social interaction, relations, and purpose. Again the "purposive" element in social research is not merely the matter of volition on the part of individuals or of the utilization of science for human betterment, but the all-inclusive process of evolution and direction of social destiny. Social science must be *science* but manifestly it must be *social* also which means that its data are found in human relationships, which in turn means variability scarcely amenable to any fixed or formal static methodology. Thus the changing processes and relations which create social phenomena in turn are controlled by the discovery and utilization of those phenomena which in turn recreate new phenomena for the social sciences. Examination of the history and development of the social sciences, in contradistinction to the development of the physical sciences will reveal essential differences between current social science and earlier efforts clearly due to the development and the increasing complexity of human society and social relationships. The physical sciences on the other hand are not faced with a changed array of physical elements nor has the scientist expected or intended to change nature. The social scientist, on the other hand, does expect that his science will be inseparably related to social development. Allport goes so far as to set up "control over social change" as one of three goals of scientific measurement,¹³ while Allyn

A. Young says that "in any complete view, the realm of the phenomena of organized society and the realm of ends are coterminous," and again "I believe that social wisdom as well as better knowledge of ways and means ought to be one of the goals of research in the social sciences."¹⁴

Various special aspects of the telic character of social research will be implied and suggested in later sections of this article while some general considerations have already been presented in our previous discussion of "The Physical and Social Sciences." There are so many angles to its presentation and so many effective illustrations of the point in question that it will be difficult to select the best samplings to state the case. Allyn A. Young in the reference above cited makes some excellent points. Assuming that every occurrence in the contemporary life of society enters into two separate sets of relations—first, a phenomenon, a scientific datum, and second, a due weight in a system of social values—, he holds "so far as the knowledge which the social sciences yield has instrumental value, it serves social ends and leads to modification of human arrangements." In similar fashion Morris R. Coben sees a unity in social science "not in the widest law of causal sequence, but in such conceptions of the ultimate social ends as will make possible a coherent science or system of judgments of human conduct."¹⁵ L. L. Bernard, estimating that the primary function of the social sciences is "to assist man in making his adjustment to his world," holds also that "the content of the social sciences is the technique, in theory and in practice, of the adjustment processes."¹⁶ And Franz Boas ventures the opinion that "a clear understanding of the principles of anthropology illuminates the processes of our own time and may show us, if we are ready to listen to its teachings, what to do and what to avoid."¹⁷ Here again, as in scores of other instances, we have not merely the dictum of applied science—we may even adhere to the spirit of "pure" science, oblivious of what is to become of its inquiries—but rather the indissoluble union of social science with social development. What society becomes depends in large measure upon what social sciences do, and what social science becomes must depend largely upon what so-

¹³ *Op. Cit.*, pp. 3, 25.

¹⁴ *The Social Sciences and Their Interrelations*, p. 447.

¹⁵ *Introduction to Social Psychology*, pp. 9, 10.

¹⁷ *Anthropology and Modern Life*, ch. 11.

¹³ Ogburn and Goldenweiser, *The Social Sciences and Their Interrelations*, p. 272.

society becomes and does—certainly a telic challenge to scientific synthesis and method.

THE SOCIAL SCIENCES DIFFERENT FROM THE PHYSICAL SCIENCES

Further aspects of the telic nature of social research and of its particular problems in synthesis and method may be seen from an examination of the essential relations and differences between the physical and the social sciences. Recent tendencies toward the closer alignment of the physical and social sciences offer one of the most striking modes of progress toward the desired research synthesis. However, certain marked limitations to the too close interrelation and organic analogy between the physical and social sciences may be often in danger of being overlooked. The problem, therefore is one of drawing upon the unity of all science—of the social and the physical—without at the same time confusing similarities, causal relationships and essential unity in law, with identity and sameness. We have noted already in a discussion of The General Analogical Approach, and in many of the other types of approach, the unscientific results and wasted efforts which come of the old organic analogies and methodologies. In so far as a similar merging of the physical and social sciences is being considered the current movement is retrogressive. But where the relations between the physical and social sciences are matters of actual basic relation and logical law and sequence the new correlations and alignments constitute an important next step. Thus social biology is essentially scientific and effective because it is built upon physical biology and its value lies in its being therefore different and not identical. Social psychology, social anthropology, social geography, are in the same category. The newer premium placed upon the physical sciences by the so-

cial sciences is almost exactly the opposite of the old organic and analogical identities. Thus conduct and behavior of human beings, in so far as they draw upon biology or anthropology for valid contributing scientific evidence, are not characterized by some metaphorical analogy between the doings of the human body, or the actions of animals from which the social sluggard must profit, but by fundamental and vital processes through which internal and external behavior patterns find their genesis and development. It comes to pass, therefore, that both strength and weakness might derive for the newer synthesis from the appraisal of the interrelation between the physical and social sciences. In the appraisal and mastery of the essential basic data of the physical sciences lie unused contributions of great importance. In the confusion of relationship and contributing elements with identity, and in the failure to recognize social phenomena as social entities, lie continued roads to failure. The road to successful achievement in social science, therefore, will be found in the recognition and mastery of essential differences between the physical sciences and the social sciences without, nevertheless, in any way discounting basic contributions and data.

Here again, samplings may be so numerous and well distributed among the various social disciplines as to make adequate selection difficult. Thus *Paul Homan* observes with some impatience, perhaps, that "the day is quite past when economics need test its scientific character by analogy to some extraneous discipline" and *Allyn A. Young* emphasizes comprehensive differences between the social and physical sciences.¹⁸ The social sciences have to be distinguished from the physical sciences, he says, "not only because the phenomena with which they deal are more complex, because their data are less exact, and because the experimental method which the more rigorous physical sciences employ is generally not

¹⁸ "Issues in Economic Theory", *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, XLII, 333-365.

available to them, but also because they encounter problems of *orientation* which are peculiar to them and from which the physical sciences are free."¹⁹ Again Professor Young cautions against unreasonable expectations from the methods of physical science: "There appear to be some who think that through research, and research alone, the social sciences might be as completely revolutionized in the course of the twentieth century as the physical sciences were during the nineteenth. As a result, we are asked to believe, society would be in command of its own destinies, in the same way that, in a sense, man is getting a better command of the forces of physical nature. Now all of this seems to me to rest upon a failure to see certain fundamental differences between the physical and social sciences, and especially upon a misapprehension of what we really mean when we speak of "controlling the processes of nature."²⁰ There is also evidence here of a paradox in the insistence of some social scientists on the methods of pure physical science and at the same time the expectation of great telic control over social nature. *Frederick Barry* makes an important distinction in noting that the methods of the social sciences "are as various as the facts with which they deal, and their organizations range from those of exact and inclusive correlation in terms of sharply definable concepts to those of loose classification or of mere description."²¹ *Morris R. Cohen* expresses the same general viewpoint when he refers to the subject matter of the social sciences as "inherently more complicated in the sense that we have more variables to deal with them in physics or biology,"²² and *John Dewey* warns against simple deductions in the midst of progress in scientific method and knowledge, advance in economic invention and control complexity of political and legal institutions, and all the other advances which complicate the whole range of human experience and variability of human phenomena.²³ *Michael Pupin* protests any tendency to sum up the world as so much matter and so much motion or as merely time and space.²⁴ *Oswald Spengler* protests a mechanical method which would collect all the works of all the dead cultures, depriving each individual piece of that instant of actualized purpose

that is its own.²⁵ *Joseph Meyer* calls attention to another distinction when he refers to the physical sciences as being based on nature's scientific building of the material universe and the social sciences as being based upon man's unscientific building of the social structure.²⁶ Another angle of the complexity of the social situation is described by Nichola Murray Butler in his view of science and society. "The scientific method is everywhere extolled and within certain limits is rigorously applied. Yet the public mind, reinforced each year by a veritable army of youth which is marched through scientific laboratories and lecture rooms, museums, and observatories, is as untouched by scientific method as if no such thing existed. Even the men of science themselves, when out of sight of their own laboratories, betray the most astounding willingness to become the victims of rumors, dogmatic assertions, and emotional appeals of every sort. The fact of the matter would seem to be that scientific training and scientific method, despite all the time and labor and money that have been lavished upon them, have thus far failed to take hold of the minds and temperaments of vast numbers of those who have been offered scientific training in greater or lesser part. Reflection on these exceptionally interesting facts prompts various queries and suggestions. Part of the difficulty may be found in the fact that science has been suffering from what may be described as a superiority complex which has prevented it from realizing its true place in the scheme of things. There is certainly no region or realm into which science does not or ought not to aim to penetrate, *on the plane in which science moves*. But that plane is, as every scholar in the field of human thinking must realize, a subordinate one."²⁷

DISTINCTIVE NATURE OF HUMAN PHENOMENA

The crux of the scientific-human method, therefore, is found in the distinctive character of human phenomena. Simple illustrations are abundant. We have already called attention to the inadequacy of the laws of biological evolution, effective as they are in the natural realm and in building up the ground-work for the study of social evolution, for the explanation of evolution on the social level. Evolution is an important principle and

¹⁹ "Economics as a Field of Research," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, XLII, 1-2.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

²¹ *Development of Scientific Thought*, p. 3.

²² Ogburn and Goldenweiser, *The Social Sciences and Their Interrelations*, p. 452.

²³ *Op. Cit.*, p. 33.

²⁴ "Our Industrialism and Idealism," *Scribners*, June 1928, pp. 659-664.

²⁵ *The Decline of the West*, p. 135.

²⁶ *The Seven Seals of Science*, p. 6.

²⁷ President's Address, 1927.

there are great gains to be derived from it for the study of human society. The comparative study of anthropoid apes is of much importance in the search for basic factors in cultural evolution and behaviour patterns. Nevertheless, man is different from the other animals and, as a scientific datum, human behaviour and human culture are different from anything else in the realm of association. As such, no matter what the interrelations and causal relationships between the social phenomena and their physical backgrounds, the problem of the social scientist is to evolve methods and technique for the explanation and mastery of these phenomena. The chemist knows that H_2SO_4 and T.N.T. are made up of certain relatively simple elements in varying combinations and relationships. He is, however, under no illusion that sulphuric acid or the super-explosive are one and the same with the simpler elements. The chemist is not inclined either to bemoan the fact that the methods for handling the simpler elements will not work for the complicated products, nor to assume that because the ones he has used on the simpler components will not work for the more complex, that therefore there are no adequate methods possible. The extremes to which the "logical" scientists sometimes go in their systems of explanation and "control" of all nature and society has often led to confusion as to the meaning of mechanistic foundations for human behaviour. Again the simple illustration—the master paintings result, of course, from physical ingredients merged and harmonized in colors and technique of form and proportion. Nothing in the physical properties, however, will help the scientists to explain fully the subjective and internal patterns through which the painted picture becomes a standard, a force, an ideal, nor will it explain the concept and the

mastery which enables the artist to achieve new standards in aesthetics. The product of art is entirely a separate entity. Likewise music may be explained through certain underlying laws of physics, and physical science may be turned into art in the contriving and manufacture of musical instruments. But the power of music upon the individual and the group, and the aptitudes and genius of the musician are on a different plane and are of a different sort. Human beings who achieve mastery in art, literature, science, or leadership, have gained distinction in some measure through the nature of their physical hygiene, food, drink, vitamines, general regimen, and yet the human products, beauty, style, love, aspiration, appetites, patterns, behaviour, are not measured and directed by the simple rules of digestion and assimilation. It is as if the politician running for office, knowing that his election must come from the actual counted votes of his constituents, should proceed simply to write down and add up the physical numbers of his constituents, regardless of the psychic and social phenomena upon which his votes are gained or lost. These and other simple illustrations might seem utterly commonplace except for the considerable vogue of the concept that social phenomena must be explained and directed by the same methods as the physical, or that because we have not been able to cope with the variables and complexity of human phenomena through the usual methods, that therefore there may not be a science of human relations. And even so we have arrived only at a restatement of our problem with nothing more definite, for instance, than the Spenglerian dictum that "a physiognomy that is precise, clear and sure of itself and its limits has never yet arisen, and it can only arise through the discoveries of method that we have yet to make.

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Herein lies the great problem for the twentieth century to solve."²⁸ As a matter of fact the thesis of this chapter is that the discovery and application of adequate scientific methods in social science is the problem of the century and must be achieved first of all by the recognition of the essential quality of human phenomena.

Speaking for the social science of economics, for instance *Paul T. Homan*, repeating the commonplace that planets are not corporations and person are not atoms and cells, reminds us that "our subject matter is human beings and the groups they form, the aims they set up, the social devices they invent, the lines of action they pursue. The subject matter is unique, and the scientific problems equally unique. Our scope, methods, and purposes . . . must be sufficiently comprehensive to provide a technique as varied as the subject matter requires."²⁹ Even the fortunes of economic theory have run the gamut of theory relative to the stability or variability of human nature. And human nature and personality come in for a large portion of the whole field of social phenomena. There is the ratio of psycho-physical structures inherited compared to the external conditioning by environment and human culture. Again, this human field includes the study of infants, of primitive folk, of cultures. Culture itself, an exclusively human product, is sometimes said to be the chief subject matter of social science. And then there are the pathological aspects of human civilization, quite distinctive from other phenomena but such as to afford a large body of scientific data and inquiry. In the make-up of our human phenomena also are the cumulative elements of tradition, learning and experience, which in turn condition both the nature of social relationships and our records of them. Indeed much of social recording has been similar to the *Spengler* concept of history. For, he says, "The countenance of history is made up of all those things which hitherto we have only managed to evaluate according to personal standards, i.e., as beneficial or harmful, good or bad, satisfactory or unsatisfactory,—political forms and economic forms, battles and arts, science and fads, mathematics and morals."³⁰ Thus again enter the problem of values and the subjective personal element in judgments, involv-

ing the human factor in the discovery, analysis and interpretation of social phenomena, as well as the very nature of the phenomena themselves.

THE HUMAN FACTOR IN SOCIAL RESEARCH

From time to time we have noted two distinctive problems of social research as found in the mastery of the scientific method and of the human factor in research itself. Not only are social phenomena essentially distinctive because of their human quality, but their discovery, analysis and interpretation are dependent upon the human factor in an entirely different way from what they are in the physical sciences. Search for physical phenomena and interpretations of their meanings are not dependent upon other physical phenomena. The distinguished physicist in his laboratory is not tempted to change his results or to combat the facts of his laboratory because he desires them to be otherwise. And yet this is substantially what happens in the case of the human science specialist looking for human data. The methodology of the social scientist must therefore take into account not only the various differences between the physical and social sciences already noted, but must comprehend a technique which will include the mastery of the human factors in social research as well. Progress in general methodology appears to be more rapid and substantial than advance dealing with methods of overcoming the human factors and limitations. These factors appear in the prejudice of the investigator, on the one hand, and of those who give information and those who receive and interpret the results of social research, on the other. On the part of the investigator his results are conditioned by his prejudices or limitations in finding out the truth, in analyzing it, in interpreting it, and in presenting the final results. The investigator may

²⁸ *The Decline of the West*, p. 105.

²⁹ "Issues in Economic Theory," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, XLII, 364.

³⁰ *Op. Cit.*, p. 101.

find what he is looking for only, or partially; he may classify his results according to preconceived arrangement, he may interpret them according to his wishes, and may present his findings, even if unknowingly, as rationalized products. On the other hand, the presentation of results are hedged about by similar limitations. The public sees and interprets what it wants to see or what its traditions and prejudices dictate. Individuals and universities as well as other institutions are frequently afraid to set forth the truth in many vital social matters. On the other hand professors are dogmatic and impatient, becoming unscientific in their methods of combatting the unscientific. It is a mixed situation in which a growing complexity of material civilization at the same time augments the human and cultural factors. James Harvey Robinson thinks that "the social sciences are in somewhat the same situation in which the natural sciences found themselves three hundred years ago in the days of Francis Bacon, Galileo and Descartes. They have to emancipate themselves from academic tradition and popular prejudices which suspect and resent any fair statement of the actual terms of human life."³¹

Perhaps no better illustration of the human factor reflecting its potency and limitations in social issues could be found than the facility with which eminent scientists and scholars could join current hymns of hate during the world war. Illustrations, however, are as numerous as examples of social research. *Stuart Rice* has analyzed the various types of human bias in an unusually comprehensive way. He finds three major kinds under each of which are various manifestations and forms. First there is the individual bias "associated with the training, temperament, social status, and social affiliations of the investigator." Among the various aspects of this individual bias are those associated with impressions and experiences of early childhood; with the transition of

the individual from one environment to another; with intimate personal experiences, such as sex and religion; with the age period of the investigator; and with various other influences in the investigator's life, such as public criticism of his work, or acceptance of his theories. The second major type of bias he lists as "bias due to unconscious or conscious pressure of particular social interests, economic, religious, political, class." And among the most important of these are political bias, with various aspects of opposition or approval of an existing order; the same in economic bias, with scores of manifestations; religious bias with perhaps equally as many phases; together with various forms of ethical bias; and professional bias in abundance. The third major type of bias is that "due to prevailing ethos of the community or the age," such as influenced by institutional character, emotional crises, contemporary civilization, and culture epochs. Illustration and analysis of Professor Rice's classifications will serve to state the case in ample proportions. Our task is to undertake the working out of the problem, one avenue of which will be the training of personnel, a topic which we take up in the next chapter. Other aspects have to do with the balancing of special method with common sense adaptation and development of new approaches.

REQUISITE METHOD FOR SCIENTIFIC-HUMAN RESEARCH

It is clear that we face a double paradox in the present trends of social research as well as in its present and future needs. It is a paradox perhaps as inevitable as it may be wholesome, if it leads to the later synthesis and integration of social research methods and scope. The paradox is one in which newer emphasis and premium are being placed upon methodology in the social sciences at the same time that there is impatience with mere narrow and static methodology composed of extraneous terminology and objectivity. If the chief emphasis is to be placed upon scientific method, then all social data and phenomena must at least somehow be reduced to the social or human denominator so that the methodology will in reality be scientific. If on the other hand, the humanistic emphasis is to be in the

³¹ *Mind in the Making.*

foreground there must be such standards of objectivity and quantitative measurement as will eliminate the "wishful thinking," deductive rationalizations, and subjective generalizations so easy and so common to the pseudo-scientific mode in the social sciences. There is much in each of the approaches and methods available for synthetic social science; there is in the broadening synthesis of social research ample opportunity for concrete and specific inquiry through special techniques. And in the composite challenge of the social sciences *successfully to do scientific research* in whatever way will best yield results, there is time and opportunity for inventiveness and initiative in the discovery and development of new methods yet to be determined. There is a growing tendency in this period of expansion to allow a wide range of freedom and experimentation in all branches of social research, with emphasis upon broad preparation, concrete experimentation, ample support, and especially upon the development of personnel in both numbers and quality to justify expectations of results. Thus Allyn Young urges "emphasis upon the quality and promise of the investigator and let us be careful not to hamper him by prescribing too narrowly just what he shall do and how he shall do it." And again, in contradistinction to this general search for method and results at the same time he protests "against the fruitless quarrels of the methodological sects, against their intolerance, and against their pretensions of exclusive possession of the only right points of view and the only effective methods of research. We ought to welcome sound work in the field of economics whatever its orientation and whatever method or technique it employs."³² Other men like

Charles H. Cooley have pointed out major contributions in the past in the several social sciences and have called attention to the fact that results and not method were the outstanding features both of the original objectives and the actual procedure. Undoubtedly one of the larger contributions which the sociological approach is making, is that of emphasis upon scientific method, yet Sydnor H. Walker notes, from considerable summarizing of opinions, that "Sociology is charged with spending its energies in seeking status by the development of paraphernalia of a science rather than by shedding light on social problems."³³ From the viewpoint of this volume this would appear a part of the substance of prevailing limitations of other approaches as well.

Wesley C. Mitchell has best stated the problem of method as it appears in this paradox of demand for method, and yet more method, alongside protestation of too much methodology as an end in itself. Interpreting in a general way the term method as a "way of doing something" and scientific methods as "ways by which specific individuals or specific groups of specific individuals endeavor to throw light upon specific problems of discovery," he emphasizes a number of corollaries to the concept. The first is that discussions of method at large are vain unless due distinctions be made between method and technique. The second corollary is that even though a scientific problem be defined definitely there is no one best method of working on that problem. A third is that the method of attack must be adapted to the materials available and pertinent to the problem. The fourth corollary is that changes in method and materials keep reacting upon the formulation of the problem. Still another point was that affirmation, nevertheless, concerning a method is more likely to be valuable than a negation, unless the affirmation is at the expense of another method in the same field. Finally, Professor Mitchell thinks that "we seldom if ever are justified in talking about 'the' scientific method. It is wiser for us to talk about scientific methods."

³² *Op. Cit.*, pp. 11-12.
³³ *Social Work and the Training of Social Workers*, p. 181.

And this concept with its six corollaries, again, just about states the case.²⁴

PRESENT TRENDS

These varied statements of the problem of the scientific-human method of social research, with particular emphasis perhaps upon the difficulties and limitations, is in no sense intended to record only negative phases of the problem and its present status. This entire volume is an exercise in the examination of progress from earlier and more limited stages to later and more effective and scientific stages of social study and social research. Throughout the book our concept of scientific method has been a broad one, interpreted perhaps as a synthesis which includes the generic scientific attitude of mind, in the specific individual and in the group, plus habituation and facility in the intellectual process and orientation, plus all scientific "methods" and "tools" available, plus resources in men and money, and plus adequate training of personnel. This, it is apparent, excludes any concept which insists upon any one method as all exclusive, or which refuses to give attention to any and all methods available for specific purposes and fields. In the review of the situation there are important trends which seem to move rapidly toward the broader and more effective scientific human social research. In the general approaches, for instance, there has been definite and very marked progress from the philosophical to the scientific, from metaphysical deduction to scientific induction and deduction. In the general methodology there has been progress from the older analogical and physical methods to broader scientific methodology, and specifically through the newer avenues as the case, survey, experimental,

historical and statistical methods, all of which have become more and more effective tools for the scientific-human method and approach. The very greatly increased emphasis upon personality, human nature, human behaviour and human cultures has turned all disciplines, approaches and methods alike into the fuller recognition and treatment of real social phenomena. All of these objectives and modes of procedure have contributed to a new alignment and synthesis on the part of the social sciences. Out of this synthesis there appear three distinctive measures of progress toward the scientific-human concept. Two of these have already been emphasized. One was in the discussion of the contrast between present-day emphasis upon the physical sciences as contributory to the social sciences as opposed to the earlier analogical interrelation. The other was in the discussion of the contrast between current progressive emphasis upon scientific method as concrete, varied, and all inclusive, as opposed to the older analogical claim for scientific validity. The third point is the newer emphasis and keynote in modern social theory, in which real workable social theory is set up in contrast to the old theorizings about society in its organic aspects. Perhaps this modern demand for real theory, in the sense of synthesis—syn-theory—in all the social sciences is the keynote to the next steps. For here are demands for scientific principles and factual bases upon which theory of society and its problems may be so worked out as to serve as working blue prints rather than mere idealistic and pictorial elevations of utopian society. This new theory, equally applicable to all the social sciences, must be based upon data gained from actual measurement, and upon synthesis which investigates and builds upon the whole of society. In this demand for

²⁴ From unpublished lectures.

theory, strangely enough, is found the most practical of all modern aspects of social science, practical in that it knows society well enough in all its phases to pass judgment upon it and to orient itself to developing human culture and human problems. That is, the emphasis and trend is upon the "problem" not in any moral or ethical sense, but in the scientific or research interpretation of the problem-unit of work and control. And when the chief emphasis is upon the social problem and its component parts, the method and procedure inevitably conform more to the needs of actual society than to those of any discipline or theoretically imagined concept of social relationships as an organismic entity. Such a scientific-human method and approach will therefore be adequate to envisage and study society as a whole but at the same time to attack any and all of its concrete manifestations and problems as well. It will be adequate to study society in its normal development but it must also be adequate to detect and analyze its abnormal and pathological aspects, human products of the increasing complexity of society. Herein lies specialism, synthesis, telic character, scientific validity of the new social research, dependent yet, however, upon the development of adequate personnel, the common sense application of all methods, and the adequate support of society and its agencies.

APPLIED TO SPECIAL SOCIAL PROBLEMS

The test of any method and approach is, of course, whether it works or not. The immediate means of testing the successful working of scientific method in social research will be found in concrete problems and examples in the whole field. Samplings from the field, however, are excellently illustrated in the special problems utilized for illustration in this vol-

ume. Take the first, for instance, that of population which we have shown to involve many types of approach and method. What are the human implications and human factors involved? How does it differ from a problem in the physical sciences? Is the search for data on birth control, for instance, easily directed into purely scientific and objective channels in the midst of traditions, religious sanctions, inherited beliefs, and many other human factors? Are there pure economic factors, or legal, or moral or human? In eugenic experimentation, is it possible to make the same sort of studies and experimentation in human stocks and behaviour as those made by Yerkes and Kohler with anthropoid apes? What are the legal obstacles, the limitations of public opinion, of family relationships, of financial costs and many others? And of interracial admixture, of immigration, of marriage and divorce, the size and standard of families and classes, and many other phases of the interrelated problem of population and family—just what are the problems of technique and method necessary to make really scientific studies? Or take the problem of war: what were the human factors involved in the hymn of hate and in the vast and complex interrelations of many factors in the genesis and end of the great war? Why did the social scientists, although aiding the physical scientists in winning the war, find little social phenomena and develop little methodology within their own fields? Does anyone even suggest that most of the ordinary problems of international relations and of conflicts are being studied in any merely naturally scientific way? And yet the test of social science may well be found in this particular social problem. Finally, the problems of regional research, in any region, but particularly in the southern region selected for one of our illus-

trations, offer an unexcelled example of the challenge to the scientific-human method. For what progress will the "timeless" and "spaceless" methodology of the physicist make in the study of southern mass politics or leadership or mob action or traditional culture or humanistic loyalties? Who will agree that the southern student, trained and nurtured in the southern culture only, can make a scientific study of the negro? Or the same of the student regionally and culturally accli-

mated in the New England states? And so for the more than one hundred and fifty type problems listed in another connection: they demonstrate the type of social problem in which the distinctively human challenge is dominant. And especially they challenge the social scientists to train personnel in adequate numbers and with requisite background and technical equipment to attack the regional problem with good effect—which in fact is not the case now.

NOTES ON "TIMELESS" SOCIOLOGY A DISCUSSION

FREDERICK J. TEGGART

THE article on "Social Change and Social Science," in the September issue of *SOCIAL FORCES*, reasserts a conception of the aim of social investigation which calls for serious consideration. Professor House says: "The ambition of those who hope to see a natural science, or an abstract science, of society develop" is to account for social phenomena "in terms of universal, timeless forces and processes," or in terms of "*timeless*, un-historical generalizations concerning social processes and social forces" (page 13). He fortifies his position by pointing out that "The theory of natural selection may be so stated that it holds good quite independently of circumstances of time and place," and adds that "In so far as the Darwinian hypothesis is a generalized description of a type of process . . . its non-historical quality is apparent" (page 15).

The first comment I would make with reference to this ambition is that the methodological difficulties which have thrust themselves so insistently of late

upon the attention of students in the social sciences have their source and origin in the assumption that the procedure of 'physics' represents, in some exclusive manner, the method of science. The second comment is that if we are to arrive at a 'science' of man or of society we must be prepared to conduct our researches without committing ourselves—in advance—to ideals and objectives which have proved useful in other fields of investigation.

Professor House appears to agree with me that the aim of social inquiry is to discover 'how things work' in the world of social phenomena. Here, however, the agreement ends. For my part, I think that if we are to achieve 'scientific' results we must start from the examination of actual data. He replies that we should start by assuming—in advance—that there are 'timeless' processes, borrowing this conception from the physical and biological sciences. My rejoinder is that the aspiration to imitate the procedure of the 'natural' sciences, and to discover 'timeless' processes, has dominated the activi-

ties of social scientists from the time of Plato and Aristotle down to the present, with the result, expressed by Professor House in the despairing conclusion, that "the problem of 'methodology' is 'eternal'" (page 17).

Since Professor House leaves the reader to his own resources in conjuring for himself the vision of a 'timeless' process, it may be well to bring this conception into relation with a specific illustration. The aim of the physiologist is to arrive at a knowledge of "all the processes, physical, chemical, and physicochemical, that go on in what we call living matter while it is typically alive and while going through the stages that lead to death." The aim of the student of human physiology is to achieve a description of the functioning of '*the human body*', by examination and comparison of a very large number of actual human bodies. The description is given, however, without reference to any actual body; it represents the current conception of 'the way things work' in a 'normal,' 'abstract,' or 'ideal' human body. This picture of 'natural' or 'normal' functioning is of value in that it provides the medical practitioner with a 'standard of reference.' Similarly, the physiologist provides a description, an 'ideal' picture or standard of reference, of the 'slow, gradual, and continuous' change which the body undergoes in the course of human life. The results arrived at are 'timeless'; they are 'true' irrespective of time and place. 'Timeless' processes, such as are arrived at in physiology, are descriptions of 'the way things work'—if nothing interferes; and, 'natural' science, in general, is concerned with the investigation of the way things work, under controlled conditions, i.e., when they are not interfered with. The first law of motion states that "Every body continues in its state of rest or of uniform motion in a straight line,

except in so far as it is compelled by the action of force to change this state." It is this un-interfered-with working that is 'un-historical.'

As students of man and of society, however, we are compelled to face an historical world, a world in which every fact has reference to a specific time and place. The question arises, therefore, as to how our efforts have been directed in the investigation of this world, in which 'interferences' play a conspicuous part. In order to answer this question it is necessary to go back to the Greeks. Plato and Aristotle were likewise faced with an historical world, but they held the view, expressed by the latter, that 'science' can do nothing with the 'accidental' or 'historical' aspect of things. How, then, did they proceed? They applied the procedure of physiology to the study of society by making the assumption that society or the state was a living being. On this basis, they undertook to describe '*the state*'—the 'ideal' republic—as a standard of reference for the statesman, who was envisaged as the physician of the 'body politic.' Further, they undertook to describe the 'natural' course of change in the life-history of '*the state*.' In other words, they provided, as they thought, the same sort of knowledge for the statesman that the physiologist provides for the medical practitioner, on the assumption that the '*state*' was a biological entity.

All this is well known, and the method employed is, substantially, that of the social sciences at the present moment. The ambition of Professor House to see a 'natural' or an 'abstract' science of society develop has been entertained by many others. There is an important aspect of the situation, however, which merits attention. The descriptions provided in any handbook of physiology have been arrived at by the examination and com-

parison of a vast number of actual bodies. Has the procedure of examination and comparison been followed in modern social science? Does Professor House propose to emulate Aristotle by comparing hundreds of actual societies, *and their histories*, for the purpose of arriving at a description of '*the state*' or '*society*', in the abstract, its constitution, its course of development, its pathology? If Professor House will admit the necessity of comparing societies and their histories in order to discover '*processes*' he will have accepted an essential element in my point of view.

Let us keep in mind this idea of the comparison of different societies and their histories. With what aim or object is the study to be carried on? Professor House says his ambition will be to discover '*timeless*' processes, meaning thereby '*physiological*' processes which are assumed to be everywhere and always at work in the living organism of '*society*'. My comment on this proposal is that it represents the program of inquiry which has created for the social sciences the difficulties which confront them at the present time. If, on the other hand, we are willing to follow Plato and Aristotle in comparing societies and their histories, but without committing ourselves to a reliance upon analogy, and without assuming that we know—in advance—the character of the results we are to find, the way will be open for new and important discoveries.

Should Professor House engage himself in the latter type of '*comparative*' study (which has nothing in common with the '*comparative method*') he would find himself occupied with actual human groups, carrying on the actual affairs of life, and subjected frequently in their history to actual '*interferences*'. He would find no opportunity to employ in his work analogies derived from other scientific fields. He would, however,

discover that, by means of the comparison of different societies, it was possible to make inductions, or inferences, in regard to '*the way things work*' to produce the results which we have before us in the present. These inductions would hardly be '*timeless*' in their acceptance (for the results of scientific work are always subject to revision), and so it would scarcely be worth while to discuss—in advance—whether they represented '*timeless*' realities.

I have said that we must be prepared to pursue our own researches independently, and without appeal to authority, precedent, or analogy. The dangers of any other course are exemplified in Professor House's appeal to Darwin's theory of natural selection. His statement that the "*non-historical quality*" of the theory is "*apparent*" simplifies matters. If, however, Professor House had followed the argument of the chapter on "*The Study of Evolution*," in the book to which he refers, he would have discovered that the "*non-historical*" character of Darwin's theory arises from the fact that, in framing his theory, the author of the *Origin of Species* excluded '*historical*' time and historical events from consideration. The procedure followed by Darwin has itself a long history, which no one has taken the trouble to trace, but which leads back to the ideas of the Greeks in which the procedure of the social sciences also had its origin.

Professor House is confident that he knows what "*was really, in fact, the way in which modern social science started*" (page 12); a general reference to "*the increase of commerce and communication*" is not, however, a satisfactory account of the process. He advocates "*background studies*"—so do I; but the particular kind of background study required by a *methodologist* is an intimate acquaintance with

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the *history* of the guiding conceptions and preconceptions in the field of his special interest. The problem of 'methodology' must remain 'eternal' until students of the social sciences discover certain facts: first, that they cannot rely upon any one but themselves; second, that they cannot

understand the present situation in methodological discussion without a study of the history of ideas; third, that they cannot create a 'science' of society by reiterating their adherence to assumptions which have proved a barrier to the furtherance of such a science in the past.

A REJOINDER

FLOYD N. HOUSE

It is not quite clear to me, after reading Professor Teggart's comment on my article several times, to what extent he proposes to join issue on what I conceive to be the most fundamental question involved, namely, the possibility and desirability of formulating, with reference to human social phenomena, generalized descriptions like the physiologists' description of the functioning of *the* human body, which he so aptly uses as an illustration. It was no part of my intention to defend the use of physical or physiological analogies in social science, other than that most general analogy, if it is to be called an analogy, which consists in making the assumption that the social scientist, like the physicist and the physiologist, may legitimately hope and strive to formulate descriptions of the way things work if nothing interferes. When this has been done, we may perhaps be able in turn to describe in general terms the types of "interferences" which play a conspicuous part in this world. To what extent generalizations of either sort have been attained up to now is another question.

I quite agree with Professor Teggart regarding the desirability, even the necessity, of comparing different societies and their histories in order to discover processes. It seems to me, however, that a

type of insight into natural process is gained by the intensive study of single cases—guided and checked no doubt, even though subconsciously, by the general knowledge of other, more or less comparable, cases which the investigator may have.

As to the desirability of studying the history of ideas in order to gain an understanding of present problems of "methodology" I may be permitted to call attention to the fact that my paper was written as a part of the conclusion of a moderately extended survey of just that field. My own ideas of fundamental methodology in social science have been clarified somewhat, however, by reading passages in an interesting monograph to which I had access only after the paper under discussion was written.

There are . . . no short cuts to knowledge, and historical inquiry, which may prove more arduous in the long run than its obvious interest would suggest, has suffered from the neglect of inquiries that have been found necessary in other fields. How far history is from making use of the recognized methods of scientific investigation may be inferred from its current dictum that historical scholarship must confine itself at present to the collection of facts, so that from these, in an undefined future, the "laws" of history may be formulated. It may be true that every science starts from a basis of ascertained fact and looks to the discovery of "laws" as the goal of its endeavors, but it is a commonplace of modern science that the collection of

facts does not of itself lead to the discovery of "laws."

The procedure now advocated by historians—namely, that we should investigate the past with our minds a perfect blank as to what we wish to know or what we may expect to find—was formulated by Francis Bacon. "Men," he said, should bid themselves for a while renounce conceptions, and begin to make acquaintance with things themselves." Bacon himself, however, failed absolutely in attempting to apply his own method, the value of which may be estimated historically by the fact that it has not been followed by any one of the great masters of science.

The actual method of science is based on the fact that "it is only when we approach Nature with a question that we can expect to get an answer. Only those who seek, find. And seeking, as opposed to rummaging, consists of a series of guesses." "Nature gives no reply to a general inquiry—she must be interrogated by questions which already contain the answer she is to give; in other words, the observer can only observe that which he is led by hypothesis

to look for; the experimenter can only obtain the result which his experiment is designed to obtain."

I quote the foregoing passages from Professor Teggart's *Prolegomena to History* (University of California, 1916), pages 159-60 and 162-63. What they suggest to me is that the social sciences must be guided in their researches by some assumptions, even if it be true that social scientists must be cautious about adopting the assumptions of the physical and biological sciences. Undoubtedly it is the business of the social sciences to make the data of experience intelligible. This does not necessarily imply without qualifications, however, that "we must start from the examination of actual data." The observer must be guided by hypothesis if his observations are to be fruitful.

The June 1929 issue of *SOCIAL FORCES* will have as its central theme the relationship between sociology and social work and the application of scientific principles to social work. Contributed articles will include "Some Contributions of Sociology to Social Work" by Earle E. Eubank; "A Sociological Analysis of the Contents of 2000 Social Case Records with Special Reference to the Treatment of Family Discord" by Ernest R. Mowrer; "A Study of Social Case Work Interviews" by Joanna C. Colcord; "A Sociological Study of Parole" by Ernest W. Burgess; with discussions of these papers by prominent sociologists and social workers. Dr. M. J. Karpf, Chairman of the section on Sociology and Social Work of the American Sociological Society, is getting the papers together and preparing them for publication. Among the departmental contributions will be an analysis of the attendance of the National Conference of Social Work by Howard R. Knight and Mary L. Mark.

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TEACHING AND RESEARCH IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

Contributions to this Department will include material of three kinds: (1) original discussion, suggestion, plans, programs, and theories; (2) reports of special projects, working programs, conferences and meetings, and progress in any distinctive aspect of the field; (3) special results of study and research.

ARE SOCIAL STUDIES SCIENCES?

WITT BOWDEN

I

THE method of science is obviously not confined to physics, astronomy, biology, and similar studies dealing with nature. It is not even a monopoly of scholars, but is the common property—the great communal wealth—of our modern world. But science is more than method. Underlying the work of the natural scientists is the conception of law in nature. The outstanding objective of scientific method in the study of nature has been the discovery of natural laws, as the Newtonian laws of gravitation, the Mendelian laws of inheritance, the laws of mechanics. It is on the basis of man's understanding of the laws of nature that the modern superstructure of technique and power has been built.

It is now realized that this vast superstructure is not impregnable. Talk about "the next war" centers around the possibility of the destruction of civilization by the technique which is the outstanding feature of that civilization. Nor is peace without its menace. "The decline of the west," "the decay of capitalist civilization," "the menace of the underman," "the new slavery"—such phrases, used by men of widely varying views, are so many indications of a fundamental failure

to articulate the advances in knowledge of natural laws and power of technique with human factors and human needs.

Why this failure? It is because our humanistic studies are only in part scientific in method and hardly at all scientific in objective. In our knowledge of our environment we are civilized; in our knowledge of ourselves we are still primitive. In our attitude toward others of our kind, we are egocentric. The Hebrews were the chosen people, Jerusalem was the earth's navel, and the earth was the center of the universe. The people of a certain American city are supposed to view it as the hub of the universe. All roads lead to our particular Rome. In our view of nature, we are more than egocentric. We like to think of ourselves as at the center of the universe, and yet as standing quite apart from nature. Whatever we will is law. Our environment, on the other hand, appears to us to be proceeding in an immutable succession of day and night, astral motion, seasons and tides. Thus arose the conception of nature as a realm of law and of man as a law unto himself.

Whenever the opposing idea that man and nature are not twain but one is advanced, there are curious diversities of opinion. At one extreme there are those

who, viewing their high estate as only a little lower than the angels, are horrified by the suggestion that they are one with atom, amoeba and ape. At the other extreme, there are devotees of evolutionary science who go beyond the doctrine of organic evolution, accepted by nearly every one, and to whom a doubt as to the psychic as well as physical unity of man and nature is an absurdity. Others, in our age of rapid tempo, when not the rules of the game but the game's the thing, when action is life and when thought if not directly connected with the work in hand is likely to be a burden, are inclined to dismiss the idea with a gesture of disdain: what difference does it make?

But it does make a difference. Of all questions this, concerning man's place in nature, is perhaps the profoundest, in practical importance as well as in philosophical interest. If it is true that nature is a realm of law, and if it turns out that man, after all, is one with atom and amoeba, then we have the inescapable and tremendously important conclusion that natural law includes man and his behavior, in a sense quite different from what is indicated by the common idea that we should "obey" the laws of nature. There follows from this the further conclusion that history, psychology, ethics, and all of the social studies, no less than astronomy, physics, and biology, and the other so-called natural sciences, should have as their main objective the quest for natural law.

The major premise, then, is that nature is a realm of law; and the minor premise is that man is a part of nature. The question resolves itself into an examination of these premises.

II

Is our environment in reality one of natural law? Earthquake, fire and flood,

and even the ordinary happenings of nature, were to our primitive ancestors the sporadic and willful manifestations of superior powers whom they sought to conciliate. To the more sophisticated view of many moderns, nature is a realm of blind chance and lawless energy, with accidental and transitory lapses, one might say, into a semblance of order. The earth, the sun, the solar system, are supposed to have emerged from planetary nebulae, and some day (any day in terms of astral time) they may be swallowed up in what would seem to man merely planetary chaos. The individual beast or atom often seems to be the sport of random forces or chance events. Is nature in reality orderly? Is it not to the contrary fickle and chaotic?

But men generally have been inclined to see an orderly meaning in nature. A theological view in one form or another has explained nature as the more or less orderly work of purposeful Beings. God and Satan, in the innumerable forms they have assumed in men's minds, have served as antidotes for what would otherwise have been a state of anarchy and confusion in human thought. The idea of God has of course often been made a substitute for knowledge of nature. An institutionalized God has indeed been made the basis of vested interests which have sometimes opposed the extension of knowledge. Theology has never attained to a comprehensive conception of natural law. Such a conception is the creation of modern science.

The scientist observes the individual beast and atom and what appears to be the random force and the chance event, and finds, or thinks he finds, that in them and in all the realm of nature there is regularity or law. Planetary evolution, sidereal motion, the succession of the seasons, wind and tide, the ebb and flow

of organic life, even such seemingly irregular and disorderly cataclysms as earthquakes and volcanic eruptions—all the major phenomena of nature he seeks to explain in terms of law. Even the lesser phenomena which, from the point of view of individual beast or atom, seem to be capricious or in the hands of chance, take their places, according to the scientist, in a world of nature of which law is an intrinsic attribute.

The concept of law as developed by the various scientific advances does not, in the scientific sense, go beyond nature as it comes within our observation. The universe as we see it appears to have fashioned and to be fashioning itself by virtue of its own intrinsic character; the drama of nature appears to be its inherent activity; the book of nature is its autobiography implicit in the cosmic processes. Thus to scientific observation, nature is self-contained; the laws of nature are the orderly ways in which nature finds self-expression; phenomenal nature is the complement of noumenal nature. Of course the scientist as well as the theologian may believe that there is an ultimate theistic coördination of natural processes paralleling them or immanent in them. But modern theological faith, like modern scientific faith, tends decidedly toward a conception of the "God of the machine," of the director of the "drama," as a law-abiding, not a law-breaking, miracle-performing God. "The hands of the living God are the laws of nature." The laws of nature are not man-made (except in so far as man may be assumed to be an effective part of nature), they are man-explained. Man's explanation is only in part coherent, but it is increasingly coherent. The fact that man is able to think of nature in coherent terms is itself an indication of the orderly, one might figuratively say, the rational, character of nature.

In a word, scientific advance has been compounded of an inductive study of nature in its various manifestations and activities and of a deductive formulation of inductive data in the form of generalizations. These generalizations, in so far as they can be shown to "work," are called the laws of nature.

But "nature," or the "universe," is a short-cut term. Of what does it consist as it comes within man's scientific view? It is commonly thought of in terms of matter and energy. At one time, energy, as heat or light, was described in terms of so-called "imponderables." Heat, for instance, according to such chemists as the great Priestly, was thought to consist of some undiscovered element. To the ancient Greeks, fire was one of the four basic elements. But modern chemistry buried the imponderables of energy, and after the demise of the theory of imponderables, science postulated a sort of dualism of matter and energy. Energy came to be viewed as a condition associated with matter, a process or activity paralleling material structures. In studying the complex atomic and molecular constitution of things, this dualistic hypothesis proved for practical purposes to be a working basis of great value in the extension of knowledge.

But recent physico-chemical science has gone into the atom and discovered therein the electron and the proton. Scientists are now seriously contemplating the hypothesis of the ultimate unity of the constitution of matter-energy. In atomic and molecular combinations, as distinguished from the ultimate electronic state, the static and substantive phase is termed matter and the dynamic and attributive phase is termed energy. But whether the conception is dual or unitary, matter is not dissociated from energy or energy from matter. There is continuity; there is law. On the basis of the dual

conception, most significant extensions of man's knowledge of the universe as a realm of law were made. But with the entry of science into the atom and the consequent development of the unitary view, these earlier extensions of knowledge bid fair to be dwarfed into relative insignificance.

Scientific knowledge remains fragmentary, but science assumes that all of nature is in reality a realm of law. Scientific advance is indeed inseparable from the concept of natural law.

III

But what shall we say concerning man's relation to nature? Man is supposed to "obey" the laws of nature, but the question goes much deeper. Are individuals and human societies integral parts of nature, or are they separate and distinct therefrom? Between man and nature, is there continuity or disjunction? Let us view the question in historical perspective.

The idea of natural law emerged in antiquity, especially among the Greeks, but ancient scientific knowledge was largely confined to mathematics. Between the founding of mathematics by the Greeks and the establishment of astronomy by Copernicus, Galileo, Kepler and Newton, there lies a gap of more than a thousand years. The basic fact in the work of these astronomers was the formulation of natural laws pertaining to the planetary system, and the acceptance of the general idea of law in respect to nature as a whole. The development of this conception in fields other than astronomy occurred first in physics and somewhat later in chemistry.

Astronomy, physics and chemistry came into conflict with traditional views at many points, particularly in displacing the earth as the center of the universe,

and in explaining many of the activities of nature in terms of law, thus tending to discredit cherished ideas as to the sphere of the miraculous and the supernatural. But these sciences dealt not with man, not even with life in its lower forms primarily, but rather with planets, atoms and molecules, and impersonal force or energy. Reinterpretations and compromises were therefore effected with relative ease (though science has its roll of martyrs). But in the nineteenth century men turned their attention increasingly to data concerning the age and history of the earth and the origins and development of living forms, including man. Thus was begun a new era in the history of the conception of natural law, inaugurating a conflict of ideas which is the outstanding fact of the thought of our own time. Upon the outcome depend the profoundest of issues in philosophy, in ethics and the other social studies, in the whole range of thought and institutions.

The geologists, observing such facts as the existence of sea fossils on mountain tops and a gradation of fossil forms from the simplest to the highest in successive layers of the earth's crust, began to formulate views of the age of the earth and of the processes of its development which obviously contradicted long-cherished views and biblical chronology. Biologists, using the evidence of fossils and various other data, formulated the great generalizations which are the foundation stones of the modern science of biology, and chiefly the cell theory and the doctrine of evolution. Thus the scientist extended the conception of natural law not only to planets, atoms and molecules and the activities of inanimate nature, but as well to the realm of life, including man himself. With the general acceptance of the doctrine of evolution, many adherents of the older views were seized

with consternation. But after all, Darwinian evolution was basically organic evolution. It was believed that the profane hands of the scientist could reach no farther than the physical organism. The psychic life was to be a last secure stronghold of the egocentric view of man apart from nature and a law unto himself. Now comes the psychologist to contest that realm also.

We commonly say that man is partly physical, partly psychic in his attributes. Since the general acceptance of the doctrine of evolution, man is recognized, on the organic side, as being the outgrowth of a single-celled organism. Man, physically, is continuous with organic life as a whole.

Furthermore, it now appears that the former rigorous distinctions between the living and the not-living can no longer be maintained. The simpler living forms are on the border line, and the border line itself is almost indistinguishable. The elements of living substances have been analyzed; and theoretically, chemical synthesis of living matter is possible. The compounds, however, are so intricate and unstable that as yet the synthetic process has not been actually carried out. The original transitions from the not-living to the living, during an earlier geologic epoch, are assumed to have occurred as natural processes, not by external fiat or "special creation."

That is to say, there is continuity in the organic world of man and of lesser forms, and likewise, there is continuity between organic and inorganic forms of matter. Man, physically, is a part of the larger world of nature, which is in turn assumed to be a world of law.

Is man psychically distinct in essence from his organism and from the rest of nature? Or is he in this respect also a part of the larger world of nature? To put

the question in its proper relations, we should recapitulate the previous discussion. In the universe of matter and energy, or of matter-energy, there is continuity, and there are laws in accord with which the phenomena of nature occur. Man himself as a physical organism is part of the larger world of nature. Up to this point, continuity and law prevail. Do they here cease? A popular view would have it that there is no all-embracing continuity. Medieval theologians drew the line at one place; successive advances in science have put it successively at different places. Should we consider the last advance of the continuity hypothesis as having been made? Should we draw a line between man's physical organism and all other forms of matter and energy or matter-energy on the one hand, and the psychic life of the ego on the other hand?

In the discussion of the world of nature as a world of law, it was pointed out that science once assumed a kind of dualism of matter and energy. Matter was viewed as the static, substantive side and energy as the dynamic, attributive side of the dualism. On the basis of this conception, the study of the nature of matter and energy and of the relations between them led to rapid scientific advances in the realm of organic as well as of inorganic matter and energy.

These advances at length embraced the human organism, and there was a progressive accumulation of scientific knowledge alike of the structural nature and the functional activities of the organism. These studies revealed in particular the remarkable complexity of the sense organs and the nervous system centering in the brain, and the functional processes of these various structures. Thus the matter-energy dualism was carried over into the study of man.

Many students held that mental activity

is merely neural energy—that mind is a particularized form of energy, just as the neural mechanism is a particularized form of matter. This view would obviously subject our mental activities to natural law.

But this simple, two-fold dualism many psychologists have been disinclined to accept. To explain conscious activities, they have developed what may be termed a psychic projection of the matter-energy dualism, which they call psycho-physical parallelism. There are in reality three phases of this so-called parallelism: (1) the neural structures, or the matter phase; (2) the neural processes, or the energy phase; and (3) the mental activities, or the psychic phase. A simple analogy (inadequate because too mechanistic) is seen in the art of the cinema: (1) the mechanism known as the motion-picture projector; (2) the operation of the mechanism before the screen; and (3) the scenes that proceed by projection on the screen. Thus mind is conceived as a sort of projected parallelism.

Now it is generally agreed among psycho-physical parallelists that mental activities have been known to take place only in connection with parallel organic activities. Consciousness gradually develops with the maturing bodily structures, and is impaired or dissolved, so far as any known facts reveal, with the impairment or dissolution of the parallel neural mechanism. That is to say, the psychic and the organic sides of the parallelism are correlated throughout, and appear to be inexorably bound together. And since continuity embraces the organism in the realm of natural law, the doctrine of psycho-physical parallelism, by a projected or parallel continuity, subjects mind as well as organism to natural law.

Some psychologists have held that this

doctrine of psychic parallelism is necessary to explain the facts of man's rational behavior. Similarly, some philosophers have held that what may be termed figuratively the "rational" behavior of the universe, or its cosmic character, can be explained only by the assumption of a theistic intelligence paralleling the cosmic processes. But just as there is no evidence of activity by theistic fiat contrary to or independent of the laws of nature, so there is no evidence of mental activity contrary to or independent of the laws of the organism. The human ego or psyche, so-called, has no more been proved to stand apart from the human organism in terms of disjunction rather than of continuity than has the *theos* or cosmic intelligence been proved to stand apart from nature at large in terms of disjunction rather than of continuity.

The theory of psycho-physical parallelism has been a useful working hypothesis, and has been used as a point of departure for important investigations, both physiological and psychological, and for the tentative correlation of discovered facts. But recent scientific developments have tended distinctly in the direction of the abandonment alike of the general matter-energy dualism and of the particularized psycho-physical parallelism.

As was pointed out earlier, physico-chemical science has opened up a new world of knowledge—the world of the atom. The atom has been found to consist of a nucleus and of electrons of negative electricity, the latter varying in number from one to ninety-two, and revolving and vibrating around the central nuclear field of positive electricity. Matter in its ultimate state is not the atom but the free electron which, in the form of light, has a velocity of 186,300 miles a second. One might say, indeed, that matter is ultimately reducible to energy,

or that energy in its derivative manifestations in the atom assumes the form of matter, the several different forms of atomic matter being determined by the number of negative electrons and their relation to the positive nuclear field. To unlock the energy of the atom means to disintegrate the atom or to reduce it to the free electronic state.

There seems to be no such thing as rest or inactivity. Motion or energy is the ultimate state of nature. In the free electronic state it seems impossible to differentiate matter and energy. The general matter-energy dualism seems, therefore, to be merely derivative, and to be replaced in ultimate analysis by the unity of the constitution of energy-matter. This in turn raises a question as to the ultimate basis of the doctrine of psycho-physical parallelism, and entails a reconsideration of the nature of neural energy in relation to so-called psychic behavior.

In the meantime, further researches in human behavior, organic and psychic, have indicated that the neural mechanism is less important than was formerly supposed. Psychic as well as physical behavior has been seen to depend most vitally on other structures, particularly the glands, as well as on the nerves and the brain. Studies of the entire organism, and correlations of all forms of human behavior with these organic studies, are tending in the direction of the unitary view of psycho-physical behavior. These tendencies, which had been developing more or less independently of the physico-chemical researches described above, have received impetus from the unitary concept of electronic science. Electronic energy, knowledge of which is in its infancy, affords a tremendously significant point of departure for further study of the nature of the organic structures and of their relations to psycho-physical behavior. But

on the basis of studies already made, it is held by the "unitary" psychologists that "consciousness," "mentality," the "ego," "personality," are not entities paralleling the neural mechanism (or rather are not together a parallel entity), but are simply logical particularizations or traits of the unitary being we call man. Thus to them the continuity of natural law in the realm of the mind is not a projected or parallel continuity; it is rather a unitary continuity that runs through all.

Thus mental activities, whether viewed as paralleling neural activities, or as constituting a phase of unitary human behavior, are seen to fall within the realm of natural law. Either conception, but particularly the unitary view, runs counter to traditional and rule-of-thumb views, much as the ideas of the sphericity of the earth and of its orbital motion around the sun are contradicted by the judgment of the senses uninformed by larger scientific knowledge.

The so-called conscious ego seems to stand apart from all else, and to itself it is a thing apart. To the individual consciousness, the basic fact is its own existence. The individual is to itself a reality, an *essense*, in the language of metaphysics, a *noumenon*. To the same individual, all other individuals, all other aspects of the universe, are not *noumenal* but *phenomenal*; the world at large is not a world of first-hand reality but a world of second-hand appearances derived from experiences therewith. To the individual its *noumenal* being is "free," while the *phenomenal* world of appearances is "deterministic." It is not inconsistent, however, for the individual *noumenon* to assume that other individuals, merely *phenomenal* to it, are to themselves *noumenal*, while it, to them, is *phenomenal*. It appears, to be sure, that "inanimate" objects, as the atom of radium, and

"lower" organisms, have modes of noumenal existence and phenomenal experience differing from that of man; but the hypothesis of continuity compels the assumption of both noumenal existence and phenomenal experience by one mode or another. To atom of radium, tree, bird, ape, we may assume that there are two worlds, the world of the atom, the tree, the bird, or the ape on the one hand, and on the other, all else beside—including man. But atom, tree, bird, ape, and man act in accord with the laws of their respective natures as parts of the cosmos.

Among men as in nature at large, law is a phenomenal expression of noumenal existence. Between man and nature there is continuity. Natural law is nature finding orderly expression; and man as a part of nature also finds orderly self-expression in the form of law. The assumption of law is obviously in keeping with the general tendency of science by which the line of continuity between the natural and the so-called supernatural, between the concept of the universe as one of natural laws and one of caprice or of fiat, has advanced successively at the expense of the latter from the age of animistic thought to the age of Newton, Darwin, and Einstein.

IV

The conclusion, then, is that whether the dual conception of psycho-physical parallelism is accepted or displaced by the unitary conception, the individual is psychically as well as physically a part of the world of nature and may therefore be assumed to fall within the realm of law. Man is a social animal; but society is composed of individuals. If the individual, by the concept of continuity, falls within the realm of natural law, it follows that society is in a similar state. The "machine" of human society is not a separate construction but merely a part of the

larger, comprehensive "mechanism." (But the figure is too mechanistic). The "book" of man is not complete in itself, but consists of a few pages (at least a paragraph or two!) in the "book" of nature.¹ (But again the figure is inadequate.) There is a continuing process, an unending tale, a drama with man playing his rôle as the trees or the birds or the winds or the planets play theirs. His rôle may be insignificant, episodal, momentary, to be sure, but it proceeds according to his intrinsic nature as part of the evolving drama.

Is such a view fatalistic or "deterministic"? If by those terms it is meant that man is a helpless creature of his environment, the environment being everything, man nothing, so far as the "determining" of what happens is concerned, then the objection is readily seen to be fallacious. Even the inert stone in the roadway may "upset the applecart." What happens is "determined" by the stone as well as by its environment. And if we give heed to the physicist in his view of the energy in each atom of the stone, it turns out to be hardly inert after all. Suppose the stone happens to be a piece of radium! Now man, with his highly differentiated and marvelously intricate organism, is probably the most complex, most active, most adaptable unit in his particular part of the universe. He has power (free will if one prefers the term, but it has too many dubious connotations to be acceptable)—man has power, individually and collectively, incomparably greater than the stone, even if it happens to be a piece of radium. He works out, in connection with his environment, and in accord with

¹ A distinction between "the book of man" and "the book of nature" is made the basis of a recent lucid popularization of the history of science, Dr. Joseph Mayer's *Seven Seals of Science*, which contains a persuasive exposition of the arguments against the main thesis of this essay.

the laws of his nature, his particular part of the "machine" or "going concern" of nature at large; he writes his particular paragraphs in the "book" of nature; he plays his rôle in the cosmic drama.

Man is an extremely complex, adaptable being. It is largely because of such characteristics that human activities appear superficially to be capricious. One aspect of his adaptability is his apparently unrivaled capacity to know his own nature and the nature of the innumerable stimuli that beat in upon him and cause his responses. It is in the increase of his adaptability by the cultivation of his exceptional capacity for knowledge (thereby changing his nature and the character of his responses to stimuli) that we find the chief significance of his quest for law. The greater his understanding of laws, human and environmental, the greater is his adaptability, the more effective is his rôle in the drama of nature.

By definition, the laws of nature are the ways in which nature finds orderly self-expression. Now self-expression in nature is not immutable, unchangeable, but is subject to continual variation. Man, as perhaps the most variable part of nature, finds that variation plays a correspondingly large part in his self-expression. Where there is no variation, there is no "freedom." (But throughout nature as well as among men there is variation, therefore "freedom"). It is in connection with variation that the nature of self-expression undergoes change. Whatever may be the general causes of variation, knowledge is a factor. Knowledge changes man's nature, facilitates variation, helps to "determine" the nature of self-expression. Knowledge, therefore, assumes not merely a passive rôle in man's conformity to law, but becomes an active force, a variant in the modification of the laws of self-expression. Even man's rational con-

tributions to his own progress are not in the exercise of a mystical "free will" but rather in changes or variations or adaptations in his nature by which his responses to stimuli are conditioned for the attainment of particular objectives. Man differs from atom, tree, bird, or ape not in the power of change, variation, or adaptation, but in the degree of his understanding of the laws by which change, variation, and adaptation are effected, and therefore in the extent of his capacity for progress.

V

Our syllogism stands thus: Nature is intrinsically a realm of law. Man, physically and psychically, individually and collectively, is an integral part of nature. Therefore, human activities, historical and contemporaneous, individual and collective, occur in accord with natural laws.

A rational understanding of such laws, can be acquired only by a process resembling the discovery and formulation of recognized laws of nature at large. Here, too, is continuity. But we should remember that there are in reality the two questions: first, do such laws exist? and second, assuming their existence, what are they? If one assumes their existence, hypotheses and even thoughtful speculations are desirable. Intellectual curiosity based even on inadequate knowledge has promoted discovery because it has helped to stimulate and point the way toward the acquisition of more adequate knowledge. Traditional illustrations, valid symbolically if only legendary, are the cases of Isaac Newton wondering why he was hit on the head by a falling apple, and James Watt speculating as to why imprisoned steam lifted the iron lid of a kettle.

If one assumes that there are no comprehensive laws pertaining to human activities, or if one is quite skeptical concerning their existence, that ends the

matter. Even if they do exist, an attitude of denial or even of skepticism is likely to prevent any serious attempts to find out what they are. On the other hand, if they exist, an understanding of their nature is obviously important. It is desirable, therefore, to answer the first question, as to whether or not such laws exist, in advance of their discovery and formulation. To answer this question has been the purpose of this essay.

As a matter of fact, much progress has been made in their discovery and formulation. Physically, the law of gravitation obviously includes man. Both organically and psychically, he has conformed to the group of laws known collectively as the doctrine of evolution, and this is true even though some subordinate phases of the doctrine are still hypothetical. But in reference to the laws that apply primarily to the province of human activities, we are a long way from the attainment of sufficient knowledge to state them except in a tentative and fragmentary manner.²

What are the principal obstacles in the way, and what steps seem to be necessary in order to surmount them?

Contemporaneous man is different from cave man, and the adult is different from the infant. Furthermore, contemporaneous man is far from homogeneous. A principal difficulty is found in the variations of different stages and types of individual and social evolution and culture.

This changing, evolutionary character of human conditions and of historical laws is, however, not peculiar to man. Even to man's fleeting view, the universe is now not what it was in the youth of the

² Probably the most interesting attempt in this direction is "Law in History," an address by Professor E. P. Cheyney as President of the American Historical Association (published in the *American Historical Review*, January, 1924).

solar system. The earth is not now what it was when man first inhabited it, nor was it then what it had been when it began its celestial career. Consider the case of geological evolution. The origin, formation, and evolution of the earth embrace many different stages. There was, it is supposed, the primitive nebulous period. Then followed the formation of the four spheres,—the inner sphere or core, the lithosphere, the hydrosphere, and the atmosphere. The laws that applied during the nebulous period were supplemented in the second period by laws not previously applicable. Later came the modification of the lithosphere and the hydrosphere. The laws of the formation of the oceans, mountains, valleys, soils, etc., supplemented and in part superseded those which applied during an earlier and different stage. In the history of man, we have analogous stages, continuous and evolutionary, to be sure, but nevertheless involving conditions in which supplementary laws explain the successive modes of human activity.

Nature is essentially in a state of flux, of change. From the electronic energy of the atom to the whirling motions of the worlds through four-dimensional space time, it is seen that nature is essentially dynamic. Of all the laws that apply to nature at large as well as to man, perhaps the most significant, and at the same time the most difficult to formulate, are those that pertain to change and variation.

What is change, variation? It is implicit in the evolution of the planetary system, of the earth, of living forms, of human behavior, of human institutions. The ultimate causes of variation are unknown; the scientist observes the processes and wherever possible explains them in terms of law. Here again continuity prevails. Variation in the life of man is a phase of universal change.

But man seems to be characterized by an exceptional rapidity of variation, resulting, no doubt, from the unusual complexity of his constitution. This fact helps to explain why it is that man appears, to his own egocentric view, to stand apart from the larger world of nature and of natural law, and why it is exceptionally difficult to reduce human phenomena to terms of law. Furthermore, it is natural that man's rational but egocentric scrutiny should have been focused first not upon himself, nor even upon the superficially capricious phenomena of his immediate environment, but rather upon the remoter and in appearance relatively fixed and stable aspects of nature. (Of course it is partly because of their remoteness that they appear to man to be relatively fixed and stable.) It is natural that astronomical laws came first (after mathematics) in the sequence of the sciences, and that man himself should be the last of the realms of nature to fall, so far as man's view is concerned, within the realm of natural law.

Briefly, the problems connected with the discovery of natural laws primarily applicable to man include (1) the difficulty of an objective, rational approach by the egocentric noumenal individual to its own experiences; (2) the relative complexity, variableness, and adaptability of man; and (3) the changing aspects of human life at different stages of individual and social evolution.

In connection with attempts to overcome these difficulties, it is apparent that the noumenal, egocentric view must be recognized as such, and corrected by a frank recognition of man's place as an integral part of nature. It is necessary, in the second place, for the studies pertaining primarily to man to be reorganized, extended, and coördinated. History (broadly defined as concerned with past

organic, psychic and social activities), biology, psychology, and sociology (including economics, politics, and allied subjects)—these four branches of study, while differentiated for purposes of division of labor in the work of inductive research, deal collectively with human phenomena. A synthesis of research, and a correlation of the results of all these branches of study, with the discovery of law as a definite objective, must be antecedent to an adequate formulation of the laws according to which human phenomena proceed.

History, next to biology, is perhaps the most adequately formulated of the four studies mentioned, especially in regard to inductive data, but its generalizations are chaotic. The science of biology is quite thoroughly established, especially in regard to sub-human data. But its attainments are limited by inadequate chemical and physical knowledge, by imperfect correlation with psychology, and by the continued rejection, in many quarters, of the postulate of the continuity of the organism and the ego. Psychology has made many advances, but many of its devotees, like those of biology, have failed to accept the full implications of the continuity hypothesis. The recent revelations of electronic science seem to have made possible a new era of advance in both biological and psychological science. Sociology (using the term in the comprehensive sense indicated above) is probably farther from establishment as a science than is psychology. It is a synthetic science, attempting the coördination of its various branches, and it can hardly be said that any one of these has as yet been definitely established as a definitive science.

But even the herculean task of developing, coördinating and synthesizing the data of these four main fields of study is

not sufficient. If man is viewed as a part of nature, the distinction between the natural and the humanistic sciences is itself merely for purposes of classification and division of labor in the work of research. Since man and his environment ultimately are one, there must be correlation and synthesis not only among the humanistic studies but also among them and the "natural" sciences. But the difficulty thus presented is not so serious as it at first appears to be. Much greater progress has been made in the study of man's environment than of man. The laws of the environment, on closer examination, prove to be applicable in part to man himself. Researches in particular fields, which often seem trivial and fruitless when uncoördinated, acquire a new significance when correlated with researches elsewhere. Students may well be guided by the maxim: Divided we fail, united we succeed.

In the various areas which historians, biologists, psychologists and sociologists are inclined to stake off as their own prospecting grounds, much mining has been done, but little progress has been made toward separating the dross and refining the gold. Energies are often misdirected, and there is lack of coöordination among historical miners and between them and miners of adjacent areas. We have hardly arrived, indeed, at the stage of mining properly speaking, but are still in the era of alluvial diggings and placer washings by individual sourdoughs.

Jason's golden fleece has been described as a sheepskin pegged down in a gold-

bearing stream till the current had washed down particles of gold and entangled them in the wool. Scholars peg down their sheepskins in the academic streams and collect stray particles—precious to be sure, but Jason's method is hardly adequate. Successful exploitation of the great veins of gold that supply the stray particles requires large-scale, coöordinated effort. The keen insight or the brilliant intuition of an individual genius may now and then illuminate the veins of gold, but the light of genius is likely to be of no avail unless there is a multitude of workers coöperating to exploit the resources thus revealed.

Will any method that can be used prove adequate? Adequate is of course a relative term. Complete and definitive knowledge of any field is unattainable. Much progress has already been made, and the tendencies of thought seem to point in the direction of progress at a greatly accelerated rate. Advances in science from the mathematical knowledge of the ancient Greeks to the latest formulations of electronic science have revealed to man successive areas of the universe as falling within the realm of law. And with each advance in his knowledge, man has played a correspondingly greater rôle in the drama in which he is cast. Further enlightenment concerning the laws of the drama as a whole and of his part in it not only intrigues his curiosity but adds to his power as an actor. His god-like rôle is not in childish egocentric illusions of occult aloofness from nature but in rational unison with nature in orderly self-expression.

TRENDS IN THE TEACHING OF "SOCIAL PROBLEMS" IN COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES IN THE UNITED STATES

JAMES M. REINHARDT

IN ORDER to find out what direction the teaching of social problems is taking in the United States, and to formulate an idea of its importance in departments of sociology in the institutions of higher learning, the writer addressed a questionnaire on the subject to the heads of departments of sociology in one hundred state and endowed colleges and universities. The questionnaire, among other things, asked for the name and an evaluation of the text used in general "Social Problems," for the length of time that the present text had been used in the institution and the reasons for its adoption as well as for a statement of the problems taught in the course in "Social Problems." The sociologists were also requested to indicate what problems, if any, were given especial emphasis and to suggest present needs in the field of social problems. A space was left in the questionnaire for suggestions and remarks.

Sixty of the one hundred questionnaires sent out were returned. Of these, thirty-three came from endowed colleges and universities, and twenty-seven, from state institutions. In all, the data comprised in the study represented only about 20 per cent of these classes of institutions in the United States,¹ but since every section of the country was well represented in the replies, the results may be taken as fairly indicative of the situation generally.²

¹ Normal schools and teachers colleges are not included in this study.

² The replies from state institutions reported one course listed as "Social Pathology" and four of such courses were reported by the endowed colleges. Because of the nature of these courses and the fact

STATE INSTITUTIONS

Out of the twenty-seven state institutions reporting all were offering courses in sociology. Fifteen, or about 55 per cent, were offering distinct courses in general "Social Problems."³ One reply stated that no such course was taught in the department and gave no other information. Four of the state institutions that offered no "social problems" course treated the subjects in specialized courses, such as "Criminology," "Poverty and Dependency," and so forth, while as many others dealt with these subjects in the introductory courses only. In two instances "Social Problems" had not been offered in the past but had been introduced for the coming year and one large university had abandoned the general course in "Social Problems" entirely for lack of a suitable text. In five institutions specialized courses in social problems were being taught in addition to the general problems course. In two of these it was indicated that the general course was introduced first and later the specialized courses were given as certain problems gained in importance.

When we come to examine for particular problems treated in the various state institutions, we find a rather wide range of variation. Only three—Poverty, Disease, and The Family—are treated by all of the fourteen institutions giving distinct

that the texts used were the same as those used in a number of the "Social Problems" courses, I have treated them along with general courses in "Social Problems."

³ See footnote 2.

courses in general social problems. Two sets of social conditions—Population and Labor Problems—are treated by thirteen of these institutions and twelve of the state schools give attention to the four problems—Crime, Divorce, Immigration, and Race Problems. Standards of Living and Wages are treated in eleven of the fourteen institutions, while Accidents and Problems of Childhood were mentioned in ten of the fourteen replies under discussion. The social survey is taught in only five of the fourteen sociology departments giving general courses in problems. Recreation was mentioned three times, while the City, Rural Problems, and Community Disorganization were mentioned twice; and two of the fourteen replies enumerating Disease also mentioned Health Problems. Then followed a scattering of subjects—thirteen in all—mentioned in thirteen different replies: Nationality and Culture, Waste, Principles of Progress and Reform, Industrial Welfare Movements, Housing, Adult Education, Propaganda, Control of War, Unemployment, Socialism, Social Change, the Aged, and Social Work.

SPECIALIZED COURSES IN SOCIAL PROBLEMS IN STATE INSTITUTIONS

"Criminology" was reported by seven of the nine institutions offering specialized courses in Social Problems. Five of these institutions mentioned Immigration, Race Problems, and Population. Four of these institutions mentioned Divorce, Poverty, Standards of Living, Disease, Accidents, The Family, and Child Welfare. Three reported Labor Problems and three Wages. Recreation was mentioned once, as was each of the following by as many different institutions: Drug Addiction and Alcoholism, Socialism, Propaganda, Prostitution, the Ecological Approach to the Community, and Personality Development.

Five of the nine sociology departments reporting special courses were also offering a general course in "Social Problems" and it was impossible to tell, except in a very few cases, from the data furnished, exactly what subjects were treated in the specialized courses. Four replies reported separate courses for Criminology, Poverty and Dependency, two stated that City Problems and Immigration were given as separate courses in the department of sociology; one institution was offering a course on The Family, and one in Family and Child Welfare.

Out of the four institutions in which social problems were confined to the courses in introductory sociology, four reported Crime, three Poverty, two Race Problems, two Population, two Childhood and the Family, one Wages, and one Standards of Living.

ENDOWED INSTITUTIONS

Out of thirty-three endowed institutions reporting, sixteen—or almost exactly 50 per cent—were teaching courses in general "Social Problems."⁴ Five of these were giving specialized courses also, and six of this class of schools reported only specialized courses in social problems. Four institutions treated problems only in the introductory courses in sociology, two others replied simply "no course in problems," and three reported no course in sociology. One other had introduced a course for next year and one large university reported that the sociology department had definitely sought to avoid courses dealing with social problems. Such courses accordingly were being handled by the "School of Citizenship."

Only one social condition, namely, Poverty, was treated by all of the sixteen departments of sociology offering a general

⁴ Four of these were listed "Social Pathology."

course in social problems. Fourteen mentioned Crime, thirteen Standards of Living, twelve stated that Disease, Race, and Immigration were studied in the departments of sociology, and eleven included in the problems taught Accidents and The Family, ten were considering Wages, Divorce, and Labor Problems, and nine enumerated Problems of Childhood. Three reported that the departments of sociology were dealing with Recreation and Leisure, three others enumerated Education, and as many more referred to Problems of Mentality such as Feeble-Mindedness, Insanity, Mental Hygiene, and so forth. While three of this group of institutions gave some attention to Rural Problems, only two gave instruction in making Social Surveys. One of the following: Housing, Unrest, Public Opinion, Social Conflict, Civil Liberty, Women in Industry, Physical Defects, Politics and Sources of Social Information, was enumerated by each of nine of the sixteen institutions giving general courses in "Social Problems." Of the eleven departments giving social problems in specialized courses, seven were dealing with race problems, six with crime, six with wages, and six were treating the subject of population. Immigration, Standards of Living, and Disease were each designated five times. Accident, The Family, and Poverty were mentioned four times each. The following four subjects were divided among four institutions, each mentioning only one: Ecology of the Community, Public Health,⁵ Social Maladies, and Problems of Personality.

As in the case of the state institutions, it was impossible to ascertain from the data available exactly what subjects were taught in the separate courses in social problems. Among the six institutions

relying entirely upon such courses for the presentation of social problems, Poverty, Criminology, Race Problems, Population, Immigration, and the Ecology of the Community, were enumerated.

The four institutions in which social problems were taught only in the introductory courses mentioned together: Crime, The Family, Recreation and Leisure, Race, Immigration, The Home, and Public Health.

GENERALIZATIONS

Forty-four different problems were reported altogether. Only twenty-one of these, however, were mentioned by both classes of institutions. It is noteworthy that the problems treated by both state and endowed institutions were the ones reported more often by both. There was also a close correlation between the number of times a problem was reported and its importance as judged by the number of times that it was underscored. The coefficient of correlation between these two conditions was .91. Stated differently: There was no significant difference between the two classes of schools or between individual institutions as regards certain major social problems. There was, however, a tendency on the part of individual departments in both classes of institution to discriminate in favor of some phase of a general subject not definitely reported by any other institution. For example, one institution reported "Physical Defects," another "Propaganda" and a third "Homeless Men." Altogether, twenty-three of the sixty replies contained some such reference. Ten of these were reported by state schools and thirteen by endowed institutions. Furthermore, except in two instances, subjects not reported by both classes of institutions were not reported more than once. However, all but eight of the twenty-one problems

⁵ In each instance "public health" was mentioned in addition to disease.

treated in both state and endowed institutions were referred to twenty-nine or more times.

Recreation appeared next in importance to Accident and was reported ten times,⁶ while but one department of sociology gave it emphasis. Nine institutions out of sixty appeared to be giving instruction in how to make a social survey and this subject was not emphasized in any.

Table I presents the thirteen social problems most frequently enumerated and underscored according to class of institu-

scored in four instances. Other problems treated in one or more of both classes of institutions are: Personality Problems, Mental Defectives, and the Home.

USE OF TEXTBOOKS IN "SOCIAL PROBLEMS"

It is worth while noting the proportion of schools that used definite texts in teaching social problems. As stated above, fifteen of the state institutions were giving courses in general "Social Problems." Eleven of these were using textbooks. One was using mimeograph material;

TABLE I
SHOWING THE RANKING OF SOCIAL PROBLEMS IN ENDOWED AND STATE INSTITUTIONS ACCORDING TO NUMBER OF TIMES REPORTED AND UNDERSCORED

PROBLEM	STATE INSTITUTIONS		ENDOWED INSTITUTIONS		TOTAL	
	Times reported	Times emphasized	Times reported	Times emphasized	Reported	Emphasized
Poverty.....	21	6	23	6	44	12
Crime.....	21	7	21	9	42	16
The Family.....	23	7	16	7	39	14
Race Problems.....	19	5	20	6	39	11
Population.....	20	10	17	3	37	14
Immigration.....	19	5	18	6	37	11
Divorce.....	19	5	18	4	37	9
Standards of Living.....	17	4	18	4	35	8
Disease.....	15	2	17	2	32	4
Problems of Labor.....	16	1	15	3	31	4
Wages.....	15	1	16	3	31	4
Childhood.....	15	2	14	3	29	5
Accidents.....	14	1	15	1	29	2

tions and depicts the similarities as between individual departments of sociology and between endowed and state institutions.⁷

The "Rural problem" was reported separately by six sociology departments but was not emphasized at all. "Public Health" was the exception that proves the rule. This subject was distinguished from disease in four replies and was under-

three were using the lecture method and references. Of the sixteen endowed schools offering courses in general social problems, thirteen used text books, one mimeograph material and two the lecture and references. The thirty-one institutions together used twelve different textbooks and two of these were used by one institution. The endowed schools used five texts not mentioned in the replies from state schools, though all of the texts but one reported by state institutions were to be found in the endowed colleges. The en-

⁶ See Table I.

⁷ 29 endowed institutions and 26 state institutions are represented in the figures presented in Table I.

dowed schools also showed a wider range in the type of books used as class texts. For example one of these reported Sumner's *Folkways*, another was using as a basis for class discussion the two books *Jesus Christ and the Social Question* and *The Social Teachings of Jesus and the Prophets*. Considering both groups of institutions together *Social Pathology* by Queen and Mann appeared to be the most popular textbook, Odum's *Man's Quest for Social Guidance* came second and Bossard's *Social Well-being* third. Odum, Queen and Mann, Dexter, Parsons, Bond, Barnes and Davis, Goddard, Gillen, Dettmer and Colbert, were the most popular books on the reference shelves of teachers of general "Social Problems" as judged by the number of times reported.

Twenty-one of the twenty-four institutions using textbooks in general "Social Problems" had adopted the present book within the past three years and all but four within the past two years. Seventeen of these institutions had used the present text one year or less.

The reasons given for the adoption of the book in use at the time the questionnaire was submitted were markedly uniform in a large number of cases. In seven cases a change was made because of a desire for newer and more up-to-date material. Two of these added: The desire for more "concreteness and definiteness." Six wanted a "more teachable" text and four of these indicated a need for more concrete and definite material. Another stated that the "old book was too dry." Still another objected to the earlier text because of its unnecessary complexity and a third wanted, also a book dealing more with the facts of life and less in theory.

Two of the twenty-four departments under discussion started the course with the present text and these mentioned, practicability and concreteness as the

most desirable features about the text. It is noteworthy that practicable and up-to-date material, concreteness, and teachableness account for fifteen or more than 71 per cent of the adoptions of textbooks in "Social Problems" during the past three years, according to the samples comprising this study.

One of the remaining six simply wanted a better text; one gave no reason for the change; one other had used mimeograph material before adopting a text; another changed from the lecture; and one on account of difference in cost between the two books: While one other adopted the newer text largely because it expressed more "sympathy for the under-dog."

Two of the three replies from institutions where the same text in "Social Problems" had been in use for four or more years stated that a change had not been made for the reason that no suitable text had arrived.

Teachableness, practicability, concreteness, and the scientific approach together account for more than 90 per cent of the strong points in the texts used by the twenty-one sociology departments that have adopted new text books within the past three years. One gave as the strong point in his text the fact that he wrote it. Another sociologist who had written his own text pronounced that its principal weakness.

Nine of the twenty-four institutions where "Social Problems" was taught as a distinct course gave: Too limited in scope or not inclusive enough as the chief weakness of their text books—one of these nine added "lacks scientific approach" and another "out-of-date." Three stated that "the text lacks organization"; four implied or stated a lack of concreteness or scientific point of view. Two replied that the texts were "too long" and one of these added "goes out of the

way to challenge tradition." One sociologist stated that his text was "too wordy and badly written," while four implied that the subjects were not properly evaluated by the writer of the text—some being over-emphasized and others not given the attention that they deserve. One other, as already noted, replied simply "I wrote it."

Lack of scientific point of view and approach; lack of inclusiveness, and poor organization together account for the objections to particular text-books in twenty-one, or more than 90 per cent, of the twenty-four replies dealing with this point in the questionnaire.

An examination of the needs indicated and the remarks on the questionnaire serves to emphasize the importance of these same features—particularly the scientific approach and the need for concrete data. So much is this true that it seems unnecessary to analyze this part of the questionnaire in detail. Two of the replies asked for more material on the constructive side. One objects that there is too much biology in text books in "Social Problems" and a third would like to have the subject treated more historically, emphasizing the developmental stages of modern social agencies.

CONCLUSIONS

The data comprised in this study are too limited to warrant conclusions on some points. However, some deductions may be made. If we exclude from consideration the apparently greater tendency on the part of state institutions to offer courses in sociology there is no significant difference between the two types of institutions as regards the teaching of social problems, except the slightly greater tendency on the part of endowed institutions to experiment with a wider and more varied range of textbooks. About 50 per cent of the departments of sociology

in state and endowed institutions of higher learning appear to be giving distinct courses in general "Social Problems" and the two classes of institutions are about equal in the proportions of departments of sociology offering such courses as is also true of the proportions giving problems in specialized courses. The number and variety of subjects taught as social problems do not differ as between classes of institutions. And both state and endowed schools emphasize the same problems in about the same degree.

There appears to be a decided trend in the teaching of social problems away from the abstract and theoretical to the use of practical, concrete and scientific material directly and simply stated. There is a tendency also to treat social problems with emphasis in terms of social pathology, though two replies objected to this.

A large range of subjects is treated as social problems although there is uniformity as regards thirteen major⁸ ones. These are—in the order of their frequency in the replies—Poverty, Crime, the Family, Race Problems, Immigration, Divorce, Population, Standards of Living, Disease, Labor Problems, Wages, Accidents, and Child Problems. The replies, also, may be interpreted to indicate a tendency on the part of departments giving courses in general "Social Problems" toward specialization and, on the part of sociology departments relying wholly upon the introductory courses, to introduce courses in problems.

The evolutionary process seems to be first an introductory course in sociology; then a general course in problems is added and finally certain problems are treated in specialized courses. The data are too limited at this point, however, to justify anything more than a bare conjecture.

⁸I have used "major" only because there is agreement among teachers of social problems as regards the importance of these.

CONSCIOUSNESS OF KIND AMONG UNIVERSITY STUDENTS

CHRIST LOUKAS

STUDENTS of society are in general agreement that articulate speech, and, what Professor Giddings calls, consciousness of kind raise human association high above that of swarms and herds. In animal societies, individuals act alike, but do not know that they act alike. Humans with this consciousness have the capacity to name likenesses and differences. Within human society individuals retain membership in the great group established by common human likeness, but at the same time they enter into smaller social forms based upon recognized likenesses and differences, special to different individuals according to their capacity to communicate such distinctive attributes to one another.¹ Professor Giddings is of the opinion, therefore, that without this consciousness of kind specialized human society would never have been possible. He defines consciousness of kind as "the awareness of resemblances and differences by the resembling individuals."² From this hypothesis he evolves all his social theories.

He divides his consciousness of kind into five modes of consciousness which constitute the total consciousness of kind.³ (1) "Organic sympathy." What he terms as organic sympathy is "collectively, the resembling sensations of resembling individuals, the resembling sensations of self and of others who resemble self and the accompanying vague feeling of attraction and pleasure." (2) "Perception of resemblance." The combination of sensations of the moment with

memories of similar sensations in the past, the connection of these immediate and memory sensations with the objects that have produced them, constitute the beginnings of perception of differences and of resemblances. (3) "Reflective sympathy." He designates as reflective sympathy "the arisal of the perception of resemblance in consciousness, which reacts upon organic sympathy and converts it into an intelligent sympathy." (4) "Affection." What he calls affection is supposed to be "the result of the perception of resemblance and conscious sympathy." (5) "Desire for Recognition." This mode of consciousness, supposedly "is the subjective consequence of resemblance, including a return of sympathy and affection."

"Though these modes of consciousness," says he, "have been described separately, in reality they are intimately blended, that it is only by a process of scientific analysis that they can be thought of singly." Hence, as a result of the above scientific analysis of consciousness of kind, he defines it anew as "that pleasurable state of mind which includes organic sympathy, the perception of resemblance, conscious or reflective sympathy, affection, and the desire for recognition."⁴

In keeping with the scientific spirit of the age, Professor Giddings sought to subject his theory to scientific scrutiny. So he proceeded to test and retest his theory by obtaining information indicative of all modes of consciousness from records made by individual observers. Needless to say, his findings furnished ample evidence in support of his theory, the validity of which everyone can verify

¹ For detailed discussion read C. A. Ellwood, *The Psychology of Human Society*, p. 58, seq.

² *Inductive Sociology*, p. 62.

³ *Inductive Sociology*, p. 91, seq. *Descriptive and Historical Sociology*, p. 275, seq.

⁴ *Descriptive and Historical Sociology*, p. 288. (Quotation abridged.)

from his own experience. Yet in some cases, especially in the physical similarities and dissimilarities, his findings were too slight to be significant.

Professor Giddings, in order to determine as to whether physical similarities could be considered as an important factor in human association, made the following inquiry of ninety-eight of his students:⁵

1. Among acquaintances of your own sex, how many persons do you habitually think of as your "best friend?"
2. Of these "best friends" how many are unmistakably like you in color (dark or light) of eyes?
3. How many are unmistakably unlike you in color of eyes?
4. How many are unmistakably like you in color of hair?

TABLE I

Number of best friends reported, 613.

Average number of best friends, 6.25.

Physical traits of best friends:

	LIKE OWN	PER CENT	UNLIKE OWN	PER CENT
Eyes.....	220	47	249	53
Hair.....	258	48	275	52
Complexion.....	258	50	258	50
Total Physical Traits.....	736	49	782	51

5. How many are unmistakably unlike you in color of hair?
6. How many are unmistakably like you in complexion?
7. How many are unmistakably unlike you in complexion?

The replies from 98 students gave the distribution shown in Table I.

The difference between like and unlike traits in this inquiry, as one may readily see, is too slight to be significant. Yet the almost equal distribution between like and unlike traits indicate that there must

⁵ Scientific study of Human Society, p. 122.

be another factor responsible for the intimate relations of these students.

The same questions were submitted to 141 University of Oregon students by the writer as an exercise for Dr. F. G. Young's class in scientific study of human society. In undertaking this study the writer had no other thought in mind save the desire to determine which are more responsible for student intimate friendships, the physical or mental traits. The questionnaire was headed with the following explanation: "Your reply to the following questions will serve as a check to an inquiry made by the Department of Sociology of Columbia University. Your frank coöperation is desired."

TABLE II

Number of best friends reported, University of Oregon, 696; Columbia University, 613.

Average number of best friends, University of Oregon, 4.9; Columbia University, 6.25.

PHYSICAL TRAITS	UNIVERSITY OF OREGON				COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY			
	Like own		Unlike		Like own		Unlike	
	Per cent	Per cent	Per cent	Per cent	Per cent	Per cent	Per cent	Per cent
Eyes.....	351	51	347	49	220	47	249	53
Hair.....	303	45	375	55	258	48	275	52
Complexion.....	292	44	376	56	258	50	258	50
Total Physical Traits.....	952	47	1,092	53	736	49	782	51

Replies to questions from 141 University of Oregon students gave the following distribution: Shown in Table II (left) as compared with those of 98 Columbia University students (right).

It becomes clear, therefore, that the results of this inquiry are distributed proportionally almost like those of Dr. Giddings. This striking similarity of results serves to further indicate that there must be an additional factor over and above physical similarities which accounts

for the intimate association of these people individually and mankind collectively.

It occurred to the investigator that the information would have been much more re-

friendship of these individuals was due to similarity of physical or mental traits. Accordingly, he repeated the inquiry to a different group of students, adding two

TABLE III

Number of best friends reported, University of Oregon (a) 696; University of Oregon (b) 650; Columbia 613. Average number of best friends, University of Oregon (a) 4.9; University of Oregon (b) 4.95; Columbia 6.25.

PHYSICAL TRAITS	UNIVERSITY OF OREGON								COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY			
	(a)				(b)				(c)			
	Like	%	Unlike	%	Like	%	Unlike	%	Like	%	Unlike	%
Eyes.....	351	51	347	49	248	39	395	61	220	47	249	53
Hair.....	303	45	375	55	261	40	392	60	258	48	275	52
Complexion.....	292	44	376	56	251	46	297	54	258	50	258	50
Total.....	952	47	1,092	43	760	40	1,084	60	736	49	782	51

vealing had he included in the questionnaire the question as to whether these best friends had the same tastes, ideas, beliefs,

more questions (calling for such information) to Professor Gidding's original set. The replies to the first seven questions

TABLE IV

SHOWS REPLIES TO EIGHTH QUESTION WHICH WAS WORDED AS FOLLOWS: AS NEARLY AS YOU CAN TELL, HOW MANY FROM THOSE THAT ARE LIKE YOU IN COLOR OF EYES, HAIR, AND COMPLEXION ARE

	LIKE YOU		UNLIKE YOU	
	Number	Per cent	Number	Per cent
1. Manners.....	217	57	164	43
2. Morals.....	268	70	114	30
3. Tastes:				
(a) of food.....	209	55	172	45
(b) of amusements....	256	70	108	30
4. Ideas.....	218	56	168	44
5. Beliefs.....	199	56	156	44
6. In appreciation:				
(a) of art.....	157	47	185	53
(b) of Music.....	212	57	159	43
(c) of Drama.....	206	56	163	44
Total.....	1,942	58	1,388	42

manners, and morals as the respondents themselves. The replies to such questions would then have given a better basis for determining whether the intimate

TABLE V

SHOWS REPLIES TO NINTH QUESTION WHICH WAS AS FOLLOWS: AS NEARLY AS YOU CAN TELL, HOW MANY OF THOSE THAT ARE UNLIKE YOU IN COLOR OF HAIR, EYES, AND COMPLEXION ARE

	LIKE YOU		UNLIKE YOU	
	Number	Per cent	Number	Per cent
1. Manners.....	242	68	113	32
2. Morals.....	269	68	124	32
3. Tastes:				
(a) of food.....	216	58	152	42
(b) of amusement....	254	69	113	31
4. Ideas.....	212	60	138	40
5. Beliefs.....	183	58	140	42
6. Appreciation:				
(a) of Art.....	208	57	156	43
(b) of Music.....	245	68	116	42
(c) of Drama.....	240	66	126	34
Total.....	2,029	64	1,178	36

from 131 students gave the following distribution as shown in Table III center (b) as compared with the first 141 U. of O.

students left (a), and with the 98 of Columbia University right (c).

It is interesting to notice the similar distribution of these like and unlike traits in the three inquiries as well as the excess of unlike traits over the like in all three cases. In addition to the written and verbal explanation of the purpose of the inquiry each of the check questions was preceded with a separate explanation: The replies to the next question must be based on your answers to questions 2, 4, and 6 (See Table IV).

The replies to the next question must be based on your answers to questions 3, 5, and 7. (See Table V.)

In the three studies in the replies to the seven original questions the unlike physical traits exceeded the like by a small percentage. The results to the last two (check) questions show a marked preponderance of like mental traits over the unlike. That is, the inquiry of Giddings shows that 51 per cent of the respondents' best friends had physical traits unlike their own. The writer's inquiries, both (a) and (b), show that 53 per cent of the former and 60 per cent of the latter, the respondents' best friends had physical traits dissimilar to theirs. This indicates that physical traits are not the only factor responsible for the intimate friendship of these students. The respondents to the check questions of the second study indicate that 58 per cent of their best friends with like physical traits and 67 per cent of those with unlike physical traits had the same mental traits as they.

The results of this study seem to indicate that the intimate associations of the majority of these students are due more to mental similarities rather than to similarity of physical traits. But it does not account for the cause of the intimate friendship of the 33 per cent of the respondents' best friends of the second check

question who fall outside the field of similarity of both mental and physical traits. The writer cannot, of course, give a scientific explanation to this question, but he can suggest three possibilities. That is, he is of the opinion, that the intimate friendships of these students with those of unlike mental and physical traits may be due to (1) Fraternal pressure. That is, some of these respondents may have been members of a fraternity, and through no choice of theirs, were obliged to room with others who had nothing in common with them. Having lived together for a period they learned to like each other in spite of their physical and mental differences. (2) They may have been partners in some laboratory course and having, through academic necessity, studied and worked together for a term or two, they too learned to like each other. (3) These friends may have had some traits similar to those of the respondents' parents—traits which were by no means pleasing but the sight of which (perhaps because of their loneliness), reminded the students of the affectionate way in which they were treated by their parents, etc. Hence, they sought the friendship of those whose characteristics were like those of their parents.

If, however, the intimate friendship of these students falls outside of the suggested possibilities, one would be inclined to suppose that there must be another factor responsible for their close contact. Whether this factor is what some students of society call, for lack of a better term, the "Gregarious Instinct" (6) rather than Dr. Giddings' "Consciousness of Kind," the writer is not yet convinced. However, the results of this study show that the intimate associations of the majority of these students are due to mental similarities rather than similarities of physical traits.

PUBLIC WELFARE AND SOCIAL WORK

Contributions to this Department will include material of three kinds: (1) original discussion, suggestion, plans, programs, and theories; (2) reports of special projects, working programs, conferences and meetings, and progress in any distinctive aspect of the field; (3) special results of study and research.

SPEAKING IN TERMS OF DOLLARS

JAMES H. S. BOSSARD

THE United States is a rich nation—gorgeously, colorfully rich. Estimates of our total wealth approximate 400 billion dollars, or about \$3,500 per capita. The national income is approaching a hundred billions a year. Consolidations and mergers are creating business entities which reckon their resources in terms of many millions. Hundred million dollar banks and corporations are common-place. A five million dollar theological seminary is dedicated. Twenty-five million automobiles swarm over the countryside seeking for freedom—from each other. Ours is a civilization of filling stations and sports' roadsters. American Radio opens at 167 and closes at 176. Tomorrow, it will reach 180; next month, 200. Silks and furs, cheviots and woolens, constitute our daily raiment. We are rich, we live well, we admit both.

THE DEBIT SIDE

It comes as an irritating reminder to recall that all persons do not share in this economic florescence, that there are really some, in this land of bounty, who are in dire need and distress. A few strokes of fact will suffice to outline this part of the general picture. At least 15 per cent of our population have lived, in recent years, at the poverty level. What this means is

that about one out of every seven persons in the United States is suffering, through lack of adequate income, from under-nourishment, overcrowding, deterioration of social equipment and personal efficiency, the hell of insecurity, and the pall of depression.

With economic insufficiency are associated many other forms of social ill-being—the physically non-effective, constituting between 5 and 6 per cent of the population; the mentally deficient, of whom there are in the United States at least a half million requiring custodial care; the morally deficient, if that time-honored phase may still be used to designate those unnumbered persons whose pathology is that of an insufficient recognition of the conventions of society and the virtues which time has winnowed; the socially deficient, those several millions, who run afoul of the more formal requirements of group life, and come to be known as criminals; and the mentally and nervously ill, of whom a quarter million are now receiving hospital care, another quarter million ought to be, and several millions additional who would be greatly benefitted by intelligent professional care. These, and various other forms of personal and social inadequacy constitute the debit side of our collective life, serious

in any and each individual case and gigantically oppressive in the aggregate.¹

THE COST OF THE DEBIT SIDE

These social debtor classes,² as they have frequently been called, not only fail to contribute their share to American prosperity and well-being, but they entail a very heavy burden and expense.

To begin with, there are certain rather direct costs involved in the identification, disposition, maintenance and treatment of such classes. Throughout western civilization, responsibility for these stark requirements has been recognized quite generally, either by formal confession of the law or by the more or less voluntary contributions of a socially minded citizenry.

Such direct costs for the United States, on the basis of the best data now available, may be placed conservatively at five billion dollars a year. Three of the five billions are spent annually for the catching, trying and detention of criminals.³ The other two billions a year are spent by social agencies dealing with the problems of other forms of social ill-being.⁴

Anything like a complete accounting of the cost to society of social ill-being must include, of course, many items in addition to the direct costs just alluded to. There is, for example, the loss of possible contributions by the individuals concerned,—

¹ James Bossard, *Problems of Social Well-Being*, Chapter I. Cf. in particular pp. 6-8.

² Cf. H. H. Laughlin, "The Socially Inadequate: How shall We Designate and Sort Them?" *American Journal of Sociology*, July, 1921, for a discussion of the problems of terminology.

³ John L. Gillin, *Criminology and Penology*, Chapter III. The reader is also referred to an article by the same author which appeared under the caption of "Crime As Our Most Expensive Luxury" in the *Journal of Applied Sociology*, X, January-February, 1926, p. 213.

⁴ Bossard, op. cit., Chapter I.

both as producing units in the economic organization of society and as personalities in its communal life. The former of these may be translated into monetary terms and measured in multiples of the average man; the latter item, that of possible social contributions, has to do with life's intangibles, and these clearly are beyond the scales of the statistician.

To be noted, too, are the deleterious effects which these pathological groups have upon those with whom they come in contact. The direct damage wrought by the criminal and the diseased prostitute are obvious illustrations. But there are other effects, more subtle and consequently more serious. These effects have to do with the efficiency of the persons with whom they come in contact, with the economic and social constructiveness of their friends and associates. If an analogy be permitted, such persons may be described as focal infections in the body of society, interfering, as such infections are wont to do in the human body, with the proper functioning of adjacent, and at times almost inconceivably remote, parts of the body.

One example of this kind of indirect cost will suffice. Psychiatrists today agree in identifying a group, long known to careful observers of everyday life, of mental and nervous deviates, whose condition while not pronounced enough to warrant institutional care, act nevertheless as a drag upon the effectiveness and general morale of all whose lives they touch. Akin in significance is the evidence now coming from behavior clinics showing how juvenile rascality has a high degree of correlation with chronic invalidism in the home situation. It does not require technical psychiatric training to appreciate such causal relationship.

How large do these indirect costs of social ill-being loom in the aggregate?

Manifestly only a scientific approximation is possible, at best. A hint may be gathered from the data on mental diseases. A total of \$80,000,000 is spent annually in the United States for the maintenance of hospitals for the mentally diseased, according to the National Committee for Mental Hygiene. The annual economic loss of these hospital cases is placed by the same agency at \$300,000,000. And this latter figure ignores the widespread ramifying aspects of the non-institutional cases, reference to which has already been made. If, as Edward A. Strecher and Franklin G. Ebaugh indicate,⁵ for every institutional case there are three or four others under observation with disorders pronounced enough to identify them as sources of *social* focal infection, and if further allowance be made for the many unidentified and unsuspected cases, then our estimates of costs, speaking in terms of dollars, manifestly must exceed any of the total estimates thus far cited or made by students of this problem.

A ratio of four to five dollars of indirect cost to every dollar of direct cost, accepting the previously made distinction between these two kinds of costs, would seem to be quite reasonable, and, on the basis of available data on the cost of various forms of social ill-being, quite conservative. This would place the indirect costs at between twenty and twenty-five billion dollars each year, in addition to the five billions already indicated as the so-called direct costs.

THE FINANCIAL GESTALT

These figures involve staggering amounts of money. Five billion dollars is almost equal to three times the total annual expenditures for the maintenance of the public school system of this coun-

try; it is almost double the amount of the budget of the federal government in recent years; it approximates three-fifths of the total revenue raised in recent years for municipal, county, state and national purposes; and it exceeds slightly the total value of all of the products of the entire automobile industry of the United States in 1927. If the indirect costs be included, a total of between twenty-five and thirty billion dollars is obtained. This about equals the total capital invested in the railroads of the country. It exceeds in amount the combined estimated investment in the iron and steel, automobile, oil and lumber industries.

Speaking in terms of dollars, the problems of social ill-being are of primary magnitude and importance. The status of social welfare work and its financial implications have changed since the balmy days of American adolescence. The haphazard reactions of a frontier civilization to the relatively few individual cases of concrete need are inadequate today and have given way to large organized services, with huge annual budgets. Work with our social debtor groups has become a profession, and the cost of this work an integral problem in public and social finance.

Furthermore, such cost is increasing, absolutely and relatively, and seems destined to continue to do so unless radically different measures be taken. And for two very good reasons. To begin with, there is an insistence upon better care and greater comfort for our socially aided classes. This seems to be due, partly to a general rise in standards of living, and partly to a change in attitude concerning the kind of care which it is deemed advisable to give. It was held formerly, and even now uninformed persons may contend, that anything but the most vigorous and parsimonious treat-

⁵ *Clinical Psychiatry*, p. 160.

ment of our social charges would encourage their multiplication. If the alms-house is attractive, cheerful and clean, too many persons will seek admission; if the Family Society helps its families to a normal life, undeserving families will flock to it—thus runs the hoary argument.

There is another reason why the aggregate budget for welfare work is likely to increase. This is to be found in the fact that our standards of selection are gradually rising. One of the concepts in this whole subject which many persons apparently are unable to grasp is that crime, poverty, feeble-mindedness, insanity, etc., all are relative terms. This being the case, it follows inevitably that the existing extent of any or all of these problems at any time depends on where the line or standard of selection be set at the moment. Superficial students are confused constantly by the fact that a general forward movement of society, involving a rise in our concepts and standards concerning social problems, increases automatically, all other things remaining equal, the number and, accordingly, the cost of cases, for social guardianship.

PUBLIC APPRECIATION OF THE COSTS OF SOCIAL ILL-BEING

Some shrewd observer has remarked that social problems will never be dealt with effectively until the man on the street feels the pinch of the defective classes on his pocketbook. Apparently something resembling this very thing is now happening, and increasingly so. More and more is being said about the cost in dollars of social ill-being, totals are being cited, comparisons are being made, and perhaps most significant of all, a sense of the sheer wastefulness of it all is taking tangible form in the popular consciousness. Here and there one finds, too, some slight realization of the posi-

tive achievements which could be wrought were it not for the expenditures which social ill-being now necessitates.

We seem to have reached a point in welfare work where the intelligent citizen is querying the financial and social acumen of present policies and procedure. At any rate, some rather pointed questions are being asked. Are the moneys expended for welfare purposes spent wisely and judiciously? Must such stupendous expenditures continue indefinitely? Are there ways, socially fruitful as well, by which these burdensome costs may be reduced? Are there not constructive social measures, now known and advocated, which would yield larger returns per unit of expenditure? Is it not true in this field as in others that the best work is the cheapest work, that the largest returns or savings in dollars result from measures socially most desirable? Is the economy of prevention not greater than that of neglect?

Such questions in turn offer a rather direct challenge to those actively engaged in welfare work, demanding nothing less than an account of their stewardship. Fortunately, welfare work in the United States, using that phrase in its most general sense, shows signs of having reached a stage in its development where it has become self-conscious enough to make self-explanation possible.

Dr. William Healy, director of the Judge Baker Foundation and internationally famous as a clinical criminologist, may be taken as an illustration in point. For some time, Dr. Healy has been emphasizing, out of the background of his rich experience, this need for social self-audit in the field of crime. He has pointed out quite frankly the paucity of reliable data on the effectiveness of various types of peno-correctional treatment, insisting upon the need of studies to follow up

careers of ex-delinquents and ex-criminals subsequent to their subjection to modern methods of penal treatment. His recent book, *Delinquent and Criminals, Their Making and Unmaking*, written in collaboration with Dr. Augusta Bronner, is a daring instance of such self-audit. Numerous other such studies in many different fields of welfare activities need to be made.

TYPES OF WELFARE ACTIVITIES

In any analysis of welfare work, particularly with reference to money costs and possible economies, it is important to distinguish between two rather fundamentally different approaches to the problems of social ill-being. It is ventured to designate these as *custodial* and *constructive*, respectively. How these terms are used, and the philosophic bases which they embody or represent, will now be considered.

Custodial Service. The term custodial is used in the broad sense of implying guardianship. As applied to social failures, it represents the policy and viewpoint of a large group of more or less socially minded persons who are alive to the existence of human need and coöperate in making provision for it. The poor need relief, the aged need homes, the sick need medical and nursing service, there must be institutions for dependent children, criminals need prisons to restrain them, and the insane must be placed in asylums.

What has just been described is essentially the direct reaction of the group to its distressed and recalcitrant members, involving the exercise of a beneficent and protective guardianship over them, and resulting, at its best, in that beautiful and impressive type of ministry which has embodied so largely our ideal of goodness throughout the ages. Such has been our traditional attitude, such is the character and purpose of a goodly portion of our welfare activities today.

The basic implication of custodial service, however, and its distinguishing feature, is its passive acceptance of human failure. These unfortunate persons are what they are, and, barring the unusual, are destined to continue so to be. Manipulated by the fingers of fate, these persons are puppets of the inexorable; however pitiful, however costly—this is the law of life. It is the duty, therefore, of righteous living and of complete citizenship to carry this burden, adequately, generously, but hopelessly.

The general philosophy of life involved is one of resignation—of acceptance of that which is. Just as there are those whose viewpoint is aptly summarized by Alexander Pope's dictum that "Whatever is, is right," so there are many, many persons whose attitude might be expressed in the phrase that "Whatever is, must be." The world is amazingly full of people who observe and endure inconveniences, inefficiency, suffering and unhappiness of all kinds, without apparently ever questioning their necessity. Human misery, according to them, is an inevitable accompaniment of life; social failures, the necessary price of social progress. Gods, devils, heredity, "immutable" laws, and what not, are involved as explanations and—guarantors. Man is an infinitesimal speck tossed about by majestic forces over which he has no control, and as a consequence of which it needs must be that some will be poor, or deaf, or feeble in mind, or afflicted in body or distressed in spirit.

The attitude and philosophy just described is one which, in at least some of its manifestations, will be quite familiar to the reader. It can be found among all kinds and conditions of persons, ranging from the religiously inclined, to whom resignation of spirit is a resplendent virtue, to nice and well-meaning individuals

who never question the status quo; to scientists, so-called, who spend not the least of their energies in explaining that a thing cannot be done, that the laws of man and nature cannot be interfered with, even though they are not always wholly positive concerning the exact identity of those laws.

Constructive Service. The constructive approach, on the other hand, may be summarized in one sentence—it is always possible to do something. This statement is nearly enough correct to warrant its epigrammatic dogmatism.

Such an approach represents in welfare work that hopelessly incurable optimism which, in political life, we call democracy. It accepts nothing as fixed, nothing as settled or hopeless. There is nothing that need be if we once know why it is. For if we know why it is we can learn how it can be made not to be.

Psychologically, the constructive ideal rests upon the confidence of modern students in the extreme modifiability of human nature; sociologically, it is based upon a conviction that the social sciences can understand and achieve as effectively as the physical sciences have made possible; historically, it is inspired by the success, and illustrated by the failure, which every parent, teacher and case worker has had during the ages of man's history; logically, it finds its basis in that need of man's faith in man, without which man ceases to be a proper companion for man.

Constructive welfare work in point of time and relation to the specific problem, is of two main kinds or types. For want of better terms, these will be referred to as (a) after the fact, and (b) before the fact.

(a) Constructive work, *after the fact*, aims at restoration. It includes custodial care, to be sure, but simply as an incident in a program looking toward the rehabilitation or improvement of those involved.

Furthermore, restoration is not conceived in the narrow sense of re-establishing a former condition of comparative well-being, but in a positive, forward-looking sense and spirit of fullest development.

Many splendid instances of constructive service of the restorative type can be found in the experience of case workers in family service, in psychiatry, with delinquents—the aggressive gangster finds a wholesome outlet for his adolescent exuberance, the family circle is restored and cemented, the hookworm victim ceases to be "constitutionally lazy," the mental deviate is integrated to his environment and the "unadjusted girl" finds balm in wholesome marriage.

(b) Restorative work, however, is a constructive experience on the basis of which we learn to prevent. This brings us to constructive service *before the fact*.

Prevention has been the dominant motif of welfare philosophy and work in the first quarter of the twentieth century. There is nothing novel about the idea of prevention except its application to human welfare. In fact the idea is a very simple one. This is true of the idea behind every epoch-making improvement or invention.

Progress in preventive work leads to positive formulation of social programs. Prevention is negative. Constructive service must be, ultimately, positive in character. "A few illustrations will serve to clarify the difference between the negative emphasis of preventive work and the constructive implications of more recent programs. Preventive medicine aims at the prevention of disease. Its purpose is to keep people from becoming ill. A constructive health program plans, on the other hand, to increase a people's vitality and efficiency and to prolong life. Or, let us make the contrast in the field of education. The earlier purpose there was to

herd the children into the schools, to reduce the amount of illiteracy, and to banish bigotry and superstition. This program is negative, it will at once be seen, and as education becomes constructive in purpose and spirit the problems emphasized concern the determination of values in education and in life, and their better coördination. Recreation, in a social program based on the idea of prevention, aims at the elimination of delinquency and street accidents to children. In the constructive stage it shades by imperceptible degrees into a program for a larger life, full of joy, of relaxation, of well-being and happiness. Labor legislation, in a preventive program, considers the protection of workers against exploitation; constructively conceived, it comes to think and work in terms of raising the wage-workers' standard of living.

"Other illustrations might be cited, but it should be apparent that the difference between a preventive and a constructive ideal or program is not one of kind, but of degree of development. They are complementary rather than distinctive. Together, they constitute a stimulating hope, opening up vistas of possible promotions of social well-being which defy the imagination of present man to envisage."⁶

SPEAKING IN TERMS OF DOLLARS

If the distinction between these types of service be kept in mind, some interesting and significant comparisons may be made on the basis of money costs, with which this paper is concerning itself.

The first comparison will be made in the field of criminology. A financial survey of the penal and correctional institutions of Pennsylvania⁷ shows that the

cost of custodial care per inmate per year in Pennsylvania's penal institutions exceeds \$600. This does not include the cost of conviction which may average several thousand dollars per case in our larger cities, the damage of the criminal act or acts, nor the potential productive power of the individual concerned.

Constructive work, with a delinquent, after the fact, i.e., aiming at his restoration or reformation, comprehends a wide range of effort. Probation or parole work will serve by way of illustration for the purpose of this discussion. On the basis of present salary schedules, a very good probation officer may be had for \$3,000 per year. This is equal to the cost of keeping five persons in the prisons of Pennsylvania. But a good probation officer can take care of at least forty individuals. With but 50 per cent success, the arithmetic of such economy must be apparent. At any rate, the essential point to be emphasized here is that, speaking in terms of dollars, the most intensive case work and individualization of the criminal yet undertaken is not only feasible, but would represent a distinct economy of expenditure.

Still more varied are the activities which by purpose are constructive, in this field, before the fact. Of the better known today are the Visiting Teacher, the Big Brother and Big Sister, Scout and Camp Fire activities, recreational projects of all kinds, and child caring agencies of the better sort. Obviously, all character forming agencies must be classified within this general group.

The cost per person per year of service of this kind is somewhat difficult to determine. It varies with the type of organization and with the type of work which it does. An examination of the total budgets of some of these organizations, and of the number of cases dealt with,

⁶ Bossard, op. cit., pp. 629-630.

⁷ Louis N. Robinson, *A Financial Survey of the State Penal and Correctional Institutions in Pennsylvania*, 1922.

shows per capita expenditures far less than the mere prison maintenance cost. Some very high grade agencies doing preventive work of a kind that gives every indication of a high rate of success operate at a cost per case of less than \$100 per year. One agency, engaged in visiting teacher work, involving some grants of scholarship, shows expenditures per case per year of less than \$75. Some of the very excellent child caring agencies, carrying the expenses of dealing with very youthful charges, spend less than \$600 per year per case. In fact, there are many colleges and universities which operate on an annual expenditure per student of less than this amount.

The effectiveness of the activities named above in preventing delinquency has been quite thoroughly established. This fact, coupled with their relatively low cost, points once again to the distinctive economy of such work. It is just another illustration in modern form of the old adage concerning the comparative work of an ounce of prevention.

Constructive work may call for very radical, i.e., root, action. To make clear this fact, and to serve as another illustration of the financial aspects of our several welfare procedures, the Juke Family is cited. As most students of social problem know, this family, first studied by Dugdale,⁸ and more recently by Estabrook,⁹ has included 170 paupers, 129 recipients of outdoor relief, 118 criminals, 378 prostitutes, 86 brothel-keepers, and 181 intemperate persons. The cost of this family to the communities wherein they resided was placed by Estabrook at \$2,516, 685. If the original family which started this strain had been sterilized, as eugenists now advocate and as certain states permit, the cost to the state of New York

would have been about \$150. If they had been segregated for life, the cost might have reached \$25,000.

It must not be assumed from the foregoing discussion and illustrations that constructive welfare work is always obviously cheaper. Such a policy frequently involves, not only rather positive action, but also relatively large expenditures at the time. In welfare work as elsewhere, to be pound wise may necessitate what seems to be penny foolishness. Consider, by way of illustration, a case such as the one cited by Richards,¹⁰ of a mother and her ten-year-old daughter, who were caught stealing from a department store. "The woman said that she stole to get food because her husband had no work. The judge ordered a case-work agency to get the husband a job and to feed the family in the meantime. The husband is a chronic alcoholic; the wife a paregoric and morphia addict. They both have the psychopathic traits of drug habitués—profound untruthfulness and utter disregard of every responsibility. Three little children from four to ten years of age live under the influence of these two drug addicts. Could anything be more unintelligent than to order such a home kept together? Yet, to the judicial mind, vocational adjustment was the only issue for consideration.

"In like manner agencies are given temporary commitment for the resuscitation of little children who in three to six months are put back again under the parental influences that formerly disorganized their health. Adults with deep-seated habits of alcoholism, gross irresponsibility, and mental dishonesty are expected to change the characteristics of a lifetime following a reprimand from the bench. Adolescent boys drifting into progressively serious misdemeanors are repeatedly given 'one more chance' on the maternal plea that their support is needed,

⁸ R. L. Dugdale, *The Jukes*, 1877.

⁹ Arthur H. Estabrook, *The Jukes in 1915*.

¹⁰ Esther Loring Richards, *Mental Hygiene*, XI, October, 1927, p. 700.

when inquiry into the actual facts fails to reveal a single evidence of wholesome habit formation in lads who have stolen from their mothers since early childhood."

Obviously, here are cases, and there are many like them where intensive case work, involving appreciable expenditures of money, is required if the necessary adjustments are to be made. Such expenditures may seem to loom very large at the time, especially if compared with the cost of some trivial or superficial arrangement which might be made for the moment. It is, however, with the ultimate cost of such cases that expenditures must be considered in the formation of a wise social policy.

The contention underlying this paper is that money spent for social purposes should be considered as an investment and planned as such, rather than as an item of necessary wastage or loss. Speaking in terms of dollars, constructive welfare work represents an investment; custodial care, the dead loss of an unremunerative carrying charge. Constructive work, after the fact, might be compared to a short time investment; constructive work, before the fact, to a long range one. The difference in terms of dollars of these respective policies is quite considerable. Definite and detailed studies showing the extent of such differences in many different fields of work need to be made. Welfare workers, and students of these problems, can contribute much to the success and support of their work by so doing.

A SCIENCE OF SOCIAL ECONOMY

There ought to be developed a book-keeping of our social experiences, involving a rather careful accounting of the financial results of our social policies. Obviously there are social economies as

there are personal and domestic ones, and it would seem to be both feasible and wise to determine them. To do this would be to create a real science of social economy.

Social research might profitably address itself into this direction. This would be but to take a leaf out of the experience of present day business which, according to the reports of the National Research Council, is now spending more than \$75,000,000 a year on research projects. It is significant to note, by statement of this same organization, that "against 5,500 researches in the nature of things we have 30,000 men studying how to apply their discoveries to practical purposes. The number of laboratories devoted to making practical use of previously discovered scientific laws has increased 200 per cent in the last ten years." This may or may not be the proportion between these two arms of research process, but there can be no doubt that society might profit tremendously from an emphasis in social research upon the practical applications and implications of our present knowledge.

The significance to social research of the change in emphasis from custodial to constructive service, as herein described, has received recent emphasis. Writes Dr. Neva R. Deardorff, director of the Research Bureau of the Welfare Council of New York City: "Since the beginnings of social work, when organized humanitarian duties were so obvious that most people missed them, and inspired leaders needed no special study to find them, many of the worst abuses (with the exception of war) have in large measure been cleaned up. The present job of positive enhancement of the value of life is of a different kind. It presents much more subtle and difficult problems than those with which our pioneers had to cope. We are far less sure of the action to be taken. We

have fewer spectacular abuses and a declining number, we hope, of those hardships which startle public opinion and indicate immediate action. Arousing people to rise up and do something drastic is now less needed than getting them to sit down and think hard about ways to secure steady upward progress.¹¹

Of the various kinds of social research now being pursued, that regarding the care and treatment of individuals and families is of direct interest in connection with our discussion. Such research, Dr. Deardorff finds as "still embryonic." "The field of methodology is perhaps the least cultivated of all the realms of social research. Social treatment in all its varied aspects, whether through community-wide measures or through individualized forms, is not yet sufficiently articulated or consistently practiced, to give much material for research purposes. We are not, however, without some examples of efforts to find out. *How Foster Children Turn Out*, by Sophie Theis, published a few years ago by the State Charities Aid Association of New York, was a brave attempt to measure results of foster-home placement for children of different ages and types. Recently an attempt has been made to measure the results of treatment by the Child Guidance Clinic of New York which was maintained on an experimental basis for five years. At the last annual meeting of the American Statistical Association, Porter R. Lee presented an analysis of the method by which measurements were attempted. It is with gratification that we learn of the plans of the New York School of Social Work to inaugurate an inquiry into the method of

measuring the results of social case work."¹²

CHILD WELFARE AND SOCIAL ECONOMY

The relation of the foregoing discussion to the problems of Child Welfare should be quite obvious. In a world clamoring for short cuts to prosperity and well-being, constructive work with children offers the closest possible approach to it. Child Welfare work, scientifically conceived and effectively executed, is *constructive*, par excellence, and *before the fact*. If there is one lesson which humans should have learned through the long centuries of their progress it is that no people can neglect its young with impunity; and that none can invest in it without reward, sixty and an hundred fold. Speaking in terms of dollars, child welfare work is the safest and most fruitful investment which a nation possibly can make.

The monetary thread running through this paper has not meant to imply a disregard or depreciation of the human aspects and values involved. Rather has it been sought to show that if these lesser financial aspects alone be considered, the problems are immeasurably important. There is, however, something to be said in favor of a consideration of social problems in terms of the financial equation. It just may be that it is on this score and in this form that their very great importance and implications may best be expressed and grasped. Surely there can be no objection to this effort so to do, for the purpose, it will be understood, has been simply one of using the dollar sign to clarify and to emphasize the social values behind it. We may speak in terms of dollars, but we must always feel in terms of humanity itself.

¹¹ Neva R. Deardorff, *The Survey*, July 15, 1928, p. 424.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 425.

RESEARCH IN THE STANDARD OF LIVING

C. R. HOFFER

DURING the last decade a number of studies dealing with the standard of living have been made. These studies have differed somewhat in their approach to the subject, because the concept, "standard of living," is very broad and inclusive. Almost any phenomenon may be related to it in one way or another. Research work is still being done in this field of investigation and a greater variety of workers are outlining research projects. It seems desirable, therefore, to indicate in a general way the scope and relationships of studies which deal with this subject.

An examination of several investigations already completed relating to family living shows that the following items have been considered:¹ Food; Clothing; Housing; Furnishings; Operation; Maintenance of Health; Advancement; Personal Expenses, and certain expenditures put under the heading Unclassified items. There is not entire agreement regarding the inclusion of life insurance as an item in the standard of living. Insurance is put under savings in at least one case. The omission of either insurance or savings from items included in the usual standard of living schedule is due probably to the theory that they are not a "cost" of living and therefore need not be considered. The procedure to be followed in cases of this kind must necessarily be determined by the objective that the investi-

gator has in mind, because as will be pointed out later, a cost of living schedule is not the same as a standard of living schedule, even though they are similar in many respects.

Items included in living studies may be considered from at least three points of view. If the chief consideration is cost, then the studies are really "cost of living studies" and all items are evaluated as accurately as possible on a dollar and cents basis. If the amount of goods of various kinds and qualities used during a given period of time is the primary consideration, then the projects are studies in "level of living" for this phase is ordinarily used to indicate the amount of goods and services consumed.² If, however, the central problem is to determine the amount and quality of different items needed and how they can be most efficiently provided, such research projects may logically be called studies in the "efficiency of living." Thus, the "cost of living," "level of living," and "efficiency of living" are sub-categories under the major concept, "standard of living." The first category represents the cost of goods and services; the second, the amount of each consumed; and the third, the degree of efficiency the family attains in the purchase and use of goods and services. Furthermore, it seems reasonable to assume that the combined result of these three factors—cost of living, level of living, and efficiency of living—must represent the way a family actually lives.

¹ See: "The Farmer's Standard of Living," United States Department of Agriculture Bulletin No. 1466, pp. 11-12. "The Standard of Living on Iowa Farms," Iowa Agricultural Experiment Station Bulletin No. 238, p. 96; and, "How Minnesota Farm Family Incomes are Spent," University of Minnesota, Agricultural Experiment Station Bulletin No. 234, p. 14.

² It is so used by (1) Andrews, *Economics of the Household*, p. 83; (2) Kirkpatrick, in *Farm Income and Farm Life*, p. 126; (3) by Tugwell, Munro and Stryker, *American Economic Life*, Parts II, III and IV.

THE CONCEPT STANDARD OF LIVING

The term "standard of living" has been used to convey two different meanings. Some writers use it to indicate an ideal or a model, while others use it to indicate a sort of average or standard in much the same way that we speak of a standard article of merchandise.³ The latter usage is more frequently employed at the present time and there is evidence that this usage of the term will increase. It is important, however, not to confuse standard of living with cost of living. Sometimes cost of living is used as a measure of standard of living (due to the lack of more accurate methods), but the two are not identical. Standard of living includes beside the factor of cost, the level of living and the efficiency in the use of goods and services that are available.

A definition of the standard of living in exact terms is very difficult, if not impossible, to make. Many factors of both a tangible and intangible nature influence it. The foundation for such a definition is being made though, as the results of scientific studies pertaining to the various aspects of living become available. Requirements for food and clothing will no doubt be worked out with considerable exactness.⁴ The standards for food and clothing thus derived will be useful for all families as a norm from which to determine their needs. Whether it will be possible to develop accurate measurements for the more intangible items influencing the standard of living is extremely questionable. Consequently any statement of the standard of living, must necessarily be general in nature and include the net result of cost,

³ H. P. Fairchild, *Applied Sociology*, p. 82.

⁴ "Dietary Scales and Standards for Measuring a Family's Nutritive Needs," Technical Bulletin No. 8, United States Department of Agriculture, describes the methods of determining food requirements.

level and efficiency of living as these factors occur in the particular family or group of families studied. Standard of living is somewhat analogous to "good" or "perfect" health. It can be understood only in relation to the factors that influence it.

MEASURING THE STANDARD OF LIVING

There have been some attempts to find relatively easy and quick methods of measuring the standard of living, but in most cases the measures finally rest on either cost of living or level of living. No investigator claims that his method is as accurate as he desires it to be. Dr. Kirkpatrick reports an initial attempt along this line. He has found significant relationships between certain quantitative facts, such as average value of family goods used and rating of farm homes, (1) by general impressions, (2) by direct observation of the farmstead, and (3) by direct observation of the interior of the house. The method of measurement by observation he concludes can be used as a rough gauge but has some obvious limitation and deserves further study.⁵

Neither cost of living, level of living, or efficiency of living will separately give a measure of the standard of living because the combination of the three factors is left unmeasured, except to the extent that there is constant association between them. This association appears not to exist to a dependable degree. For we read, "It is true that in present-day economy almost all consumption goods and services are purchasable. Mere expenditure of money, however, cannot constitute a wholly satisfactory index to living, for uneconomical and wasteful expenditure of a given amount of money may buy

⁵ E. L. Kirkpatrick, "Measuring the Farmer's Standard of Living," *Journal of Home Economics*, 19, pp. 459-462.

a much smaller increment of goods and services to satisfy a given set of wants and desires than a less amount would buy if wisely spent.⁶

Such considerations need not discourage efforts to measure certain aspects of the standard of living. They will be helpful in understanding its nature and will assist in making a more exact definition for it. Referring to the analogy of good health again, it may be stated that there is not a simple or quick test that can be used to measure health as a unit. Rather, reliable tests have been devised for testing specific aspects of an individual's health. In like manner, the measure of the standard of living will not be one measure but will consist of several measures that can be applied to the way a family lives.

TYPES OF PROJECTS IN STANDARD OF LIVING STUDIES

Research projects in connection with the standard of living may be divided into at least three groups. The first relates to cost of living. It involves a consideration of how much it costs on a dollar and cents basis for families to live under different circumstances.⁷ Several factors deserve attention here. It would be desirable to have the data show not only what amounts the family spends for different items but also how the amount for any specific item varies. What are the costs of clothing for a family year by year for a period of twenty years? How do they vary? Likewise, what is the expenditure for advancement as children grow up and attend

high school and college? If such data for families in different stages of development could be collected and arranged in consecutive order they would be extremely helpful in giving not only an estimate of the cost of living for particular families but also an estimate of the cost for particular items.⁸

The value of such data is apparent to anyone interested in social research because the figures furnish a quantitative basis for comparing the cost of living with many factors such as income, total wealth of the family and education. Moreover, a knowledge of the probable increase or decrease in the cost of different items would assist families in planning to meet these changes before they arrive.

Studies in the level of living to show the amount of different kinds of goods used constitute a second type of investigation. The habits of people regarding their manner of living change. For instance, education regarding diet is having its effect. People are consuming less meat and more fruits and milk. Clothing needs vary. How often is an overcoat, suit or hat purchased? To what extent are modern household appliances now available on the market being used? These are all questions related to the level of living. The Commissioner of Labor Statistics definitely makes a plea for a new family budgetary survey in his annual report to the Secretary of Labor. "The family budgetary survey upon which the Bureau is depending for its weights, or in other words, for the amount of each article consumed by the average working-man's family was made in 1918-19 and is

⁶ C. C. Taylor, *Rural Sociology*, Harper & Brothers Publishers, p. 110.

⁷ Some problems to be considered in studying cost of living are discussed by C. C. Zimmerman, "Objectives and Methods in Rural Living Studies," *Journal of Farm Economics*, IX, pp. 223-237.

⁸ This has been done for farm families. See United States Department of Agriculture Bulletin No. 1466. Also, "The Measurement of the Relative Economic Status of Families" by Edgar Syenstricker and Willford I. King, *Journal of American Statistical Association*, XVII, pp. 842-857.

therefore practically ten years old."⁹ Many changes have taken place in living habits during the decade. The Commissioner doubts the value of collecting up-to-date prices and applying them to a 1918 quantity distribution of family purchases.¹⁰

Efficiency of living studies represents a third type of investigation related to family living. Presumably such projects should deal with the requirements of different amounts and qualities of goods needed by various members of the family as well as the most economical way to supply such goods. This involves the whole question of foods, diet, clothing and housing requirements for families. But other factors such as health maintenance and expenditures for schools and churches are involved. It makes considerable difference from the standpoint of the family whether its money is spent to maintain a poorly equipped school or church, or is spent to maintain institutions that are thoroughly modern and efficient.

There is no intention in thus dividing the field of research in the standard of living to limit a given type of investigation to the particular type of worker. A research worker may make any type of investigation, provided he or she can do it well and the study is pertinent to the problem that the investigator has in mind. Thus standard of living studies emphasizing cost of living have been made by rural sociologists. These studies are to a large

extent economic in character but they have shown that increased income on the farm does not always result in high standards of living. This is exactly the point the sociologist and other persons needed to know.

THE STANDARD OF LIFE

Within recent years the term "standard of life" has been used in connection with discussions of how people live. It has sometimes been used interchangeably with "standard of living." There is, however, a significant difference between these terms. "Standard of life" as defined by Kirkpatrick, "refers to the objectives, the aims and ideals of the family in regard to its living."¹¹ When viewed from this standpoint, it is evident that "standard of life" is more comprehensive in scope than standard of living. Standard of living, as described in this paper, is largely determined by the standard of life, because the latter term refers to the aims and ideals that people have. Ideals are powerful factors in controlling human behavior. They motivate a family to live according to the standards set by the psycho-social environment which envelops it. Standard of life is a cultural product. It depends upon the numbers and types of contacts that flow from family to family and from group to group. Detailed investigations of these contacts in modern society have only just begun. An understanding of their nature and content is basic to a complete analysis of the standard of living as it is manifested in different groups at the present time.

⁹ Annual report of the Commissioner of Labor Statistics for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1927, p. 17.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

¹¹ *Farm Income and Farm Life*, p. 127.

MUST WE PAY FOR MODERN LIVING WITH SHORTENED LIVES?

R. BRODA

AMERICAN public opinion is rather optimistic about the great improvement in public health which has taken place in this country during the last half century. People think proudly of the successful war waged against epidemic diseases and of the cutting in half of the mortality in the Panama Canal Zone, through the suppression of the mosquito by American health engineers. The decrease in the mortality rate from tuberculosis (in the United States registration area for 100,000 living) from 245 in 1890 to 97 in 1920 shows that that great scourge of youth has been effectively combated. The general decline of the death rate also seems to be encouraging. In the registration area, per 100,000 living, it has decreased from 1,755 in 1900 to 1,496 in 1910, to 1,308 in 1920, and to 1,182 in 1925.

But a deeper analysis of the yearly mortality statistics published by the Bureau of the Census shows that prolongation of the average life is due nearly exclusively to two causes: elimination of many dangers to infants' lives and radical restriction of infectious diseases. The expectation for a newly born child to live to the age of fifty years is now much greater than it was a quarter of a century ago. But has the probable life span of the man of fifty been increased in a corresponding way? The statistics say "no." They show that mortality from the chronic diseases of middle age and advanced age does not decrease but *increases*. The above mentioned mortality rates, 1910-1920 of the Census Bureau, show (p. 99) the development of the mortality from organic

diseases of the heart¹ per 100,000 population in the registration states of 1900 (see Table I).

The cited mortality rates give (pp. 87, 81) the corresponding figures for two other chronic diseases of the second half of the life, diabetes and cancer, and show the same strong increase. (See Table II).

The conclusion seems clear. Notwithstanding all the advances of medical science, notwithstanding the greater wealth of the people, making possible greater comfort and more care for health, the typical chronic diseases, particularly in the later years of life, increase.

To ascertain the probable reasons for the phenomenon it seems useful to find out whether different conditions of life have influence on the mortality rates and whether the increased rates refer more particularly to one group of people. We find in the Statistical Abstract for 1926 that the mortality rate for 1925 per 1,000 people was 13 in the registration cities, and only 10.7 in the rural part of the registration area. There is undoubtedly

¹ Care has been taken to eliminate the source of error from comparing mortality rates in population groups having a different age composition. It is, of course, clear that the decrease of mortality in younger years has changed that age composition and that people of higher age predominate more today than in the past. That increases automatically the mortality rate from organic diseases of advanced age. There is, however, a statistical device to correct that error by rebalinating mortality rates on the basis of a standard composition of population. The standard population of England and Wales in 1901 has been chosen for that purpose; these adjusted rates eliminate the differences due to dissimilarities in the age and sex distribution of the population and permit exact comparisons.

something connected with city life that increases mortality. It is true that even in the cities the mortality rate decreased from 15.3 in 1913 to 13.0 in 1925, but we have already pointed out that this is due to the fact that the *decrease* in mortality for infants and for tuberculosis weighs heavier than the *increase*, clearly proven in the preceding tables, for the chronic dis-

northeastern states, which in 1900 already registered deaths and are among the most developed of this country, have undergone processes of far reaching industrialization and developed some of the greatest cities of the country. It was therefore a shift from agriculture to industry, from country to city, and that shift seems to be to a large extent responsible for the great increase of mortality rates from the organic diseases.

The conclusion seems appropriate therefore that industrial life in this country brings about great dangers to health; more so even than in Europe. Fisher and Fisk show in their book *How To Live* (p. 444) that the mortality from heart, blood vessel, and kidney diseases has varied in a different way in England and Wales than in the United States registration area. In England and Wales the death rates for these diseases, for 10,000 living have decreased from 30 in 1890 to 29 in 1920. In the United States registration area the death rates have increased from 27 in 1890 to 37 in 1920, or 37 per cent. The less strict application of laws for industrial workers in this country, the lack of social insurance, etc., seem to have an effect of increased mortality among the working class. The quicker life in American cities, the greater haste, the greater endeavor to beat the competitor, the greater intensity of labor have also undoubtedly put a greater strain on the heart and the nerves; and seem to be responsible for the quicker destruction of the vital force of the American city dweller, in comparison both with the American village dweller and with the average Britisher, although the latter lives even to a greater extent in cities than the contemporary American.

TABLE I

YEAR	MORTALITY FROM
	Heart diseases
1900.....	108.7
Average 1901-1905.....	121.9
1910.....	149.0
Average 1911-1915.....	149.6
1920.....	158.0
1925.....	(about) 180.0*

* The Statistical Abstract of the United States for 1926 gives on page 77 the crude rates for heart diseases, which were 234.2, and applying the ratio between crude and adjusted rates which holds good in 1920 leads to an adjusted rate of 180.

TABLE II

YEAR	MORTALITY FROM	
	Diabetes	Cancer
1900.....	10.4	60.7
Average 1901-1905.....	12.1	64.7
1910.....	16.6	77.3
Average 1911-1915.....	17.6	80.2
1920.....	18.7	87.8
1925.....	19.1*	98.0*

* Calculation from crude rates transferred into adjusted rates.

eases of advanced age. Viewing the tables of the increase in chronic diseases from another angle, we find that they refer to the registration area of 1900, both for that year and for today.² But the

² That restriction was necessary in order to compare mortality in the same states. The western and southern states did not register deaths in 1900. Most of them did in 1925. Comparing figures of 1900 for some states with figures of 1925 for practically all

states would not show the development in the *same* area.

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Industrialization in this country proceeds further and further and the detrimental effect on health and mortality may therefore become more and more preponderant. Have we simply to pay that heavy price for greater productivity of labor, possession of more goods to satisfy our desires? Have we to admit the dilemma that in order to crowd more satisfactions of desires inside the space of one year of life we must accept the diminution of the total number of years we have to live?

TABLE III

RATES OF MORTALITY PER THOUSAND LIVING (IN 1910)

	AGE		
	20	40	60
Rural districts:			
White males.....	4.83	7.06	22.91
White females.....	4.41	6.65	20.06
Nearly identical mortality for men and women			
Cities:			
White males.....	4.93	12.10	38.51
White females.....	4.10	8.83	30.65
Gross difference between men and women, particularly in the second part of life			

In order to find remedies we must try to circumscribe yet more precisely the particular groups of people in danger of premature death. The United States life tables, published by the Bureau of the Census, give (p. 33) the rates shown in Table III. The vital force of men is more quickly exhausted by the hasty ways of cities to *earn a living*. Women in their homes suffer less. *Living* in cities increases mortality; but *working* in these is worse.

We have noted, however, that the mortality from *tuberculosis*, the most pernicious occupational disease of the *industrial* worker *decreases*. The last year has accelerated the movement. We find, in

the Mortality Statistics for 1924 of the Census Bureau (p. 39), that the mortality from tuberculosis (per 1,000 living) has decreased in cities in registration states from 1.36 in 1915 to 0.78 in 1924. On the other hand, we have seen that the mortality *increases* rapidly from diseases prevalent among people who are overweight (heart diseases; diabetes; kidney troubles; and diseases caused by abnormal conditions of the blood vessels); that is to say, among people of means who partake of rich nourishment and who do not do heavy manual work; to a large extent therefore with *business men*. In addition to these two points, overeating and lack of exercise, a third point—*nervous exhaustion* through the *haste* of life and work, significant for this class, seems to play a decisive rôle. Heart diseases and diabetes are indeed frequently the consequence of nervous tension. It may be worth while to counteract that tendency and to diminish its force, if it cannot be broken entirely.

Viewing once more the possible reasons for the increasing mortality, particularly from heart diseases, diabetes, and diseases caused by abnormal conditions of the blood vessels and kidneys, we have alluded already to the fact that it is mainly people who are overweight who are struck by these ailments. In the April 1926 number of the journal *How to Live*, we find a table showing the influence of weight on mortality from the age of 35 to 49³ (see Table IV). Now this particular reason for an increasing mortality is less aloof than is city life generally, it can be attacked with greater success; and, by the application of individual hygiene in diet, the danger can be reduced.

The Life Extension Institute has made

³ I am also indebted for some of these data to Mr. K. B. Mabon of the Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada.

arrangements with several insurance societies, offering to examine the policy holders periodically, in order to discover whether they suffer from any unsuspected ailments, to give them useful advice on how to combat them, and to prolong the period of life during which they can pay premiums. The statistical department of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company of New York has ascertained, after an

TABLE IV

	PER CENT HIGHER DEATH RATE, COM- PAARED WITH RATE OF PEOPLE WEIGHING 10 POUNDS UNDER THE AVERAGE WEIGHT	per cent
Average weight.....	4	
5 pounds above average.....	8	
10 pounds above average.....	12	
15 pounds above average.....	18	
20 pounds above average.....	22	
25 pounds above average.....	26	
30 pounds above average.....	32	
35 pounds above average.....	40	
40 pounds above average.....	49	
45 pounds above average.....	55	
50 pounds above average.....	60	
55 pounds above average.....	65	
60 pounds above average.....	71	
65 pounds above average.....	78	
70 pounds above average.....	85	
75 pounds above average.....	92	
80 pounds above average.....	100	
85 pounds above average.....	110	
90 pounds above average.....	120	

experience of six years, that 6,000 persons have been periodically examined, that the expense was \$60,000, and the gain from prolonged payment of premiums \$120,000.

The Guardian Life Company ascertained in an analogous way that the mortality rate was decreased by 23 per cent through these examinations.⁴ These

⁴ "Lengthening of Human Life in Retrospect and Prospect" by Irving Fisher in the *American Journal of Public Health* for January, 1927.

endeavors to combat chronic diseases have been extended also to factory workers. The *American Journal of Public Health* gives a table of the results obtained (see Table V). It must, of course, be admitted that these curative medical endeavors touch only one side of the development. A further development of public hygiene and better application of personal hygiene, a change in the way of living, less haste, less overeating, better housing conditions, and less factory work under unhygienic conditions are of even greater importance for the decrease or in-

TABLE V
IMPROVEMENT IN PHYSICAL CONDITION OF INDUSTRIAL WORKERS RESULTING FROM PERIODIC PHYSICAL EXAMINATION AS REVEALED BY THE MEDICAL AND SURGICAL ATTENTION NEEDED AT 3 SUCCESSIVE YEARS OF EXAMINATION (596 INDIVIDUALS)

CLASS OF MEDICAL OR SURGICAL ATTENTION NEEDED	NUMBER OF CASES NEEDING ATTENTION AT FIRST EXAMINATION	NEW CASES NEEDING ATTENTION AT SECOND EXAMINATION	PERCENTAGE OF CASES CURED WITHIN YEAR FOLLOWING DISCOVERY OF IMPAIRMENT
General medicine.....	90	60	69
Eye.....	217	66	52
Ear.....	64	24	58
Nose and throat.....	144	79	50
Surgical.....	79	61	62

crease of mortality rates; these changes necessitate broader efforts than the simple decision to be examined once a year by a competent physician and to follow his advice. But even these broader efforts do not seem to exceed human strength, and certainly not the force of initiative of the American individual and of the American nation. *It can be done.* Whether it *will* be done seems to depend on general recognition of the *necessity* to do it. There is *danger* that the decrease in mortality of the last decades may slowly shift into an *increase*.

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THE COMMUNITY AND NEIGHBORHOOD

This department is conducted by THE NATIONAL COMMUNITY CENTER ASSOCIATION, and is edited by LeRoy E. Bowman, 403 Fayerweather Hall, Columbia University, New York City.

THE 1929 CONTENT OF THE COMMUNITY CONCEPT

LeROY E. BOWMAN

AUTOMOBILE manufacturers change their makes; psychologies multiply and differentiate; and sociological concepts take on new forms and to lesser extent new content year by year. The annual conferences of the sociologists offer the double interest of something new in a familiar field, and the sight of a game played by many old friends and a few new ones in which some have new tricks to display, and most of us do not. The main show and one side tent is all one can comfortably "take in," and for the benefit of those who did not see all the community performances, this critical, analytical and informative review is offered. It is, like all sociology, very incomplete although quite comprehensive, suggestive but not too graphic, and despite the fact that it deals with a world wide subject, it reveals more of the author's opinions than ultimate truths about communities.

If the Ford had not only evolved into its latest resplendent form but had jumped out of its class into that of the most expensive motor car, it would have made no greater metamorphosis than has the general idea of community in the last few years. No longer can the old time enthusiast come to a national conference and hear pictured in words a nice, small

understandable community that can be handled, visualized, organized and held up as a model. Instead of geographic boundaries and foundations he hears about ecological factors that keep constantly on the move; instead of definite forms of organization he hears about adjustments of local folkways and mores; instead of institutions like a school, a settlement house or a town hall, he meets—or at least views partially—a complex culture concept. If forms have not disappeared, the interest in them has given way to meanings, traditions, forces behind forms; if he comes determined on what he is going to do to a community and is looking for a formula, he will soon find himself listening to what the community has done to him to make him so determined. If he attempts to discover what after all is the community in which democratic coöperation can be developed, he will find that there are many varied kinds of communities and within any one there is going on beneath the surface a ceaseless struggle for status and as much of a desire to get away from some people in some ways as to get next to the same or other people in other ways. If then the community concept in modern style has revolted against its own tradition, is different from what it was (and perhaps

ought to be), and cannot be described simply and categorically as in its youth, it is quite in order to tell in suggestive terms some of the interesting developments in its life history.

First then the community concept is not so single as it once was; community organization seems to be mixed up with a number of things; whereas it started out as a movement all by itself. Social service has taken its name and in some slight measure begun to copy its democratic ways; adult education is very close to it, and according to one excellent authority is the same thing and should have so recognized itself as long ago as during the World War. City and regional planning are either causes and conditions of it or they are of the self same stock. Strange to say the sociologists have not yet added an attachment to their community concept that has fundamental implications; namely community religion—not the community church, nor the Protestant federated church, not belief or supernaturalism. Nor have they yet talked of, if they have seen, the meaning of community as applied to consumption; and hence have not recognized the relation of the community concept to the coöperative movement.

A few have been thinking for many years that community organization is the communal aspect of social adjustments; the idea is just barely getting into words and not very clear ones as yet. The community case-study texts of Pettit and Steiner, the clear cut analysis of Russian communal life by Borders, regional plans, and the classic background of Thomas' studies in adjustments, these are gradually creating a substantial meaning for the term community. Community of the protagonists, community of the community surveys, these were static things; history and tradition are the prime essen-

tials in a description or understanding of community forces.

The 1929 model of community is not backward in one sociological concept whether one sees it in Chicago, Southern California, Columbia or Connecticut College, namely the culture concept. If the paper deals with Jewish centers, Negro districts, a Russian religious sect, or the most effective geographical unit for studying racial influences, the hypothetical community one starts out to find is one inherent in the culture of a people or a group. Never before was the agreement so unanimous, nor the studies so sure in their procedure. There is a feeling of "biting into something" and the expectancy that studies of communities along these lines will be quite significant.

This is a long way from the Community Center conferences of only fifteen years ago. Culture deals with attitudes and assumptions, social habits, not so much with deliberative, planned organization. And yet there is one other distinct recent development in thinking about community. Cities are being deliberately replanned and remade, and under our eyes we have seen whole communities carved out of metropolitan areas by politicians and real estate developers. Not only have the housing developments come about, but with them neighborhood organization, neighborhood gossip, potent primary controls and all the rest that has been listed as a relic of the past. Community building, neighborhood organization are not all a product of what went before us. As a result, studies in the planning of neighborhood units, that seemed utopian only a few months ago, are filled with a new meaning.

Best of all the noticeable features of recent thinking on community is its skepticism, a skepticism that is not scientifically dutiful or religiously critical, but

rather reserved, tolerant and amused. Community spirit is no longer the sumum bonum, it is merely a good thing in moderation. While it is needed to carry out common projects, the same thing in smaller units in church, nationality groups, lodges, political parties, etc., is recognized as the chief detriment to common projects. The practical organizers are speaking as much of "divisive factors" as they are of "community consciousness." They also smile a great deal when the subject of the "community

movement" is brought up. One must admit it is humorous, but it is a most unusual thing to see people smile their own movement out of the conference. Perhaps they have acquired an attitude of amused skepticism toward all movements and are acting in the same way toward their own. That performance is close to introjection, whereas community organizers not long ago were in the habit of thinking and feeling noble sentiments and attempting to realize them in and on the rest of the world. That was projection.

LOCAL AUTONOMY IN RUSSIAN VILLAGE LIFE UNDER THE SOVIETS

KARL BORDERS

EVERY student of Russian life and institutions under the Tsars, whether Russian or foreign, was forcibly struck by the apparent anomaly of the existence of the utmost democratic local government in the village commune in the midst of the most perfectly autocratic central government. Wallace, a British traveler, writing in 1875 devotes pages to this astounding phenomenon as he witnessed it in the activities of the Village Mir. Stepniak, a prominent Russian nihilist writing ten years later, finds in this far flung ancient instinct for local autonomy evidence against the popular idea that Russians are constitutionally adapted for despotism. Lenin was always a defender of the villager against his more doctrinaire compatriots and insisted that even the Bolsheviks had much to learn from them.

COMMUNITIES BY GEOGRAPHY AND HISTORY

The physical characteristics of the Russian village have much to do with its social and political nature. The isolated

farm such as is common in the United States is even today rare in Russia. The peasant lives in compact settlements with courtyards set side by side along the central artery of a broad main street. The population may vary from one hundred to ten thousand. The village may be set in the middle of the steppe or immured in the woodlands of the north. But its inhabitants are nine-tenths or more engaged in the actual cultivation of the soil, going often as far as ten or fifteen miles to their fields.

In the days of serfdom, two generations ago, this was a convenient unit for the mobilization of laborers. Both the landlord and the government dealt with the commune as the village body was called, and not with the individual. The village was often remote. Roads in Russia are invariably bad. Both government and landlord worked principally by absentee treatment through the unspeakable mediation of small officials whose chief business was the collection of taxes and rents. Both were levied, not upon individuals,

but upon the commune. The division of these burdens within the group, as well as most of the minor details concerning the lives and affairs of the villagers was left to the commune. In this way centuries of experience in simple local autonomy grew up within and alongside the remote and legendary offices of the Tsar.

With the coming of emancipation a form of local government was instituted known as the Zemstvo. Here again the peasants of the village commune did not participate directly as electors, but formed a sort of electoral college whose deputies selected district representatives from candidates proffered by the provincial governor. The "land captains," introduced in later years, exercised even more intimate autocratic powers than were present under the old system. The burden of the rule of these captains coupled with the excessive redemption taxes paid for their land, made the new "freedom" of the peasants a doubtful bargain.

The Zemstvo, however, did draw to its services thousands of the more liberal and progressive men of Russia and so far as permitted by the autocracy, undertook to serve the village. Through it schools, hospitals, public improvements, and modern agricultural methods made considerable headway, and, what is more, at least a few peasants received further training in representative government and the management of public affairs.

SOVIET VILLAGE ORGANIZATION

The October Revolution found the villages already taking over the estates deserted by the landlords or disposing of the landlords who remained and dividing the land which they had always regarded as their own among themselves through the simple devices of communal justice. In the beginning, the Bolsheviks did little more than give official sanction to this

process and the agrarian laws finally adopted were those which were in essential accord with the wishes of the peasants and long ago formulated by the Social Democrats.

Land today theoretically belongs to the state. The available fields of the village are divided by a local committee with utter impartiality among all the villagers who wish to till it on the basis of the number of members in the family. It remains to all practical purposes, the property of this family so long as it is cultivated by them. The old idea of the communal land has thus carried over.

True, there is an energetic penetration of the village under way by the Communists, but since the almost calamitous grain requisitions of the military days, this has been a quiet and peaceful penetration. Again, the masters have changed, the village pursues the autonomous tenor of its way.

The general pyramidal structure of the Soviet State is too well known to require elaboration in this paper. Its bases rest in avowed class principle upon the peasant and worker. But they do not rest equally even yet. Communism is a proletarian product and the electoral power in the grand summary is so weighted as to give the vote of the city worker about three times the weight of that of the villager by the time its effect has been felt in the higher branches of government. This distinction, however, is not in the least apparent in the village. A village election today is wellnigh as simple as a gathering of the Mir a century ago. Suffrage is extended to every village worker over eighteen, men and women alike with a few notable exceptions. The disfranchised are excluded frankly on a class basis and include clergy, old members of the Tsar's police, private merchants and employers of more than three hired workmen—a total of not

more than one per cent of those of voting age. The communist group of a village of three thousand in which I lived numbered only fifteen. Elections are held once a year, usually in the early winter. Long before the day set, a vigorous campaign was undertaken by every means of publicity, poster, speech and newspaper, to get out the vote. For the Communists have found the danger in the village to be not in peasant opposition but peasant indifference. The little party nucleus, well disciplined and instructed, has, of course, been busy in the preparation of a slate, like every good political party, in the case of the village not so much to elect a Communist ticket, as to see that those generally favorable to the government were elected to the village soviet. The local battle is again narrowed to class lines with an avowed purpose of saving the soviet from the dominance of the "Kulak" as the comparatively rich peasant is called.

Finally, on a winter afternoon the electorate of our village assembled in the open courtyard of the soviet headquarters. Even we Americans were entitled to vote since social and economic status are the basis of suffrage rather than any formal citizenship. Blocks were visibly present, the few women in a group, the Kulaks in a group, the poor and horseless in a group. The party had prepared a list of forty candidates from which they proposed that our thirty members of the soviet be chosen. But when this list was presented, the electors said almost unanimously that they would have none of the list, but would nominate and elect their own candidates. This we proceeded to do in very direct fashion. Names were suggested from the floor—or ground, literally—until all were satisfied that enough candidates were before the group. Voting was then done by raising the

hand, as has been done for centuries. Discussion of candidates was free and outspoken. I recall that one name at once provoked a storm of protest. The candidate, they said, had been on the school board where he was expected to build a stove and didn't. Also, he could not be trusted with money. He was quickly defeated. One of those named was not well known and was asked to mount to the porch that they might look him over. The greybeards shook their heads and said he was too young. They wanted older men of more wisdom. And so on through the cold afternoon while we stamped our feet and wriggled our hands to keep warm, the patient and good-natured chairman guided the deliberation while every man had his say until the thirty had been chosen. Six of them were party members, three were women whom the men in smiling condescension had given a place for the first time.

According to the system, this council then elected delegates to the county soviet, and that body in turn to the state soviet, and so on to Moscow. The local group divides itself into commissions to deal with the schools, the taxes, land distribution, and public works, leaving much latitude to the individuals in the choice of commissions according to their interests. A revision committee is chosen at the time of general election by direct vote. The council elects its own president who, with a secretary and two clerks, did the routine work in our village. The soviet meets regularly twice a month with the ad-interim business done by a small executive committee. In the consideration of larger village projects such as the building of a new school or the levying of special taxes for local needs, the entire electorate may be and often is reassembled. Only the four officials mentioned a moment ago receive salaries.

Taxes are still, as always, the most acute point at which the village meets the central government. Immediately upon the normalization of government in 1920, village taxes were levied in a single agricultural tax, which might at present be called an income tax. The local tax commission sits frequently and keeps minute tab on the probable crop returns of the community. These are relayed through the larger units and form the basis along with city resources, of the annual budget. The tax allotment then returns by the same route to the village where it is flexibly applied to the individual families. About fifteen per cent of all the peasants of Russia are entirely exempted from tax. These are the poorest farmers without horses or cattle. The principal burden is consciously laid on the so-called rich peasant. The whole local process is marked by an intimacy and simplicity which is only possible in a compact community where few secrets are hid from the eyes of always interested neighbours. Thus local politics become as Lenin would have all politics be, on a larger scale, the daily administration of the practical affairs of village house-keeping.

This same informality is consciously carried over into the activities of the restrictive agents of government, the courts, jails and police. The policeman is the only uniformed official of the village but even buttons and red epoulets serve poorly to disguise the peasant beneath who must rely on persuasion and fair play rather than old time bullying. Justice in local affairs moves considerably. For example, the secretary of the local trade union was caught defaulting with monies of his organization. The police came to arrest him and found him acting as stage manager for a play about to be produced. He plead that he was indispensable and was

supported by his fellow dramatists. The result was that he was left at large until the play was over. Another young man jailed for drunkenness broke the none too secure door when he sobered up, and went back to his tractor. When the law pursued him he plead that he simply could not leave the tractor in plowing season. So the law let the sentence wait while the plowing was done. In certain sections peasants take turns at acting jailer to remove all fear and suspicion of what goes on in these ancient citadels of horror.

The court itself as it moves to the village with the circuit judge again acts entirely without pomp and ceremony, though it be clothed in a certain simple dignity. The villagers taken in alphabetical order and serving for a week, sit behind the red draped table and act as co-adjudicators with the official judge. Before them pass the simple disputes of the village from that over a breach in the garden wall to the uncertain paternity of a new citizen of Soviet Russia. There are no subtleties of the law, but a simple effort to get at the facts and a sentence designed to reform the offender and give justice to the offended rather than to punish and appease the law. The accused may speak for himself, use the counsel offered by the court or hire his own counsel. The judge uses his opportunity, not alone to speak to the principals at the trial, but to instruct and exhort the villagers who always gather in large numbers to hear the trials.

SOCIAL AND COÖPERATIVE ORGANIZATION

But the local social activities by no means end with these official functions of the village. The Communist régime has set in motion a whole series of voluntary coöperative enterprises. The consumers and producers coöperative societies already strong before the revolution, have been revived and are growing vigorously

including in their membership more than 25 per cent of the entire population of the country. These afford excellent practice in communal administration, to say nothing of the material benefits derived by the members. And, to these have been added, the extremely interesting and significant agricultural collective enterprises built around the coöperative ownership of the tractor and other heavy machinery. This movement involves the exploitation of large contiguous tracts of land and often leads to groups of families leaving the larger village to settle on their land, thus stimulating a form of land cultivation that may have immense meaning for the whole future of the village. It is as yet in its infancy with but 20,000 such groups in all Russia, but it will certainly grow as and if it proves demonstrably successful, particularly among the poorer peasants.

The Bolshevik régime has likewise extended a new social factor in the unionization of farm hands for the purpose of guarding the interests of the laborers against their "Kulak" employers or even the state farms which employ comparatively large numbers of workers in many communities. Here again experience is provided in local self government and simple administration.

The center of the cultural and social activities of the village is the "Narodni Dom" or "Peoples House" which we would call our social center. Usually the largest house of the village has been commandeered for this purpose, perhaps the home of the old landlord. In the largest hall of this building the judge will hold court, Lenin's day will be celebrated, or the First of May, or International Woman's Day, the weekly movie will be shown if the village affords the entertainment. Certainly frequent local talent dramatic productions will be staged here.

In another room a library and reading room is housed where on stated occasions newspapers will be read aloud for the sake of the illiterate. Evening classes are offered for the "liquidation of illiteracy." If there is ample room the "Young Pioneers," the Boy and Girl Scouts of Russia, will gather to learn woodcraft and Communism. The young Communists will have their center here or in private rooms in the village.

In addition to this house practically every village boasts its public playground and football field. Soccer, particularly, has been adopted since the revolution, English vocabulary and all, and may be heard resounding on a Saturday or Sunday holiday across the whole vast plain of Russia.

Nor are these activities confined to the larger villages. It is one of the marvels of Bolshevik thoroughness that these social leavens have been set to work in the remotest villages where, of course, they operate with varying success.

BOLSHEVIK INFILTRATION

I have tried to point out that all the village activities are built on an ancient base of local autonomy whose spirit has been honored by the new dictatorship. But I have also suggested that Party infiltration is quietly practiced. In the beginning Party members from the city were commandeered to go to the village where places were found for them in the clerical posts of the soviets, in the co-operatives or the unions. This proved to be often a poor policy since the commandeered man frequently knew little of the village or had little interest in its affairs. The plan now calls for volunteers for this service. Once in the village the little "nucleus" is expected to make a place for itself by active participation in all the social and political undertakings of the

community. They are not thrust down the unwilling throats of the villagers, though even yet I have heard such officials characterized at first as being sent to them "in an envelope" and suspiciously received until they have made a useful place for themselves.

One of the most interesting meetings I attended in our village was a periodic "Party Cleansing." The affair was conducted as a sort of open meeting of the Party with visiting inspectors from the District headquarters. It reminded me of nothing more than an old fashioned revival. The members were exhorted to remember that they were the cynosure of all village eyes. They were expected to take the lead in the village in all good works and to let their personal lives be above censure. At the close of the meeting any villager present was invited to censure the activities of the government, of the local party group; the Young Communists, or any individual members. Some words of condemnation were outspoken. Others were invited and given in private. The result was the expulsion of one of the local fifteen for excessive drunkenness.

One picture out of the old Russia remains to mar this pastoral scene of rural

autonomy. The state police or "Gay Pay Oo" is called in on all cases purporting to be crimes against the state and I have within the last year and a half seen weeping families at the train bidding farewell to sons and fathers sent for secret reasons for periods of banishment to other districts. These incursions, however, are infrequent in the rural districts where even suspected anti-government activities are rare. For the most part the peasant contents himself with open growlings at the taxes, poor soviet officials and the dearth of manufactured articles. Far from being suppressed, these criticisms are encouraged and every village is expected to have its "workers correspondent" to the greatest newspapers to act as mouth pieces for the dissatisfaction of the village.

The promotion of all these local participations is a strange activity for a dictatorship unless it feels that its power will be strengthened by an enlightened understanding and an increasing participation of the village in the larger affairs of state. For, however tintured with propaganda, all these activities, one soon discovers at work beneath the sleepy outward inertia of the village may be, an enlarged view of the world, and added capabilities of self government are sure to ensue.

The organization of farm communities in accordance with the principles of the science of human relationships was urged by Dr. C. J. Galpin, Bureau of Agricultural Economics sociologist, United States Department of Agriculture, addressing the North Dakota Agricultural College, Fargo, North Dakota, January 15. Declaring that discriminations against farmers have resulted in many communities which have been "allowed to shift for years like a flock of untended chickens," Doctor Galpin said that "the farmer must now convert himself, as he converted himself to modern dairying, to the science of community life, and learn exactly how good communities grow and grow better and better and keep good."

THE NEGRO COMMUNITY, A CULTURAL PHENOMENON

E. FRANKLIN FRAZIER

RECENT studies of the city have shown that the urban community is more than a "physical mechanism and an artificial construction"¹ and that in its expansion "a process of distribution takes place which sifts and allocates individuals and groups by residence and occupation."² The segregation of economic and cultural groups which thus gives organization to the city determines the place of the individuals in the total organization. Among the cultural groupings giving form and organization to our cities is the Negro population. Although segregation of the Negro population exists in some form in all American cities, it does not exist even in the South with its caste system to the extent that it creates ghettos such as was the case with the Jews during the Middle Ages in Europe.³ Nevertheless, the relative isolation of the Negro population in American cities creates a cultural community, and if studies of such Negro groups are to have any sociological significance they must seek to discover within the Negro community those characteristic expressions of fundamental human motives.⁴ In this paper the writer will undertake to summarize some of the tentative results of an attempt to study the Negro community as a cultural phenomenon.

¹ Robert E. Park, *The City: Suggestions for the Investigation of Human Behavior in the Urban Environment*, in *The City* by Robert E. Park, Ernest W. Burgess, Roderick D. McKenzie, p. 1.

² Ernest W. Burgess, *The Growth of the City*, p. 54.

³ Ernest W. Burgess, Residential Segregation in American Cities, *The American Negro, Annals of the Amer. Acad. of Pol. and Soc. Sc.*, Vol. CXXX (November, 1928) p. 105.

⁴ Louis Wirth, *The Ghetto* (Chicago, 1928) p. 9.

Spatial Distribution of the Negro Community

The spatial distribution of the Negro population in a city is significant both for its relation to the total organization of the urban community and the solidarity of the Negro group. We find that the concentration of this racial group is similar to other immigrant groups. In 364 Chicago census tracts out of 499 there were one or more Negro residents. In 95 tracts Negroes constituted one per cent or more of the population; in 51 tracts 5 per cent or more; and in 16 tracts 50 per cent or more of the population. While the wide distribution of solitary residents can be accounted for by the fact that in many cases they are servants living on the premises, one finds widely scattered over the city small groups of Negroes who have established themselves as families and own their homes. For example there were 137 tracts in which there were five or more Negro families. However, in spite of these cases of widely scattered groups over 90 per cent of the Negro population is concentrated in what is known as the Black Belt.

The location of the Black Belt in the city of Chicago fits into the pattern of urban zones as worked out by Dr. Burgess.⁵ The largest portion of the Negro population is found in the region between the residential and industrial areas. When the study of the Negro was made by the Commission on Race Relations, the area from Thirty-ninth to Fifty-fifth and from Michigan to the Lake was a contested

⁵ E. W. Burgess, *The Growth of the City in Park, R. E., The City*, Chap. II.

area.⁶ Since then the Negro population has acquired almost undisputed possession of this area as far east as Cottage Grove and as far south as Sixtieth Street. The movement of the Negro population southward has often been looked upon as the invasion of a residential area by a group unsuited economically and culturally for the area. But a closer study of the processes involved seems to show that the Negro group was the only group that could have taken over the large residences in this area which were being vacated as the character of the neighborhood changed. Age and sex distribution of Negroes within the census tracts in this area show them to be a migrant group.⁷ Therefore, historically and culturally the Negro group was best suited to take over these houses and maintain them by keeping a large number of roomers.⁸ In Woofter's book on Negro Problems in Cities the maps which he has made to show the location of the Negro population in cities seem to indicate that the location of the Negro population in Northern cities bears the same relationship to the organization of the city as the Negro population in Chicago. The distribution of the Negro population in Southern Cities seems to show many local variations which are probably the result of historical conditions; as, for example, the location of Negro quarters in the rear of their white employers.

THE HISTORY OF THE NEGRO COMMUNITY

In some northern cities the Negro population was inconspicuous as a part of the

⁶ *The Negro in Chicago*, Chicago, 1922.

⁷ From a manuscript of the author, on the Negro Family in Chicago.

⁸ Suggested by Mr. Newcomb of the Local Community Research Staff who has been studying the distribution of age and sex groups in the city of Chicago.

urban organization until the migrations during the World War. In such cases there was a lack of community consciousness on the part of the few Negro families which were lost in the white population. Their status though somewhat lower than that of the whites was superior to that of Negroes who form large communities in segregated areas. In other cities the Negro community has a history extending back to the early history of the city. In Chicago the Negro community dates its origin traditionally to the first settler. By 1900 several colonies of Negroes had sprung up, and half the Negro population was located in the Black Belt. From 1900 to 1910 the population increased from 30,150 to 44,103. But it was during the next decade that the most significant change took place in the Negro population. The increase in population during this period of 148.5 per cent is significant not only because of the enormous growth in the size of the Negro population, but because of the changes which is occasioned within the internal organization of the Negro community. Externally the established equilibrium was destroyed and a new relationship with the urban community was gradually established not without conflicts and a race riot. In the process of adjustment the Negro lost on the whole some of the privileges he had formerly enjoyed, but on the other hand it created a community solidarity and differentiation that has been significant for the development of the Negro's place within the community. The migration from the South brought into Chicago thousands of Negro peasants, with different traditions and habits from the settled population. The consequent changes in institutions, class differentiations, and specialization of functions have contributed to creating a relatively self-sufficient community.

ORGANIZATION OF THE NEGRO COMMUNITY

In discussing the organization of the Negro community we are concerned first with those institutions which develop within the community for the purposes of carrying on group life and maintaining control. In the city of Chicago these organizations may be divided into six types: (1) Economic organizations; (2) Organizations for social intercourse; (3) Religious organizations; (4) Professional organizations; (5) Social and civic organizations; (6) Political organizations.

1. The economic organizations are of two types: (a) Business enterprises and (b) labor organizations. The business enterprises consist of such larger establishments as insurance companies, banks, newspapers, and manufacturing, besides the many smaller businesses. The labor organizations include the two Pullman porters' associations, plasterers' unions, waiters' union, a musicians' union, and red caps' union, etc. Although some of these unions are affiliated with white labor organizations they represent on the whole efforts on the part of different sections of the Negro population with common interests to maintain control.

2. The organizations for social intercourse consist of (a) lodges and (b) social clubs. The lodges are fraternal organizations with rituals. Although these organizations do not have the influence that they have in the South where they rank next to the church, they still have considerable prestige. The social clubs include a rather large variety of groups. Prominent among them is the Federation of Women's Clubs which undertake welfare work. The City Federation is a part of a state and national organization and is probably the most widespread and powerful organization among colored women. There are state clubs in which former residents of southern states attempt to main-

tain and build up the associations connected with a common origin. The college clubs are fostered by the alumni of the southern Negro colleges; while the Greek letter fraternities and sororities hold together college graduates from all over the country. There is also an Intercollegiate Club which affords social intercourse for Negro students in the local universities.

3. The religious organizations may be divided into three classes: (a) the denominational churches; (b) the independent and more liberal churches; (c) the store-front churches. Each type of church has grown up in response to the different conceptions of life held by the different strata of the Negro population. The older denominational churches, especially the Methodist and Baptist, hold about the same dominant place in the social life of masses of Negroes as they do in the South. "They serve as a medium for the exchange of ideas, making and maintaining friendships, community coöperation, collective striving, group competition, as well as for the dissemination of information, assistance and advice on practical problems, and the upholding of religious ideals."⁹ For the more intelligent and emancipated portion of the Negro population these churches are not congenial. These people are to be found in the Congregational, Catholic, Lutheran, and Episcopal churches and the independent churches. The denominational churches do not always offer to the migrant the satisfactions which he found in the church in the South. For example, a migrant who deserted one of the larger churches said that in her church in Alabama she had a regular seat and if she were not present the pastor came to her home to find out the reason, but that in Chicago she was not only not missed from church but was not even known by the pastor.

⁹ *The Negro in Chicago*, pp. 142-143.

The "store-front" church comes into existence as a result of an effort to maintain the face-to-face relationships of the South.

4. The professional organizations for physicians, dentists, pharmacists, and lawyers bring together Negro professional men in their respective associations where they maintain group standards and promote their mutual welfare. These associations including the social workers are developed partly from necessity and partly from choice; for even where membership is open in the white organizations the more intimate relations in the Negro community among those with common traditions and the same problems make such exclusive associations desirable.

5. Chief among the social and civic agencies we find organizations like the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, the Chicago Urban League, the Young Men's Christian Association, the Young Women's Christian Association, various homes for working girls, community centers, and hospitals.

6. Organizations among Negroes for political purposes are maintained in two wards under the leadership of Negro committeemen. The organizations form a part of the regular Republican machine. During the recent fight between the two factions in the party, the so-called reform group were able to create an organization among Negroes. There has been some attempts with little success to form independent political organizations; and during the presidential campaign there was a Democratic organization that did not survive the election.

Not only is the Negro community characterized by the formal types of organizations which have been described above, but there are social distinctions of an informal nature which make for status and control. Even in those small Negro

communities in Northern cities where there is little differentiation of the Negro group there is nearly always a cleavage due to a feeling of superiority on the part of a small number of families constituting often the older settlers who have acquired property and built up standards of conduct and who guard their status very jealously. They view with suspicion and alarm the advent of new-comers especially when it means the lowering of their status. In Chicago when the migrants began pouring into the city, some of the old settlers who regarded this movement as a menace to their own status moved into white neighborhoods. This was especially easy in the case of mulattoes whose color did not arouse opposition.

In the Negro population we see taking place the same processes which we find in the immigrant communities. Just as within the immigrant colonies the more ambitious and those with keener intelligence emerge from the mass the same types become differentiated from the mass of Negroes. In the case of the white immigrants, they move into areas of second immigrant settlement and the ties of race, language, and culture are weakened.¹⁰ This process among Negroes is held in check because of the fact of color which makes it possible to resist the expansion on the part of the Negro community.

Dr. Park has pointed out the fact that, "among no other people is it possible to find so many stages of culture existing contemporaneously"¹¹ as we find among Negroes and it might be added that these differences are accentuated in the urban

¹⁰ Robert E. Park, *A Spacial Pattern and a Moral Order in the Urban Community*, Edited by Ernest W. Burgess (Chicago, 1926) p. 9.

¹¹ Robert E. Park, *The Conflict and Fusion of Cultures With Special Reference to the Negro*, *Journal of Negro History*, Vol. IV, p. 115.

environment. We find for example among the Negro population religious beliefs and practices ranging from the primitive "shout" which is to be found among isolated plantation Negroes in the South to the modern metaphysical religious conceptions. The migration of the Negro to the Northern cities has been likened to a folk movement because the leaders followed the masses. Young men and women who have completed their education in the South, as well as those seeking the advantages of Northern schools, have all followed the masses to Northern cities to practice their professions and seek their fortunes in a large community of Negroes. The presence in the Negro community of a large group of professional and business people to serve their various demands creates a distinct class, not always accepted by the older settlers. Here we have what might be called competition between these classes. Generally, the new professional and business classes relegate the older residents to a less prominent place. Often they intermarry with the old settlers.

THE NEGRO FAMILY

Since the study of the Negro family is fundamental to an understanding of the controls and traditions of Negro group life and adjustments to the urban environment, it naturally forms a basis for the study of the Negro community. According to the present method of studying the Negro community, instead of regarding it as a homogeneous group, the Negro population is broken up in so far as it is possible to get objective indices to the different sections of the population, and the significance of the statistics on the family is brought out through their relation to the differences in the Negro population.

In regard to age and sex distribution of

the Negro population within the census tracts, we find considerable variation. We find some tracts which approach the distribution of age and sex groups for the country as a whole. Others conform more to the form for the city showing the influence of migration in disproportionately large numbers of men and women from twenty to forty-four years of age. Another fact of special importance in the study of the family which serves as an index to the character of these areas is the great variation in the amount of home ownership. In nine of fifty-one tracts chosen for intensive study there was no home ownership. The significance of this receives the proper emphasis when we realize that in one of these tracts there were 455 families and in another tract 440 families. The rate of home ownership increases until it reaches 78.3 per cent in one area. In one tract, known as Morgan Park, in 1920 of a total of 189 Negro families 139 owned their homes. The high per cent of home ownership in this area is an index to the history and culture of the Negro population in this area. The first few Negroes in this area were servants employed by the professors at a theological seminary in this section. The increase in population was due to the fact that well-to-do Negroes owning homes in the more congested sections sold out to migrants and sought better home conditions for themselves and children. Many of them were civil service employees and Pullman porters.¹² Later influx into this area has changed its character and these changes are reflected in the statistics for family disorganization.

By the distribution of the statistics for family disorganization according to census tracts something of their true significance becomes apparent. The rate of Negro

¹² *The Negro in Chicago*, p. 137-138.

desertions varies among these census tracts from zero in three tracts to 16.6 per cent. Non-support among Negroes varies from zero in five tracts to 23 per cent. Juvenile delinquency, illegitimacy, and charity cases show the same wide variations. At the present stage of the study correlation between these factors has not been worked out; but from family histories and other materials throwing light on the cultural difference between these tracts, we are in a position to indicate the significance of statistics on the Negro family. Let us take for example one census tract south of Washington Park where there has been a colored settlement for about twenty-three years. In this area in 1920 one hundred and two of the 350 families owned their homes. Over a period of two and a half years there were six cases of illegitimacy and five cases of desertions. For 1926 there were only five cases of arrests for juvenile delinquency; for 1927 there were twenty-one charity cases and ten cases of non-support. In locating the residences of certain professional and business groups it was found that sixty-five such families fell within this tract and when the personnel of these classes is completely determined more will undoubtedly be found to be resident there.

Although this area shows up a relatively small amount of family disorganization and considerable home ownership as well as a large upper class group, it is by no means free from those forms of social pathology which we would not according to our thesis associate with that area. To explain the discrepancy it is necessary to remember that there is not as complete segregation of classes within the Negro community as in the white. In spite of the effort on the part of Negroes on the higher cultural levels to move into areas where they can maintain standards, Negroes on a lower level are constantly

pressing close upon them. There are neighborhoods which have organized to maintain standards by preventing the entrance of undesirable persons. Consequently, it is not to be expected that an area as large as the one we are considering would be entirely free from family disorganization. Family histories collected within this area show that many of its residents have a family tradition and a very definite conception of their rôle in the community. These families have originated in a struggle for property and education and have passed the tradition on to their children. When we compare cultural differences between this group and those areas in which there is no history of home ownership, achievement, and family tradition, statistics for the Negro family become significant because of their relation to the cultural differences in the Negro community.

CONCLUSION

In this paper an attempt has been made to show that the Negro community represents a little social world or moral order; and that in order to study the Negro community in any fundamental sense this fact must be taken into consideration. The spatial distribution of the Negro population is significant both because it forms the basis of group solidarity and class differentiation. It is in this social world with its own public opinion and class differentiation that the Negro acquires status, and controls are maintained. The value of this approach to institutional and other aspects of Negro life was illustrated in our approach to the study of the family, where cultural differences show the significance of statistics on the family. We did not go into the relation of the Negro community to the larger community except in its larger and formal organizational aspects.

RACE, CULTURAL GROUPS, SOCIAL DIFFERENTIATION

Contributions to this Department will include material of three kinds: (1) original discussion, suggestion, plans, programs, and theories; (2) reports of special projects, working programs, conferences and meetings, and progress in any distinctive aspect of the field; (3) special results of study and research.

THE CONCEPT OF THE CULTURE-AREA

RUSSELL GORDON SMITH

IF ONE admits, as all scientifically minded persons must, that the classification of cultural data is prerequisite to valid factorization, two questions immediately present themselves: What is to be the unit of investigation? and What should be the basic principle of classification? Presumptive answers to these questions are quite worthless. Only by an empirical study of the artifacts, the symbols and the traditional procedures, which constitute objectively the cultures of various peoples, can the unit of investigation and the principle of classification be determined. The culture-area is an empirical grouping of cultural data in which the unit of investigation and the principle of classification have been derived from direct observation of the facts and of their temporal and spatial distributions. It is therefore receiving more and more attention from sociologists who are less interested in the chauvanistic defense of some sociological system than in a truly scientific analysis of collective human behavior.¹

While the culture-area concept developed chiefly in America and has been used, for the most part, in the study of the

American Indian, it was anticipated many years ago in the "geographical provinces" of Adolph Bastian.² Bastian, after a series of travels among the primitive tribes of America, Africa, India, Eastern Asia and the islands of the South Seas, became convinced of what in current ethnological and sociological circles is called the "psychic unity of mankind." The fundamental similarity of the various groups composing the species homo sapiens, Bastian attributed to the *Elementargedanken*, elemental ideas, with which, presumably, all humans are blessed at birth. Nowhere in his voluminous writings can one find a clear-cut statement of what, specifically, elemental ideas are, but probably the most appropriate current psychological label would be "the original nature of man."³ But granting the fundamental unity of the human species, how explain the amazing diversity of opinion and practice which confronts the comparative ethnologist? The *Elementargedanken*, says Bastian, are transformed into *Völkergedanken*, folk ideas, by the pressure of geographical circumstances and the

¹ Cf. Herskovits and Willey, "The Cultural Approach to Sociology," *American Journal of Sociology*, XXIX, 188-199.

² Der *Völkergedanke*, passim. Cf. his *Ethnische Elementargedanken*. Cf. also A. A. Goldenweiser, "Cultural Anthropology" in *The History and Prospects of the Social Sciences* (H. E. Barnes, ed.), p. 211.

³ Cf. Goldenweiser, op. c4, p. 211.

cultural and psychological interchanges attendant upon tribal contacts. These concretings of the abstract *Elementargedanken* occur at specific times and places. Thus result those culturally characteristic areas which Bastian called "geographical provinces." While the historian of thought finds in these geographical provinces a "foreshadowing" of the culture-area concept, the scientific student of society is chiefly impressed by the vagueness of Bastian's ideas, his metaphysical leanings, the uselessness of his undefined terms and his failure to delimit the provinces about which he was so garrulous. Bastian's theories as Goldenweiser says,⁴ "proved of little practical use in the early growth of the science of man, and in due time were forgotten."

Several decades after Bastian's ponderous tomes had passed into not unmerited desuetude, Graebner, another German anthropologist, building upon the foundations laid by Ratzel, formulated the concept of the *Kulturreis*. The *Kulturreis* is, literally, a culture-area, but the facts and theoretical presuppositions upon which it is based conspicuously differentiate it from the analogous concept of contemporary American ethnologists and call for exposition and critical analysis.⁵

It requires only a cursory reading of Graebner's books and monographs to

realize that he is less interested in an empirical classification of cultural data than in upholding the tenets of diffusionism. Man's power to invent either artifacts or ideas is according to Graebner, an almost negligible factor in the growth of culture, and the last inference one should draw from similar cultural features is that they were independently invented. Independent origin, indeed, can only be assumed after tribal contacts and culture-borrowing have been excluded. By thus following the logical methods of a criminal lawyer, Graebner comes to the conclusion that the central problem of ethnology is to give time-perspective to primitive culture, that is, to reconstruct the history of peoples who have no written records.⁶

Whether or not this be the central problem of ethnology, it necessitates a thoroughgoing study of cultural similarities, their provenience and their geographic distribution. To this task Graebner addressed himself with less of scientific cautiousness than of diffusionistic zeal. He posited two criteria to determine the degree of similarity among cultural elements, one qualitative, the criterion of form, the other quantitative. The former refers to similarities in the shape, size, color, decorative designs, etc. of two artifacts, or to objective similarities in religious rituals or social groupings; the latter, to the number of such "qualitative" resemblances.⁷ Graebner seems blissfully unaware both of the identity, for all practical purposes, of his two criteria and of the limited possibilities in cultural development.⁸ The closer the resemblance

⁴ "Diffusionism and the American School of Historical Ethnology," *American Journal of Sociology*, XXXI, 34.

⁵ For the principles and methods of Grachner and his loyal disciples see F. Graebner, *Methode der Ethnologie*, especially pp. 125-151; "Kulturreise und Kulturschichten in Ozeania," *Zeitschrift für Ethnologie*, XXXVII, 28-54; "Die melanesische Bogenkultur und ihre Verwandten," *Anthropos*, IV, 726-780, 998-1032; B. Ankerman, "Kulturreise und Kulturschichten in Afrika," *Zeitschrift für Ethnologie*, XXXVII, 54-84; P. W. Schmidt, "Kulturreise und Kulturschichten in Südamerika," *Zeitschrift für Ethnologie*, XLV, 1014-1124.

⁶ *Methode der Ethnologie*, p. 140 ff. Cf. A. A. Goldenweiser, "Cultural Anthropology," in *The History and Prospects of the Social Sciences*, p. 235.

⁷ *Methode der Ethnologie*, p. 104 ff.

⁸ Cf. M. J. Herskovits, "The Cattle Complex in East Africa," *American Anthropologist*, 28, pp. 235-236; A. A. Goldenweiser, "The Principle of Limited

between two culture-elements, judged by these relatively unanalyzed criteria, the higher the probability, according to Graebner, of their common origin and of their diffusion through tribal contacts. Indeed "probability" is too mild a word, for Graebner would claim absolute validity for his criteria, and once cultural similarity has been thereby established, the common origin and diffusion of the compared elements become Graebnerian certainties, regardless of the distance between the areas where the elements are found.⁹

But Graebner does not delimit his *Kulturreise* by mapping the geographic distributions of independent culture-elements. On the contrary he emphatically asserts that a culture-element, be it an artifact, a symbol, a ritual, a social grouping, has no independent existence and never travels alone.¹⁰ It is an inseparable part of a cluster of culture-elements which constitute a unity, stabilized in a given area and diffused as a whole.¹¹ This cluster, or group of adhesive cultural

features, to use Tylor's phrase, is the Graebnerian *Kulturcomplex*, and the criteria of similarity noted above are applied to culture-elements only for the purpose of establishing the empirical and logical identity of various culture-complexes. The *Kulturreis* does not presuppose absolute unity of cultural conditions nor absolute continuity in the dissemination of culture-elements, for the possibility of cultural stratification must always be taken into account. It is based upon the simple fact, says Graebner, "dass ein bestimmter Komplex von Kulturelementen für ein bestimmtes Gebiet charakteristisch und in der Hauptsache darauf beschränkt ist."¹² A *Kulturreis* is, in other words, the area in which one finds a Graebnerian *Kulturcomplex*.

But Graebner's *Kulturcomplex* does not bear close scientific scrutiny. It is, in the first place, composed of culture-elements which have been arbitrarily selected, chiefly from the realm of material culture,¹³ and which are assumed to constitute an almost indissoluble unity, without any explanation of the basis for this association. In the second place, the Graebnerian, in comparing the component culture-elements of complexes, considers only external and formal similarity and ignores completely the social milieu in which the elements are found, the different meanings which the elements may have in various tribal groups and the different uses to which they may be put.¹⁴ This may be a

Possibilities in the Development of Culture," *Journal of American Folklore*, XXVI, p. 259 ff.; F. Boas, Review of Graebner's Methode der Ethnologie, *Science*, Vol. XXXIV, n.s., pp. 804 ff.; P. Ehrenreich, *Correspondenzblatt der deutschen Gesellschaft für Anthropologie, Ethnologie und Urgeschichte*, 1903, pp. 176-180.

⁹ Graebner, op. cit., p. 62 ff.

¹⁰ Graebner, op. cit., p. 115 ff.

¹¹ Graebner's dogmatic assertion that a culture-trait is never singly diffused, but always as a unit in a *Kulturcomplex*, is one of the most palpable absurdities in ethnological literature. It can best be described in Graebner's own phrase, "kulturgeschichtliches Nonsense." For an excellent illustration of the independent dissemination of culture-trait and of their fortuitous coalescence into tribal complexes, see R. F. Benedict, "The Concept of the Guardian Spirit in North America," *Memoirs of the American Anthropological Association*, No. 29, especially pp. 84-85. Cf., R. H. Lowie, *Primitive Society*, Chap. XV; E. Sapir, "Time Perspective in Aboriginal American Culture," Memoir 90, Canada Department of Mines, *Geological Survey*, pp. 44-51.

¹² Graebner, op. cit., p. 133.

¹³ Cf. B. Aukerman, "Kulturreise und Kulturschichten in Afrika," *Zeitschrift für Ethnologie*, XXXVII, 71-72.

¹⁴ Graebner, op. cit., pp. 144-46. For a more detailed criticism of the Graebnerian *Kulturcomplex*, especially as it relates to the relative importance of diffusion and parallelism in the growth of culture, see F. Boas, Review of Graebner's Methode der Ethnologie, *Science*, XXXIV, n.s., p. 805 ff.; R. H. Lowie, "On the Principle of Convergence in Ethnology,"

legitimate procedure for one who has determined to prove at all costs the universality of diffusion, but it is not a scientific method of cultural classification.

The *Kulturreis* is, then, a far-flung cultural district, not necessarily geographically continuous, in which a number of culture-elements, arbitrarily selected, adhere in a characteristic *Kulturkomplex*. The *Kulturreis* is not an empirical grouping of tribal, or other social, units according to their objective and psychological cultural resemblances; and it should be quite clear, even from the brief exposition that has been given, that the concept is based upon a number of *a priori* assumptions and unproved postulates which unmistakably reflect Graebner's diffusionistic bias.¹⁵

Neither the geographical provinces of Bastian nor the *Kulturreise* of Graebner are acceptable inductions from carefully observed and adequately classified ethnic data. Even as heuristic tools they are dangerously misleading. For the former are quasi-mystical and based upon obsolete psychology; while the latter rest upon logical modes of classification which ignore cultural realities.

The culture-areas of American ethnologists may leave much to be desired by those who long to find order in the chaos of human living, but they have certainly not come out of philosophical speculation or an ill-concealed effort to substantiate a preconception by specious reasoning. They bear the stamp of inductive research and may justly be regarded as almost inevitable by-products of ethnological field-work among the American Indians. There

is nothing recondite or esoteric about the culture-area idea, but to understand it clearly and to evaluate its usefulness one must acquire familiarity with the methods, the principles and the terminology of those American ethnologists whose researches have led to its formulation.¹⁶

The culture-area idea had its origin, according to Goldenweiser,¹⁷ in Professor Boas' attempt to classify and arrange the ethnographic collections of the American Museum of Natural History. He found that the specimens could be ranged in relatively homogeneous groups which corresponded to specific geographical districts, and that North America could thus be divided into areas characterized by their material culture. While this "origin" is as plausible as any that has been suggested, it is highly improbable, as Wissler has recently pointed out,¹⁸ that the culture-area concept, either in its inception or in its present form, can be attributed to any one individual. It is a natural outgrowth of research and teaching and of the efforts of several scholars

¹⁵ For popular and semi-popular descriptions of the methods and concepts of this school of American ethnologists see, F. Boas, *The Mind of Primitive Man*; A. A. Goldenweiser, *Early Civilization*; R. H. Lowie, *Primitive Society*; A. L. Kroeber, *Anthropology*; A. M. Tozzer, *Social Origins and Social Continuities*; C. Wissler, *The American Indian; Man and Culture; The Relation of Nature to Man in Aboriginal America*; W. F. Ogburn, *Social Change*; H. E. Barnes, *The New History and the Social Studies*, Chap. IV. For technical expositions and for the factual materials on which the concepts of this school are based, see the monographic studies by Boas, Lowie, Wissler, Kroeber, Goldenweiser, Benedict, Herskovits, Bogoras, Swanton, Speck, Dorsey, Goddard, Holmes, Mason, Mooney, Nelson, Radin, Sapir, Spinden, Teit, Fletcher, Waterman, etc.

¹⁶ "Cultural Anthropology," in the *The History and Prospects of the Social Sciences*, p. 244, footnote 72. Cf. also, by the same author, "Diffusionism and the American School of Historical Ethnology," *American Journal of Sociology*, XXXI, 34-35.

¹⁷ "The Culture-Area Concept in Social Anthropology," *American Journal of Sociology*, XXXII, 882 ff.

Journal American Folklore, XXV, 24 ff; M. J. Herskovits, "The Cattle Complex in East Africa," *American Anthropologist*, 28, pp. 231-239.

¹⁸ Cf. A. A. Goldenweiser, "Diffusionism and the American School of Historical Ethnology," *American Journal of Sociology*, XXXI, 21-23.

to derive methodological and interpretative principles from the descriptive monographs of specialists in American Indian cultures.

In the earlier stages of anthropological development in this country, the ideal of the field-worker was to describe completely, and as objectively and concretely as possible, not only all of the material and non-material culture-trait of a tribe but also its language and its racial characteristics. But life is short and time is fleeting and American anthropologists soon realized that this ideal exceeded the grasp of a single individual. Specialization followed along three chief lines: linguistics, somatology, and culture.¹⁹ Nor was division of labor to stop here. The complete description of the culture-trait of one tribe is, for a single investigator, a big task; of several tribes, well-nigh impossible.²⁰ American ethnologists therefore came to concentrate upon single tribes or upon several neighboring tribes with similar cultures. Specialization became not only topical, but regional.²¹ The point to be noted here is that the attempt to describe completely the culture-trait of the American Indian literally forced ethnologists into specialization by geographical areas. The boundaries to these areas, as Wissler points out,²² were not absolutely set by the investigators but were inherent in the phenomena themselves. As soon as the findings of

these various regional specialists were compared and contrasted, the culture-area concept became practically inevitable. The scientific study of cultures, like the scientific study of any phenomena, necessitates an analysis of large and intricate wholes into their component parts. Cultural analysis by American ethnologists has led to the formulation of the methodological concepts of the culture-trait, the culture-complex, and the culture-area.

The culture-trait is a unit of tribal culture.²³ But it is not a unit in the sense of an absolute and indivisible entity with a constant quantitative value. It is, rather, what may be called a practical or an observational unit. It is a cultural element which the ethnological field-worker sees, or thinks he sees, when he sets about to describe the social life of a primitive people. For example, among the Todas a man may not utter the name of his mother's brother.²⁴ This observed fact is recorded as a culture-trait. A field-worker among the Blackfoot Indians notes that at certain times members of this tribe torture themselves.²⁵ This is a trait of the tribal culture. The Central Eskimo do their sea-hunting in Kayaks;²⁶ the Sioux Indians live in tipis;²⁷ a Crow Indian must not speak to his wife's parents.²⁸ These are randomly selected illustrations of culture-trait.

Further analysis of the culture-trait brings out two points which receive emphasis in current ethnological literature. The first is that the culture-trait of differ-

¹⁹ Cf. C. Wissler, "Recent Developments in Anthropology," in *Recent Developments in the Social Sciences* (E. C. Hayes, ed.), p. 57 ff.

²⁰ For an interesting list of data "needed to characterize the material culture of an Americas tribe," see C. Wissler, "Material Culture of the North American Indians," *American Anthropologist*, 16, No. 3, (n.s.), pp. 448-449.

²¹ Cf. C. Wissler, "The Culture-Area Concept in Social Anthropology," *American Journal of Sociology*, XXXII, 882 ff.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 883.

²³ C. Wissler, *Man and Culture*, p. 50.

²⁴ W. H. R. Rivers, *The Todas*, p. 626.

²⁵ L. Spier, "The Sun Dance of the Plains Indians," *Anthropological Papers, American Museum of Natural History*, Vol. 16, part 7, p. 461.

²⁶ F. Boas, "The Central Eskimo," *Sixth Annual Report, Bureau of Ethnology*, p. 486.

²⁷ C. Wissler, *The Relation of Nature to Man in Aboriginal America*, p. 1.

²⁸ R. H. Lowie, *Primitive Society*, p. 87.

ent tribes should never be identified merely on the basis of their objective similarity; they must also be psychologically similar, that is, they must have the same "meaning" in the tribes in which they are found. It is here that the American school takes definite issue with the Graeberians who, as we have seen,²⁹ contend that objective resemblance between two culture-elements establishes identity and proves diffusion from a common source. Boas has tersely expressed the contrary position of American ethnologists as follows:

The concepts of comparability and homogeneity . . . have to deal not only with historical relationship, but . . . with psychological similarity. . . . If the aged are killed by one people for economic reasons, by another to insure them a happy future life, then the two customs are not comparable, even if they should have their origin in the same historical sources.³⁰

The second fact revealed by a scrutiny of the culture-trait is that it is "not a clear-cut unit, but a kind of complex."³¹ For example, the trait of Toda culture mentioned above,³² that a man may not utter the name of his mother's brother, does not stand isolated from all other Toda traits. On the contrary, it is, from the Toda point of view, inextricably bound up, logically and functionally, with a number of other traits. It is a link in a series which cuts across Toda social organization, Toda etiquette, and Toda religion. Or to cite Wissler's frequently quoted illustration, taken from Jenks' monograph, the Ojibway Indians use wild rice for food. This is a trait of Ojibway culture. But, as Wissler says:

. . . each member of the tribe did not snatch his rice food directly from the plant as do the birds, but

received it as the end of a cycle of activities in which he, as an individual, played a varying part. Thus, though the plant is wild, some care was given the plots where it grew; later, the plants were tied in bunches to discourage rice-eating birds, then the rice was gathered, cured, hulled, winnowed, stored, cooked, and eaten. . . . The many processes involved required techniques of various complexities and special appliances. But that is not all, for intimately bound up in the whole are property rights, labor obligations, etiquette, methods of keeping time, and a number of special religious observances, prohibitions, and taboos.³³

Some of the traits in a complex are, obviously, necessarily related to each other. Prerequisite to the Toda taboo on uttering the name of one's maternal uncle is a classificatory system which makes certain distinctions in kinship by blood and marriage. An Ojibway Indian cannot eat wild rice until it has been gathered. The relations between such traits are functional and necessary. But other traits in a complex are not necessarily related to each other. While from the Ojibway point of view the gathering of wild rice may be no more "necessary" preliminary to eating it than the performance of a religious ritual, it is quite clear that the latter trait could be omitted without disturbing the remainder of the complex.³⁴ A culture-complex is, then, a cluster of culture-trait some of which are functionally associated and therefore indispensable, others of which are apparently related only fortuitously, but all of which are knit together into what seems to the members of the tribe possessing the complex, a logical whole. It should be noted that the culture-complex as thus described differs markedly from the Graeberian *Kulturkomplex*. The latter, as we

²⁹ Supra., p. 422ff.

³⁰ F. Boas, Review of Graeber's Methode der Ethnologie, *Science*, 34, n.s., p. 808.

³¹ Wissler, *Man and Culture*, p. 51.

³² Supra., p. 425.

³³ Wissler, op. cit., pp. 51-52. Cf. A. E. Jenks, "The Wild Rice Gatherers of the Upper Lakes," *Nineteenth Annual Report, Bureau of American Ethnology*, Part 2.

³⁴ Wissler, op. cit., p. 64.

have seen,³⁵ is a group of arbitrarily selected culture-elements, chiefly artifacts, assumed to constitute an indivisible unity which is diffused as a whole; the former is simply a description of the inter-relation and interdependence of a number of observed traits, material and non-material, with no assumptions as to the origin and diffusion of these traits, either singly or in combination.

If one studies a trait-complex as it appears in various regions it quickly becomes apparent that the complex is not a constant, having the same form and content wherever found, but a variable. Not only do individual traits differ, in practice, from one social group to another within a given tribe, but the complex as a whole varies from one tribe to another. The so-called "maize-complex," for example, is widely distributed among North American Indians.³⁶ It includes all the practices, processes, and ceremonies which accompany the production of maize and its use as a staple food. But the methods of planting, cultivating, gathering, grinding, etc., and the ceremonial and ideology associated with these procedures, exhibit tribal variations. Some of the processes may be altogether omitted; others may be highly elaborated in one tribe and extremely attenuated in another. The sun-dance, a ceremonial complex found among the Plains Indians, is composed, according to Professor Spier,³⁷ of eighty-two traits or elements. But no one tribe has all these traits; the number varies from five in the Canadian Dakota tribe to fifty-four in the Arapaho. It is not difficult, however, for the trained investigator to find among these differences the "typical" trait and the "typical" complex, and to recog-

nize the variations as deviations from these norms.³⁸ A glance at Wissler's map showing the distribution of the Plains type of female dress,³⁹ will make clear that the local differences are merely variations on the same stylistic theme. A culture-complex may, in the light of the foregoing, be re-defined as a varying cluster of culture-trait, each of which is itself a variable.

If the geographic distribution of a culture-complex be plotted on a map, the complex and its variants will not be randomly scattered, but definitely localized in a continuous area. Wissler has shown this to be true for practically all the major trait-complexes of the American Indians.⁴⁰ It also appears that if we select the most highly elaborated variant of a complex, that is, the one composed of the largest number of interdependent traits, it will be found to occupy a "central" position in relation to the other variants. The contiguous variants will most closely resemble the "typical" or "central" complex, in the number of constituent traits and the intricateness of their interrelation, and this similarity will decrease as the distance from the "center" increases. Wissler holds that all trait-complexes thus far studied fall into these zoned distributions around common centers.⁴¹

What happens, one may ask, when the geographic distributions of many trait-complexes are superimposed? As ethnologists have repeatedly demonstrated, from Tylor's pioneer investigation⁴² to

³⁵ Wissler, *Man and Culture*, p. 53.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 54.

³⁷ Wissler, *The American Indian*, *passim*.

³⁸ Wissler, *The Relation of Nature to Man in Aboriginal America*, pp. 180-82, and *passim*.

⁴⁰ E. B. Tylor, "On a Method of Investigating the Development of Institutions; applied to Laws of Marriage and Descent," *Journal of the Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland*, Vol. 18, pp. 245-272.

³⁵ Supra, p. 422ff.

³⁶ Wissler, *The American Indian*, p. 20.

³⁷ Cited by Wissler in *The Relation of Nature to Man in Aboriginal America*, p. 83 ff.

the study by Hobhouse, Wheeler and Ginsberg,⁴³ trait-complexes coincide, they are associated and integrated in characteristic clusters, they accumulate in a circumscribed territory. The relation between coincident trait-complexes does not seem to be a functional or necessary one. In fact, the contrary has repeatedly been demonstrated, as in the well-known association between the maize-complex and the pottery-complex in North America. Trait-complexes are bound together for the most part simply because historical causes have brought them together.⁴⁴ We are not here primarily concerned with the basis of this association, but with the observable fact.

If now, to follow Wissler's lead once more, we consider all trait-complexes jointly, and shift the point of view from the cultural units, namely, the trait and the complex, to the social units,⁴⁵ it will be found that these social units, namely, the tribes, can be ranged in relatively homogeneous groups localized in continuous areas. "This will give us culture areas, or a classification of social groups according to their cultural traits."⁴⁶

The exposition up to this point should have made it fairly clear that a culture-area is not a rigidly delimited district. Its periphery is always, to some extent, arbitrary. The intersecting straight lines which mark off, for example, the Plains Indian culture-area⁴⁷ could be shifted here and there into a somewhat different geometric design without doing violence to

⁴³ Hobhouse, Wheeler, and Ginsberg, *The Material Culture and Social Institutions of the Simpler Peoples*.

⁴⁴ Wissler, *The American Indian*, pp. 385-388.

⁴⁵ Except in dealing with archaeological data, it is difficult and perhaps unnecessary, to maintain the distinction between a cultural unit and a social unit, for culture-trait and culture-complexes are after all merely the folkways and mores of living tribes.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 218

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 221.

the assembled data or to the principle of classification. Indeed the boundary lines of a culture-area are hardly more than a graphic device to indicate that within the enclosed region there is a cluster of trait-complexes in characteristic combination, or, to phrase it from the viewpoint of the social units, that the flexible periphery encompasses a group of tribes whose culture is relatively homogeneous. The culture-area concept is empirical and analytical, and it should always be understood that further research may necessitate expansion or reduction of a given area. Occasionally, of course, the boundary-line to an area may be set by climatic or other geographical conditions, as Herskovits found in his study of the culture-areas of Africa, where the line of sixty-inch rainfall unequivocally divides the Congo area from the East African Cattle area,⁴⁸ but this is exceptional.

It should also be clear from the foregoing exposition that the tribes included in a culture-area are not thus grouped as culturally homogeneous merely because they objectively exhibit similar trait-complexes. The social attitudes accompanying these trait-complexes, the social emphasis given to one complex rather than another, the way in which the trait-complexes interpenetrate to form a characteristic cultural pattern, must all be considered. For this reason the culture-area concept is said to be not only objective but psychological.⁴⁹ For this, and for other reasons, it stands out in sharp contrast to the Graebnerian *Kultukreis*.⁵⁰

Since, as we have seen,⁵¹ a "typical"

⁴⁸ M. J. Herskovits, "A Preliminary Consideration of the Culture Areas of Africa," *American Anthropologist*, 26, p. 52.

⁴⁹ Cf. A. A. Goldenweiser, "Cultural Anthropology," in *The History and Prospects of the Social Sciences*, p. 244

⁵⁰ *Supra*, p. 422 ff.

⁵¹ *Supra*, p. 427.

trait-complex and its variants fall into a zoned geographic distribution around a common center, it is to be expected that a number of coincident trait-complexes will have the same distribution-form. Now a tribal culture is composed of coincident trait-complexes integrated, objectively and psychologically, in a characteristic way. It follows, then, that the tribal cultures within a given culture-area must be regarded as variants around a "type" or norm and that they will be distributed geographically like trait-complexes. This expectation is realized in the facts. The Plains Indian culture-area will serve as an illustration. Wissler describes the type of culture in this area as follows:

The chief traits of this culture are dependence upon the buffalo or bison, and the very limited use of roots and berries; absence of fishing; lack of agriculture; the tipi as a movable dwelling; transportation by land only, with the dog and the travois (in historic times with the horse); want of basketry and pottery; no true weaving; clothing of buffalo and deerskins; a special bead technique; high development of work in skins; special rawhide work (*parfleche*, cylindrical bag, etc.); use of a circular shield; weak development of work in wood, stone, and bone. Their art is strongly geometric, but as a whole, not symbolic; social organization tends to the simple band; a camp circle organization; a series of societies for men; sun dance ceremony; sweat house observances, scalp dances, etc.⁵²

The constituent trait-complexes of this culture are not spread uniformly over the area. Some of the tribes have all of the trait-complexes, highly elaborated; others have nearly all; others have relatively few of the positive trait-complexes and a number of the negative ones; while still others have a preponderance of the negative complexes. To put it more generally, any given tribe in this area is, in certain respects, like every other tribe in the area; in other respects, it is like the

tribes in a restricted part of the area; in still others, it is unique.⁵³ If the thirty-one Plains Indian tribes be classified according to the number of trait-complexes, characteristic of this area, which they exhibit, and according to the elaborateness of these complexes,⁵⁴ several groupings emerge: (1) a group of eleven tribes—the Assiniboin, Arapaho, Blackfoot, Cheyenne, Comanche, Crow, Gros Ventre, Kiowa, Kiowa-Apache, Sarsi, and Teton-Dakota—having all the chief culture-trait of the area; (2) a group of about seventeen tribes—Arikara, Mandan, Shoshoni Osage, Wichita, etc.,—having most of the positive traits and some of the negative ones, such as a limited use of pottery and basketry or less dependence upon the buffalo and more upon deer and small game; (3) a group—Plains-Ojibway, Plains Cree, etc.—having a high percentage of Plains traits but, in addition, many traits not characteristic of this area.⁵⁵ A study of the map will show that the tribes composing the first group are contiguous from north to south and occupy the heart of the Plains area; that the second group divides geographically into two groups, one located on the eastern border of the central group, the other on the western border; and that the tribes composing the third group are nearest the boundaries of the Plains area, farthest, that is, from the central tribes. The habitat of this central group is called the culture center and its culture is taken "as the type for the area as a whole."⁵⁶ As we move from this center we find tribal variations from this type increasing, not abruptly but gradually, until we come to regions where the

⁵² Cf. A. A. Goldenweiser, *Early Civilization*, p. 113.

⁵³ "Elaborateness" refers chiefly to the number of culture-trait composing the complex. Cf., the discussion of the sun dance ceremonial, *supra*, p. 427.

⁵⁴ Wissler, op. cit., pp. 220-222, especially Fig. 59.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 222.

⁵² Wissler, op. cit., pp. 218 and 220.

tribal cultures exhibit many extraneous elements. These outlying districts are called marginal areas. The justification for the use of this term is found in the fact that the "extraneous elements" are seen, upon investigation, to be "typical" of other culture-areas. That is, if we continue to move, say westward, from the central tribes of the Plains, we should encounter more and more extraneous elements until eventually we should come upon a cluster of tribal cultures whose coincident trait-complexes constituted a distinct type. The habitat of these tribes would be the culture center of the Plateau area.

Exposition in terms of a single illustration has the disadvantage of seeming to posit unproved assumptions. Culture-areas are not data but inductions. When the culture of a large portion of the earth's surface, such as a continent, is minutely analyzed, intensively studied and geographically distributed, it is found that trait-complexes coincide in specific regions in characteristic combinations and that the inhabiting tribes are culturally homogeneous, that is, they have about the same trait-complexes and the complexes are made up of about the same traits. Such regions are culture-centers. They are the nuclei, so to speak, of culture-areas, which may be regarded as types of culture plus their variants. Obviously in all culture-areas will be found districts in which the tribal cultures are of doubtful classification. These are the marginal areas.

The foregoing exposition of the culture-area and its subsidiary concepts may now be briefly resumed. The culture-area is, first of all, and, for the purpose of this paper, most important of all, a method of cultural classification. It does not presuppose a diffusionistic theory nor is it based upon any assumptions save the methodological assumptions that culture

is classifiable and that the mode of classification should be dictated by cultural realities. It developed naturally along with that specialization in anthropological research which led field-workers to concentrate upon one or two tribal cultures and eventually, through comparison of the resulting monographs, to discover that all specific social procedures in aboriginal North America were regional rather than tribal. The delimitation of culture-areas involves an analysis of artifacts, folkways, customs, and institutions into their constituent elements. The simplest observational unit revealed by such analysis is called a culture-trait; but scrutiny of the culture-trait shows that it is not an isolable entity but a link in a series of functionally and fortuitously interrelated traits. This concatenation of traits, or cycle of unit-processes, is called a culture-complex or a trait-complex. Trait-complexes are classified according to their objective and psychological similarities, and their geographic distributions plotted. It is thereby discovered that trait-complexes are not randomly scattered but that they tend to coincide, to accumulate in various places in characteristic combinations. Such coincidences of trait-complexes determine the loci of culture-areas. Description in terms of the trait-complex, the cultural unit, tends to emphasize the fact that cultural similarities cut across political, that is, tribal, lines, but the culture-area is more realistically described in terms of the social unit. From this point of view the culture-area is simply an empirical geographic grouping of tribes having similar cultures. But similarity, in the parlance of American ethnologists, is not identity. A culture-area merely defines geographically a type of culture and its variants. Within it one finds a centrally located group of tribes whose culture is highly homogeneous.

The habitat of these tribes is the culture center. Surrounding this center are other tribes whose culture is less homogeneous but obviously a variation from the central culture. Surrounding these, farthest from the center, are tribes whose culture is still less homogeneous and in many features quite different from the central culture. The habitats of these tribes are the marginal areas. The boundaries of culture-areas are therefore merely diagrammatic, serving to differentiate culture centers and to mark roughly the geographic limits of variation from these norms.

Culture-areas, as thus conceived, have been established with varying degrees of exactitude for North and South America and for Africa. Ten North American areas are recognized: Plains, Plateau, California, North Pacific Coast, Eskimo, Mackenzie, Eastern Woodland, Southeastern, Southwestern, Nahua.⁵⁷ These areas are the gradual and empirical results of intensive field-work and research. With the exception of the Plateau and Mackenzie areas, both of which are vague in positive trait-complexes, the distinctness and approximate boundaries of these culture-areas have been clearly established. They represent, as Kroeber says,

. . . a consensus of opinion as to the classification of a mass of facts, slowly arrived at, contributed to by many workers, probably accepted in exact identity by no two of them but in essential outlines by all. . . .⁵⁸

The five South American areas, Chibcha, Inca, Guanaco, Amazon, Antillean,⁵⁹ are products of less intensive research and future studies will doubtless increase the number.⁶⁰ Herskovits has mapped the East African Cattle Area⁶¹ and laid the

⁵⁷ Wissler, op. cit., p. 218 ff.

⁵⁸ Kroeber, *Anthropology*, p. 336.

⁵⁹ Wissler, op. cit., p. 245 ff.

⁶⁰ Kroeber, op. cit., p. 337

⁶¹ Herskovits, "The Cattle Complex in East Africa," *American Anthropologist*, 28.

foundations for a mapping of other African areas,⁶² but his work must be regarded as preliminary to the precise delimitation of culture-areas for this continent.

The culture-area concept has been used extensively by American ethnologists in the study of diffusion. While the geographically continuous distribution of cultural similarities is doubtless best explained by diffusion from common centers of dispersal, it should be understood that this is an inference from the classified data, not an assumption, as in the case of the Graebnerian *Kulturkreis*, upon which the classification depends for its validity. The culture-area has no time-depth⁶³ and though it has proved to be a valuable heuristic tool in making historical reconstructions it is primarily a descriptive, not an historical, concept.⁶⁴ Neither should the implications of environmental determinism conveyed by the term "culture-area" be taken literally. Whatever, and to what extent, geographic factors determine culture-areas is a research problem, not a postulate upon which the culture-area concept is based. In brief, the culture-area is a classification of coexistent cultural data according to their objective and psychological resemblances and in terms of their regional distributions. It represents an attempt to reduce the chaotic details of primitive social behavior to the level of human comprehension, to provide that ordered body of knowledge without which scientific factorization and generalization are impossible.

⁶² Herskovits, "A Preliminary Consideration of the Culture Areas of Africa," *American Anthropologist*, 26, pp. 50-63.

⁶³ Herskovits, op. cit., p. 657.

⁶⁴ Sapir, "Time Perspective in Aboriginal American Culture," *Canada Department of Mines, Geological Survey, Memoir* 90, Anthropological Series, No. 13, p. 44 ff.

While the culture-area concept has been, up to now, used chiefly by the ethnologists in the study of the simpler peoples, it is receiving more and more attention from sociologists and other social scientists,⁶⁵ who recognize the applicability of this

⁶⁵ Cf., F. H. Giddings, *The Scientific Study of Human Society*, p. 16; S. A. Rice, *Farmers, and Workers in American Politics*, p. 177 ff.; M. M. Willey, "Society and Its Cultural Heritage," in *An Introduction to Sociology* by Davis, Barnes and others, pp. 495-587; C. Wissler, *Man and Culture*, Chap. II and *passim*; "The Culture Concept in Social Anthropology," loc. cit., p. 881 ff.; A. A. Goldenweiser, "Diffusionism and the American School of Historical Ethnology," loc. cit., p. 37; W. D. Wallis, "The Analysis of Culture," Pub. of the American Sociological Society, XXI, p. 158-164.

mode of classification to the culture of civilized societies. A number of questions immediately arise: What are the culture-areas of modern society? What data are available for their delimitation? Will the geographic distribution of the trait-complexes of western and oriental civilizations give districts of sufficient homogeneity to be of service to the sociologist? If not, what other regional characterizations are necessary? The attempt should be made to state some of the problems suggested by these questions in such a way that statistical and other techniques may be brought to bear upon them.

AN INDIAN SHAKER INITIATION AND HEALING SERVICE¹

BERNHARD J. STERN

THE following is a description of ceremonies held at Skokomish Reservation, Washington, October 16, 1927, during a Shaker convention which the writer attended.

The "shaking" occurred in the evening. After the church bell had been tolled and all were assembled, seated on benches around a clearing in the center of the meeting place, the leading minister called out: "Any new joiners?"

A young girl about eighteen years of age was brought forward by her mother.

"Handle her with care, not too rough," cautioned the minister, "But shake the bad stuff off."

Upon further call for volunteers, three

other joiners came forward. The novices stood at intervals of four feet facing a wooden crucifix made of crossed pieces of two-by-fours, and upon which candles were burning. The older shakers arose, partially disrobed, and formed in a line waiting for the ceremonies to begin. The leader solicited other participants:

"Any sick people need help?"

A man spoke up: "I want help to raise my right arm. Difficult to use due to paralysis. I want you to get me power to use it."

While other sick people were asking for relief, one of the head elders of the church, volunteered an explanation of the proceedings to the writer:

This shaking is for this earth to keep body alive. Can't save soul through shaking. Shaking like medicine, healing. I can shake strong but that is not going to save me. Shake to get power for the new members. When they don't shake, we can't consider them members. When they get power, we take them as new members.

¹ The Indian Shaker religion was founded by John Slocum, a Puget Sound Indian in 1881 after his alleged resurrection. The founding of the faith, its early history and its beliefs are excellently portrayed by James Mooney in his classic *The Ghost Dance Religion* (United States Bureau of Ethnology, 14th Annual Report, 1892-3, Part II, pp. 746-63).

When no additional joiners and sick people volunteered, all the participants stood facing forward and a woman was asked to open with prayer. With a voice vibrant with intense emotion, she began to chant in her native tongue "In the name of the Father, Son and Holy Ghost." Repeating the refrain three times, her voice mounted in passionate and shrill fervor as she crossed herself in the rhythm of her song. The congregation then murmured the chant thrice in unison with dignified restraint and solemnity but with fervid feeling and religiosity. There was a brief stillness, pregnant with ominous impressiveness, the cadences of the mournful chant still vibrating in one's memory. Then suddenly a weird melody rent the air, the song of the medicine men of the past. The leaders beat time with cow-bells and the participants hopped and jumped rhythmically as they sang. The voices became louder and louder, the peals of the bells deafening in their intensity, and the jumping more vigorous. Soon individuals showed the effects of this bedlam and began to shake and writhe spasmodically. Heads and arms shook in frenzy, eyes and mouths twitched, bodies swayed, and some men and women beat themselves furiously on their heads, breasts and sides. The clangorous bells and the ear-rending melody continued; intermittently there would be a moment's pause in the din, to begin again with ever increasing energy and effect.

Work on the "joiners" started at once; about six individuals concentrating on each subject. One stood in back of the "joiner" ringing two cow-bells directly in her ears. Another rotated a lighted candle in front of her eyes fixating her attention upon it inducing hypnosis. A man caressed the head and hair of the subject softly and then let his hands wander up and down the sides of her body

with gentle languor. A woman raised her hands and pressed her palms against those of the subject while she shook vigorously. Others made passes with their hands and arms in front of her face and sought to make her body move in rhythm with the bells and song.

The "joiners" reacted differently to this treatment. One soon fell into a cataleptic stupor and rotated slowly round and around on one spot. But in spite of hours of frantic efforts of the believers, she did not respond to their attempts to make her shake. Another, first dazed, with her mouth wide open, breathing heavily, then rigid and tense, shortly began to shake slowly and finally was jerking violently, her head, arms and body shaking in spasms. The attractive eighteen-year-old girl was the only one, however, who "got under sanctification and received the power of God." She appeared irresponsible at first, while her mother and others worked upon her with great earnestness. As if terror stricken, she held her arm before her eyes in despair. Suddenly she began to move slowly, bent low in a trance, and revolving at least fifty times she moved about the room her finger pointing to the ground. Eventually she fell into a dead faint and lay prostrate on the floor as some members kneeled beside her praying and singing songs of benediction. Finally the girl arose and in an ecstatic trance with her right arm stretched upward, she led a march around the church while her followers sang.

The healing of the sick proceeded simultaneously with "giving power" to the "joiners." The man with the paralytic arm received energetic chiropractic treatment. The sick women were accorded especially emphatic healing by the men. A humpback with a pointed beard and piercing eyes specialized on one of the women. Noting the interest the hump-

back took in the woman, a fellow participant hypnotized both of them and sought to effect a communication between them. His technique culminated in his pressing his cupped hands against the woman's abdomen as if gathering some of her spirit and then transmitting the captured spirit to the humpback. One of the sick women who was put in a state of rigid coma by the treatment she received, was brought back to consciousness by another woman who bit into her shoulder and blew into the wound as if imbuing her with the breath of life. She followed this performance by expanding the subject's lungs by vigorous arm movements and rubbed her body until she breathed normally again.

All this time the bells were ringing, the weird rhythmic chants continued and the stamping and jumping of the hundred participants added to the cacophony. Those who were not engaged in hypnotiz-

ing the "joiners" and in "healing" the sick, operated on each other. One woman glided about, feline like, with half closed eyes, putting individual after individual into a trance. The majority were shaking, "getting power" and beating themselves in convulsive frenzy. All sorts of different postures and attitudes were assumed. One individual hopped around the room in a hypnoidal state with arms outstretched rigidly. Another with blissful rapture, leaned forward in an attitude of attention as if listening to some distant melodious voices. Still another with a finger pointed to the ground exhorted with some absent spirits. The maddening noises continued with unabated fury.

About three A.M. one of the most active of the Shakers who had put another member in a state of catalepsy, decided that the white man too must "get power." The writer suddenly felt it was getting late. . . .

SOCIAL WORK CONFERENCE MEETS IN SAN FRANCISCO

The fifty-sixth meeting of the National Conference of Social Work will take place in San Francisco, California, June 26 to July 3, under the leadership of Porter R. Lee, the president, who is director of the New York School of Social Work.

The Conference is open to anyone who wishes to attend. It brings together at one time the most important group of experts in the field of social work in the country. Its program deals with child welfare, community life, delinquency, health, immigration, mental hygiene, and similar social problems. Thirty kindred organizations will hold meetings in connection with the Conference.

All railroads offer tourist rates, with special arrangements for vacation trips. Adequate hotel space has been assured. Additional information about the Conference can be secured from Howard R. Knight, General Secretary, 277 East Long Street, Columbus, Ohio.

GOVERNMENT, POLITICS, CITIZENSHIP

Contributions to this Department will include material of three kinds: (1) original discussion, suggestion, plans, programs, and theories; (2) reports of special projects, working programs, conferences and meetings, and progress in any distinctive aspect of the field; (3) special results of study and research.

RACE IN POLITICS: AN OPPORTUNITY FOR ORIGINAL RESEARCH

T. J. WOOFTER, JR.

PROBABLY no phase of relations between Negroes and white people in the United States has been argued about more bitterly and consequently thought about less rationally than the place of the Negro in politics. It is not the object of this article to advance any new arguments in this controversy but to point out some phases of the political aspect of race problems where rich material should reward the effort of research workers to uncover the truth.

Deny a child a piece of candy and candy will immediately occupy a disproportionate amount of his consciousness. Deny an adult the privilege of attending a base ball game and he is likely to think base ball more than he otherwise would. With this in mind it appears only human that since Negroes have been denied suffrage in the areas where a large majority of them live they think about suffrage much more than do the white people and magnify the value of the privilege of voting beyond the value ascribed to it by the white holders of the suffrage who use it in such limited numbers. In the minds of those who gain the confidences of Negroes and talk intimately with them, or those who analyze the reasoning of the Negro press, there is

little doubt that the Negro's preoccupation with suffrage colors, to a great extent, his attitude toward race relations.

Similarly the thinking of the white man in the South, in so far as he thinks about the race question, is colored by his feeling about the Negro vote and the social heritage derived from reconstruction controversies. Thus in the whole South-eastern area politics form the background of much of the thinking on race relations, the basis of many of the racial attitudes, the origin of many of the customs, and the reason for the structure of the elective machinery. Yet this powerful determinant of the situation is rarely discussed rationally and never studied impartially.

In the North an equally important but different political situation has been precipitated by the migration of Negroes to metropolises where they come into contact with machine politics of the type practiced by Tammany in New York, Big Bill Thompson in Chicago, Vare in Philadelphia, and lesser lights of the same school. To what extent Negroes moving North have used their suffrage privileges, what has been their relationship to the machines and what has been the result in political privileges and rewards are fields which are entirely untouched by the research worker.

In general there are four lines of political research in Negro problems which seem to offer fruitful possibilities. First, the historical treatment of the reconstruction period and of the disfranchisement movement. Some work of a general nature on the historical aspects of reconstruction has been done in which the ebb and flow of controversy were described. However, the actual evaluation of efforts of Negroes in reconstruction politics has been neglected.

The material for this study is rapidly passing because it is embodied largely in human documents—the minds of men white and colored who were active during that period. These men are dying off every year. One whose political reminiscences would have been of tremendous importance was Isaiah Montgomery of Mound Bayou, Mississippi, whose daughter Mrs. Booze, was the center of such acrimonious rumors in the whispering campaign of 1928. Montgomery was a slave of Jefferson Davis, founder of the town of Mound Bayou, active in the Mississippi reconstruction politics and well thought of and probably well advised by many of Mississippi's white leaders. It is from human witnesses of this kind rather than from the windy contentions of political campaigns that the real story of reconstruction is to be written.

Mr. Lewinson, formerly of the Brookings School, has made a contribution to the literature regarding the disfranchisement movement, chiefly through his emphasis of the relationship of this movement to the rise of the populist party. However, this field is only partially worked.

The second and most dynamic aspect of the political field which needs study is an effort to gage exactly the present political status of the Negro and the trends in his status. It would seem at first glance that

this question might be answered off-hand by the statement that the Negro votes in the Northern and border states and does not vote in the South. However, the truth is not so simple. Some of the problems of the Negro in the politics of the Northern metropolitan centers have been indicated. Even in the South things are happening which have not been evaluated. For the past fifteen years it has been evident that the growing number of Negro property owners eligible to vote in bond elections and other municipal elections has in various places been sufficient to control the balance of power and force political recognition. Recently the writer was vividly reminded of how much has taken place by watching a perfectly frank discussion between a Negro hotel porter and a white traveling man as to which candidates they had supported in a municipal election in a city where such a discussion, ten years ago, would have been racial heresy. The writer has also seen white women of unbroken Southern tradition and unquestioned social standing, carry Negro women to the polls in their cars in order to win the mayoralty for an independent reform candidate running against a machine boss of the democratic party in a far Southern city.

The surprises of the 1928 campaign have not been collected, but the phenomenon of most widespread interest and encouragement was the effort of both parties to inject race as an issue in the South with results which were appreciable but not nearly so evident as they would have been ten years ago and with slight race friction. A collection and analysis of the lurid sub-rosa campaign articles and pamphlets, designed to stir race prejudice in the 1928 election would be illuminating in the description of political stimulus. This whole field of the present status of the Negro in politics both in the South and in the North

needs to be approached by case studies of elections where Negroes have participated and statistical studies of the trends in the number of Negro qualified voters and the extent to which they vote.

The most important recent single event in this field was the ruling by the Supreme Court of the United States that the Texas white primary law was contrary to the spirit of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments. Hitherto it has been more or less tacitly assumed that the white primary system was legal disfranchisement. The extension of this decision to apply in other Southern states would precipitate an entirely new political situation.

The third research field is presented by the problems of the Negro office holder, both in the all-Negro communities such as Mound Bayou, Mississippi, Boley, Oklahoma, and Taft, Oklahoma and in white communities. Professor Bunche of Howard University notes that there are sixty-four towns and twenty-one settlements in the United States populated and governed almost entirely by Negroes. In addition to the notable political progress of the Negro in New York, Chicago, St. Louis, Kansas City, and Cleveland, he lists quite a number of cities which have Negro representatives in the city council. And the following states have recently had Negro members in the legislature; New York 2, Ohio 1, Pennsylvania 2, New Jersey 2, Missouri 1, California 1, and Illinois 5. The methodology of evaluating the Negro office holder would seem to be a combination of the biographical, with analysis of official documents.

The fourth and the most important and difficult field for study is the effort to analyze the effects of the political situation as it exists. That this situation has a profound effect on the Negro is apparent. That it also has its profound effects on the white South is not so fully realized.

A most amusing and illuminating instance of this effect is furnished by the recent action of the Mississippi Legislature. The American Legion with all its young enthusiasm had sponsored a bill requiring that the constitution of the United States be taught in the public schools. With such sponsorship the bill was having smooth sailing and was about to pass without much comment until one of the rural legislators arose to caution the honorable assembly that if the bill should pass it would mean the teaching of the constitution in the Negro public schools including the thirteenth and fourteenth and fifteenth amendments,—which would never do. The bill was immediately tabled and never came up again. It is thus that having disfranchised the Negro the white South made him dominant in their political thinking. A study of the legislation in the major social movements in the South would reveal the extent to which the Negro as a political potentiality has moulded Southern legislation. Prohibition, compulsory education and woman's suffrage bills have been fought through over a bitter opposition which advanced, as one of its main arguments, the assertion that this legislation would be of great benefit to Negroes. The backwardness of the South in respect to child labor legislation is also undoubtedly attributable in part to the feeling in regard to Negro labor. Thus in the effort to eliminate the Negro in politics, the South has made him a dominant factor. It is a repetition of Booker T. Washington's old story that it is impossible to hold a man in the ditch without staying there with him. Thus not only the future of the Negro in the South, but also the future policies of democracy toward minority groups are involved in the questions which arise from the political aspects of race relations.

The question which is repeatedly raised in research circles is whether or not social science has a contribution to make in the discovery and analysis of the facts of this situation. Professional politicians with controversial methods have had two opportunities to deal with the situation once during reconstruction and once during the period of disfranchisement. Probably their efforts yielded as good results as

could have been expected under the existing conditions. There seems, however, to be no uniformity or stability to the application of their formulae. The question which we raise is whether or not it would not be a salutary procedure to mix some tested facts with the controversies which will undoubtedly rage before this agitated social situation is stabilized.

SUDDEN CHANGES IN GROUP OPINION

EDWIN H. PAGET

I

THE numerous problems arising from our social order both encourage and discourage the student of the social sciences. He is discouraged because very little has been solved. Considering the vastness of the field, we have made but slight progress. But the student is also encouraged by the opportunities for creative research. And among the many problems demanding solution, he will find one which has been strangely neglected, although a problem of unusual importance. In truth, the matter is so vital a one that the neglect of it is difficult indeed to understand. Although the problem is too complex for a complete and immediate solution, I have been unable to find a good beginning or even a statement of the elements involved. It is the purpose of this paper to make such an analysis; not to solve the problem but to place before the interested researchers the unknown elements yet to be classified.

The first difficulty is to define what we are to consider. In a general way it might be entitled: "Sudden Changes in Group or Public Opinion." All of us certainly have observed that even the

most seemingly permanent beliefs are mutable. For years, to take a recent example, the American public may express a complete and astonishing confidence in a certain statesman—the president of this country, let us say. Suddenly, in a few months time, almost before we are aware that a change has occurred, the man is no longer unusually popular. They cease to applaud him in the theatres when his picture is shown in the news reels. Other politicians are able to defy his authority without fear of losing political support back home. We even find entire sections of the country in revolt against his rule. Nor is this sudden reversal limited to the popularity of individuals. For decades, to take another instance, certain important social classes in our nation maintain a puritanical attitude toward morals which many critics of our American scene find usually narrow and rigid. Their influence is so strong that the most unfounded, underground gossip might seriously damage a reputation, especially a feminine one. Mrs. Grundy is more powerful than any Bourbon or Stuart had ever dared to be. But witness many once dominated communities today. Only a few years have passed,

yet a considerable number of their recognized social leaders publicly advocate and semipublicly practice a liberalism of morals alarmingly "modern." Mrs. Grundy is very ill. Only yesterday she was strong and vigorous. Today she is dying. Perhaps she is already dead; the doctors have not yet decided.

These comparatively sudden reversals of public or group opinion are so numerous that even an enumeration of the more important ones would fill many pages. They occur in every phase of our life. They are uncertain and therefore dangerous elements. And for that reason these reversals demand careful analysis. How dare we plan any extensive campaign of social control if the work of years may be upset by such a comparatively unexpected change in public support? As an illustration of the danger involved, we find, upon an examination of a characteristic reversal, that fifty years of unselfish work towards the establishment of an international organization making for world peace may be largely undone in a few years or even a few months. The collapse in this country during 1918-1919 of the sympathy for nearly all international coöperation is an illustration of the quicksand in which the well-meaning may at any time, and with inadequate warning, find themselves caught. And yet in the early part of 1919 the pro-Leaguers had every reason to be encouraged by their success in placing America in the world leadership of the movement to out-law war. It is the common practice to blame the fiasco of 1919-1920 on either the alleged stubbornness of Woodrow Wilson or the alleged narrow-mindedness of Senator Lodge with outside aid from the famous Senate irreconcilables. But a thorough study of public opinion will show that Wilson and his followers were caught without adequate warning in a fairly sudden reactionary

sweep which was really responsible for their defeat. Strange how superficial have been the numerous analyses of that critical period in the history of the world!

In addition to giving us both a better understanding of many historical events and a greater security in our social planning, a complete and exhaustive study of this sudden-reversal phenomenon would have yet another use. It would give those who form the valiant armies of the minority some standard, however uncertain, by which to judge their progress. Public opinion is often very cruel to those who struggle most unselfishly for the public welfare. A worthy movement may be carried on for years without any indication that people generally regard the proposed reform with any attitude other than amusement or scorn or even violent hostility. Nearly every reform has been thus received. Some reformers are thick-skinned and seem to live happily under criticism. But many sensitive minds, unable to see any evidence of progress, despair of further effort. And numerous competent men refuse even to "waste their time" with such futile agitation. The picture which George Bernard Shaw paints of the wide gulf separating Heart-break House, the home of the "intelligencia," from Horsback Hall, the home of the narrow minded political rulers of England, has its counterpart in American life. It is difficult to work vehemently during years in which the worker receives no indication of progress. Many vital social reforms, advanced by men unable to test the efficiency of their persuasive methods, have died of slow starvation. Indeed, much of the world's history has never been written. We know it only by indirection. The many cruel, vicious, or trivial institutions which we find dominant throughout the history of the race are indirect evidence that countless better

projects failed to receive sufficiently energetic, intelligent, and long-continued support. Most unfortunate and tragic of all, many estimable causes have undoubtedly been deserted almost on the verge of victory. The short-lived abandonment by Saint Peter of his efforts to Christianize Rome, as described in *Quo Vadis*, may have no historical basis, but it does illustrate how close Christianity might easily have come *not* to being the religion of the western world.

Here, then, is the issue. How shall we find its solution?

II

The first question to be answered in solving this problem is: "Why should there ever be a sudden reversal of group opinion?" Some students of social psychology might deny that these sudden reversals do occur, pointing to customs which go on from generation to generation with little change. But unfortunately, as we have already seen, we cannot accept this conclusion. Although a change may, at times, take many years, at other times the transition is very brief indeed. The results of years of effort may be destroyed in even a few weeks, a warning which cannot be too often repeated. Admitting the danger, then, we must explain its sources. Why are there so many contradictions to the axiom that all things change slowly? And the first major reason for these sudden reversals is that most people act with little reason for acting. During the last war, to take a well-known example, millions of Americans were persuaded by effective propaganda that Germany intended to "conquer the world," that the Kaiser was a lieutenant of Satan. They had very little evidence to support this conclusion. Indeed, historians are still studying the origins of the World War, and although

their conclusions are far from final, the verdict of history will probably fail to substantiate the conquest of the world accusation. But in 1917 even unusually intelligent men refused to concern themselves about the historical evidence of war guilt. Instead, their minds were dominated by somewhat unreal but very vivid pictures of Belgium invasions and the resulting cruelty to the population, secret councils of haughty Prussian militarists, and the vision of democracy ultimately triumphant in nearly every country of the world. The foundations of belief, therefore, were very shaky. Then the peace treaty was signed. A year or two passed. We came to see "glorious" France as an unwilling debtor, trying to "cheat" us of our billions. The news reels showed the ex-Kaiser, a harmless and even kind looking man, chopping wood in his Dutch retreat, certainly no imperial demon. Also, our interest in internationalism and world-wide democracy became confused when confronted by the tangled plans for the League of Nations. We came to think "America first," and our enmity towards Germany was no longer vivid enough to prevent our enjoying plays glorifying the student life of old Heidelberg or cheering the German flyers who had crossed the Atlantic.

An understanding of this change will give us our first conclusion—a group opinion which is neither founded in a thorough comprehension of the points at issue nor supported by strong associations with some enduring prejudice, may easily disintegrate. A man may cheer for a program, but his convictions may be shallow. He may be stirred emotionally, but there may be no permanent basis for his emotions. Yet uncritically, all things seem alike.

But this sudden-reversal problem has a second aspect, one of even greater serious-

ness to those who guide our social institutions. In forming our conclusions concerning the drift of public opinion, we are all too easily satisfied by a purely formal response. Since millions attend church regularly on Sunday, many conclude that the nation is safely Christian. This complacency may go on for years and even decades. Suddenly we find that in many communities, at least, there is widespread skepticism not only among those who do not attend church but among those who do. Even while they contribute to the church fund and play base ball on the church picnics, many of the members no longer "take religion seriously." It is "all right for Sunday, but don't preach to me now; I get enough of that from the minister." And although millions openly profess a belief in life immortal, they secretly come to regard death as the end of all things. Yet the *formal response* to religion continues. And those who still examine only the surface fail to see the spread of a skepticism or, worse, of an indifference which should frighten the thoughtful student of religious influence.

The lulling effect of the formal (but semi-meaningless) response which we all make in assenting to beliefs we no longer hold, has a further danger. Those who attempt to direct group opinion tend to neglect the vehement and aggressive persuasive campaign which alone can protect their plans from the callousness of "all too human nature." It is easy to underestimate the need for this conditioning. Of late years many "liberals" have objected to the extremely patriotic history books assigned for study in the elementary grades. They ridicule the picture of the heroic American patriots opposing the heartless British villains. And although we may grant that many of our histories are too nationalistic and too militaristic, we must not forget that these same texts

have aided in producing a national consciousness invaluable to this country in hours of crisis. If our educators are to revise the history texts, the nation must find other means of teaching a reasonable patriotism. Merely singing the *Star Spangled Banner* and taking a holiday on Independence Day do not insure us that future generations will understand love of country as it was once understood. And as with patriotism, so with other matters. The response sought should never be a meaningless formality. It should come from a thoughtful understanding of that to which we assent, and from a legitimate but vehement emotional reaction to its many connotations. Only constant alertness assures effective social control.

The third major reason for sudden changes in group opinion results usually from the unwise and over-aggressive actions of those who attempt to direct that opinion. Here is the old story of carrying an acceptable plan to an illogical extreme. Encouraged by group support, men advance rapidly beyond the sympathy of the group. Thus, with little warning, a seemingly safe majority will shrink to an impotent minority. This is a constant danger. A recent illustration is the so-called "reform" movement. It gained considerable public support by advocating the abolishment of the saloon, the closing of all gambling houses, the barring of horse racing, and censorship of obscene books. But their widespread success increased the ambitions of the reformers. They determined to make prohibition "bone-dry" in the driest possible sense of the word, even though its enforcement necessitated a spy-system repugnant to the public. At the height of their victory, some of the reformers rejoiced that certain alcohol had been poisoned. "They who violate the constitution deserve death." Nor did the reformers stop

here. They suppressed books which in other times would have been considered harmless enough. They announced their intention of abolishing ultimately all use of tobacco. Blue laws were to be extended in all directions. Most of this, of course, was mere talk, but there seemed to be enough reality to their plans to alarm the public. As a result, we are now witnessing a reaction which threatens to destroy even the legitimate accomplishments of the reform group. Success is often the prelude to defeat. This should never be forgotten by those who would direct any movement making for social improvement. When we are at the height of victory, we are often but a step from the edge of the cliff.

The fourth reason for the sudden reversals is somewhat related to the one just considered. Here the reversal is made possible by the normal person's willingness to say "yes" to a plan of action, even though that person hold certain less powerful (at the time) objections to that proposal. Thus a man may say, "I like Taylor; he is a good friend of mine." And yet at the same time he may be thinking, "Somehow I don't completely trust Taylor. If it were to his own gain, he might be willing to injure me." Shrewd students of human behavior have long since noted that a man will often defend a belief more warmly when he is not completely certain of its validity than when he is calmly confident that it cannot be disproved. When we are very vehement, we are often endeavoring to convince ourselves as well as our listeners. This conflicting state of mind increases the danger of the reversal in group opinion, for we have as yet very crude means of measuring the degree of popular assent. If we question an individual closely, he may qualify his admiration for his friend, Taylor; but the members of a large group

are rarely given an opportunity to state their beliefs exactly. Thus year after year in a certain city hundreds of thousands may vote for extensive bond issues. The politicians may assert loudly that the money expended is greatly improving the city. Those who consistently vote for the bond issues may outnumber those who vote against them by five to three. And yet the political leaders who are planning extensive and necessary improvements (let us assume that they will be improvements) may have either a safe majority or a very shaky one. That is to say, five eighths of the voters may be enthusiastically in favor of the issues. Or this same majority may, for the most part, be very doubtful of their real value and yet, at the same time, be afraid to risk stopping "the growth of the city" by voting against the bonds. This example, you may think, is not entirely a fortunate one, since most politicians are careful to measure the actual strength of the voters' enthusiasm. And probably the more successful do. The all-important fact for us to remember is that the "amateur" politician often neglects to make this study. And yet it is to the unselfish and intelligent interest of these amateur politicians that we must look for a large part of our political and social improvement. Perhaps this explains why the professional politician is usually victorious in his struggle with the so-called better elements. The novice is notoriously content with one or two victories. He fails to realize that the public must be watched constantly; that even while they vote for a project, a deadly doubt or indifference may be growing in their minds.

The fifth major cause for sudden reversals in group opinion is akin to the one just discussed in that it arises from hidden factors which the untrained observer may easily overlook. In the final

analysis, any group is often opposed not to an evil or an undesirable *force* but rather to an evil or undesirable *situation*. If, therefore, this threatening situation comes later to assume a pleasing aspect, the opposition may quickly collapse. The real evil may continue as before, but few look below the surface of things. Thus a corrupt mayor will order the police department to enforce very strictly all laws against vice for the six months preceding the majority election. And when election day comes, thousands of otherwise intelligent people will vote for the incumbent mayor, the friend of law and order. True, the return to the old situation may cause them to turn against their favorite again, but with election necessary only once every four years, the latitude is great. And as with politics, so with all other social functions. A corrupt or incompetent man may long remain in control.

Those who would check the possibilities of such reversals of well-founded group indignation, must stress the fundamental evils *inherent* in the forces they oppose. They must resist the alluring temptation to give undue emphasis to temporary embarrassments of their opponents. This temporary embarrassment will surely pass. It may even be succeeded by a very favorable outlook. At the least, the gloom of the present may make even a brief rift in the clouds seem the coming of perpetual sunshine. But the fundamental causes for the evils will probably remain. And although it is more difficult to educate the group to understand the underlying and less obvious forces making for maladjustment or corruption, such an education once accomplished is reasonable surety for permanent support. And here again we see the need for a complete study of this sudden reversal phenomenon in all its phases.

Those who would advance their own selfish and often anti-social interests have little to lose by playing the game of expediency. But those who direct any extensive plan for progressive action are in grave danger at every turn. They must constantly guard against any sudden reversal which would destroy years of work. And yet these same workers are, for the most part, astonishingly ignorant of the real cause for these disastrous reversals. Time after time they exaggerate and magnify the unpleasant situations which their opponents have created, not realizing that by doing so they give the opposition an opportunity to win widespread public favor by even a comparatively slight amelioration of that situation.

There is, in addition, a sixth cause for any sudden change. Here the danger arises from the possibility that a leader of an opposing and reactionary movement may be given an opportunity to capture the imaginations of the public. "Imagination" is a vague word, of course, but there is as yet no better word to describe the object of the appeal. In Italy, for example, the socialistic groups, who were endeavoring to work out an extensive social program, were rather suddenly overcome by Mussolini and his Facisti. Because of the peculiar conditions existing before the rise of the Facisti, conditions conducive to the advancement of radical experimentation, the student of history might have concluded that the liberal and socialistic forces would retain control for some years before being overthrown by the inevitable reaction. Instead, their downfall was sudden, complete, and final. Mussolini appealed to the "imaginations" of the Italian people. He became the new Caesar, the strong, fearless man destined to restore order and prosperity to a weary nation. He promised to place Italy in her proper place, a leader in

European affairs. Rome was to be born again. Glory and a New Order! For the first time in decades, Italy turned her eyes towards the future.

Mussolini is, I grant, an extreme example, but fairly similar changes occur everywhere. "Facts," "reasons," and "evidence" have rarely gained a secure hold on the minds of most men. On the contrary, the logical elements very often create a "heavy and dry" atmosphere, an

admirable time for a reactionary movement to win a sweeping victory by some bold appeal to the imagination. Those who are directing social improvements forget at their peril to advance some symbol which will catch the fancy of the group whose support must be maintained. They who pride themselves upon their logic and reasonableness are only too prone, at times, to overlook the far different forces motivating most human action.

THE COMMUNITY CONFERENCE


In June 1924 a group of mid-westerns gathered at Hull House in a council on forums and discussion groups. Following that council a small fund was obtained to organize, aid, and abet all sorts of discussion groups interested primarily in public questions. The first six months of work clipped the council's wings by a thorough failure. Nevertheless, this beginning was followed by similar movements in Chicago and other cities,—namely Cleveland, Detroit, and St. Louis, which have met with varying success.

The fellowship of interest between these councils led to periodic interchanges of view and experience and to acquaintance finally with leaders of related programs in other cities. In the early part of 1928 a group composed of *M. A. Cartwright* of the American Association for Adult Education, *Fred A. Moore*, *Mildred Chadsey*, Seymour Board of the Brooklyn People's Institute, *Clarence Marsh* of the Buffalo Committee on Adult Education, *E. R. Silcox* of the Inquiry, *Paul M. Pearson* of the National Community Foundation and the writer met and formed the Community Conference, the objects of which are as follows: Aid new "community-scale" developments in adult education; "clear existing community developments;" aid in furtherance of national speakers and program service, develop a handbook of urban adult education developments, develop a guide book for community self-surveys in adult education.

About a dozen cities are now affiliated in this conference. Among them special mention should go to Dallas and its Civic Federation, which, under the direction and leadership of Elmer Scott has probably accomplished the most genuine piece of pioneering in this field in the United States.

The Community Conference attempts no novel activities. It recognizes the prime need of a community director of ceremonies in the adult education field, a need that has been recognized in the public schools, in city government, in commercial associations, in philanthropy. Therefore, the community director of adult education has come to us in the logical march of events. His is the most interesting "profession" in the United States at the present juncture; for he directs the institutional aids to thinking at those ages in which the needs of democracy demand constructive thought and the influence of the public schools is over.

JOHN W. HERRING.



SOCIAL INDUSTRIAL RELATIONSHIPS

Contributions to this Department will include material of three kinds: (1) original discussion, suggestion, plans, programs, and theories; (2) reports of special projects, working programs, conferences and meetings, and progress in any distinctive aspect of the field; (3) special results of study and research.

THE INTERVIEW IN SOCIAL INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH

BRUCE V. MOORE

A PROMINENT social investigator with many years of experience in interviewing has come to the conclusion that nine-tenths of the information obtained by interviews is unreliable. His experience has led him to be extremely cautious in placing reliance on what he is able to learn in this way. Other interviewers of equal experience have more confidence in the interview. Very little has been done to determine how reliable the information obtained by interview actually is, or what are the best techniques to improve the reliability. It is for that reason that a scientific investigation of the technique and reliability of the personal interview for fact-finding is one of the tasks we have undertaken in the Personnel Research Federation. We are far from being ready to state dogmatically the rules and instructions to govern interviewers in social research. I hope, however, in this paper, to bring some of these questions to the fore, and show that there are some fundamental principles which can be brought to bear on them. It is hoped that these will help point the way to improvement in professional standards to be followed by our students who will be the future social investigators.

When it was proposed to study the interview, many interviewers were skeptical

of the possibility. They said it could not and should not be standardized, it was an art, and it depended wholly on the personality of the interviewer. Nevertheless, we believed that the interview could be studied with some hope of practical results. Other processes, psychological or social in nature, and just as intangible, had been analyzed and improved. Moreover, it has often been found that the direct commonsense method of doing a thing, or learning to do it, was not ultimately the best method. An example of this is the simple hunt-and-hit method of typewriting with one finger of each hand, compared to the touch method using all fingers. Therefore it seemed that it should be possible to shorten the trial-and-error process of learning to interview, and point out methods of avoiding pitfalls in this learning process that would be valuable to the beginner.

The first step in the investigation was to survey the literature of the various fields in which the interview is used or studied, and to digest discussions of interviewing, questioning, and related techniques. The next step was to have conferences and discussions with successful interviewers to elicit what they could tell of their techniques and of their conclusions and principles arrived at from their experiences.

In some instances actual interviews were observed. Over sixty interviewers were visited in the fields of psychiatry, psychological clinics, social case work, social research, personnel administration, vocational guidance, college personnel work, journalism, law, and anthropological research.

The third step was to test, try out, and compare various hypotheses, principles, and techniques of interviewing. This undertaking required us to find investigations in which the interview was actually being used, and in which comparative and experimental studies of the interview techniques could be made. This would require situations in which the variable factors affecting the interviews could be differentiated and controlled to a more or less extent.

The investigations from which we are receiving data on the interview are as follows: (1) A study of the mental and emotional attitudes of metal workers, with special attention to the effect of specialization. This is the study which has been reported by Miss Fairchild. (2) An intensive study of mental states and general efficiency, and the factors affecting them, as found in male workers of a railroad shop. (3) A study of restriction of output among unorganized workers. (4) A study of transferability of skilled labor. (5) A study by the United States Children's Bureau of the welfare of children of working mothers. (6) Interviews by agents of a state bureau for obtaining facts of labor law violations.

This third step includes two additional studies which are undertaken primarily for the purpose of investigating the interview. They are experimental studies of the reliability of the interview for obtaining various kinds of data. These experimental investigations are: (1) A study of the interview for determining attitudes of

workers toward an employment guarantee plan after it has been tried eight years following a strike against it at the time of its introduction. (2) A study of the interview for determining pertinent facts relating to the New Bedford textile strike.

In these investigations using experimental and statistical methods there can be comparison of different techniques of interviewing, and evaluation of the same technique under different conditions, and as used by persons of different sex, experience, and education. Also, there should be possible some measure of the relative validity of interviews for obtaining different kinds of facts, and a determination of the number of interviews necessary for a reliable statement of these facts. Since we are just now getting in our data, we are not ready to state any conclusions. It would seem profitable, however, to discuss further the questions and hypotheses upon which we are working.

A valuable result of the visits with interviewers, in the second step described earlier, was the aid received more or less indirectly in bringing to light and analyzing the problems and the principles of the interview. Certain statements received frequently from different interviewers revealed a few common trends of opinion, which in turn, pointed toward the possibility and the nature of a few general principles. On the other hand, the differences in techniques used, and the conflict of opinions and interpretations offered by interviewers served to focus attention on the difficulties and the unsolved problems as well as to indicate the live controversial questions in methods of interviewing. Analysis of these differences and the correlated practices pointed to hypotheses, principles, and techniques to be tested by comparative and experimental procedures.

Often the interviewers described their

techniques and experience in interviewing in the form of conclusions, principles, or rules. The differences and contradictions among the principles stated by different interviewers indicated that these were really not fundamental principles, but merely empirical methods or rule-of-thumb recipes. To find real principles we should have to dig below these superficial generalizations. The fact, however, that interviewers seemed to be successful with their different methods and rules urged us to find more nearly fundamental principles which would account for and even reconcile the differences.

Although all good techniques of interviewing probably have many elements in common, there are at least two different theories or attitudes which modify these and make different use of them. These viewpoints might be designated as the aristocratic and the democratic. Other descriptive terms might be applied, such as the paternal versus the fraternal attitudes, the "get" versus the "give-and-take" method, the clever, subtle approach versus the frank approach, or inquisition versus coöperation. The first of these is the commonsense viewpoint or practical theory of interviewing commonly accepted. The Webbs of England were probably the first to describe it. It considers the serious difficulties of getting facts possessed by an interviewee as due chiefly to the inability, or the unwillingness, of this interviewee to reveal the truth. Success in overcoming these difficulties depends on the cleverness of the interviewer, particularly on his being more clever in the interview than the interviewee is. This assumption is not specifically stated, but it is implied by the suggestions given for interviewing. It is stated that subordinates are less on their guard than higher executives in interviews, and that they have more intimate

information and experience. The manner of interviewing is a form of psycho-analysis, and the interviewer should avoid blocking thoughts, permitting the client to pour out fictitious tales and develop preposterous theories. The interviewer must listen sympathetically to personal opinion, current tradition, and hearsay reports, all of which may be useful in suggesting new sources of inquiry and in revealing bias. "The atmosphere of the dinner-table or the smoking room is a better 'conductor' than that of the office during business hours. The best of these occasions is that you can sometimes start several experts arguing among themselves; and in this way you will pick up more information in one hour than you will acquire during a whole day in a series of interviews." When documents or statistics are mentioned, ask in an off-hand way for opportunity to see them. "The expert interviewer, like the bedside physician, agrees straightway with all the assumptions and generalizations of his patient, and uses his detective skill to sift, by tactful cross-examination, the grain of fact from the bushel of sentiment, self-interest, and theory."

It is evident that the viewpoint of the interview held here is not that of a free give-and-take process in a democratic exchange of ideas. An American investigator in the social sciences, who has some mental initiative on his own part, attempted to interview the Webbs, but he had to describe the interview as unsatisfactory. He said they had a canny way of making their statements, or replies to questions, in the form of questions. They threw the interrogator into the position of giving information. Unquestionably this method sometimes gets results; but let us now consider the other method in comparison.

A viewpoint different from that just

described results in a method of interviewing which might be called a frank, free give-and-take process. There is an attempt at coöperation in getting at the facts. The interviewer not only explains frankly what he wants to know and why he wants to know it; but he also attempts to give the interviewee the same motives for revealing the facts as he has in discovering them. This process of getting together tends to minimize error due to misunderstanding or deceit. When the interviewer tries to be more clever than the interviewee, he often forgets that the interviewee is usually trying to do the same thing. Real cleverness, on the part of the interviewee, conceals itself, and thus the deceiver is subject to his greatest pitfall, deceitfulness of defense aroused in the interviewee.

Getting the facts by interview is difficult enough without introducing any unnecessary handicaps to mutual understanding. Let us briefly analyze the steps in the process. (1) One individual or group of individuals have an experience, which raises a problem. (2) On the basis of experience, certain facts are judged necessary to solve the problem. (3) Questions to obtain these facts are formulated in terms of the interviewer's vocabulary. (4) In the presence of the interviewee, these questions are articulated. (5) The questions are adequately heard by the interviewee. (6) The interviewee translates the questions into terms of his own familiar every-day vocabulary. (7) The interviewee relates the questions to his own experience, and in his own experience finds answers. (8) The answers are formulated in terms of the interviewee's vocabulary. (9) The answers are articulated accurately in the presence of the interviewer. (10) The answers are accurately heard by the interviewer. (11) The interviewer translates the answers into terms

of his own familiar vocabulary. (12) The interviewer relates the answers to his own experience and thus finds their meaning for his problem. Errors may come in through any of these steps, but mutual understanding of interviewer and interviewee tends to minimize them. Even then, differences of education, experience, and interests in life make it sufficiently difficult for the interviewer to explain what he wants to know and why he wants to know it, without introducing other sources of misunderstanding. Because of these differences in persons, the explanation given by the interviewer must be given so that the interviewee can understand it, and often he cannot convey the full meaning which the problem has for himself. The best he can do is to explain the true purpose of the interview in so far as the interviewee can appreciate it in terms of his experience and his interests.

An interviewer investigating the extra-trade training and experience of workers in the metal trades first tried direct questioning. After about two months of this method with poor results, she tried an indirect method of getting the men to talk in a casual conversation, and then picking up what information she could. This free report or conversational method was expensive in time, and subject to error. Sometimes after such an interview was completed and the interviewee was about to leave, he might say: "I worked three years in the cotton mills, but of course you are not interested in that." And of course it was just what the investigator wanted to know. After considerably more experience in interviewing, she found herself using direct questions again, but with much greater success than that attained in the two previous periods of interviewing. The essential difference was that she had learned how to approach the interview from the point of view and

interests of the worker, and she could tie her interests and the problem of her investigation with the interests of the workers. Then she could go directly to the point and get her facts.

The reliability of the interview in research presents two important questions: (1) How can the reliability of information be determined? (2) How may the reliability be increased? There have been some psychological studies which, though general in nature, can be applied more or less specifically to the problem of determining and controlling the reliability of interviews. The interview, particularly the interview involving fact-finding, can be divided into two correlated phases or processes. One process is that of acquiring or exchanging information by conversation or the medium of speech. The other process is that of acquiring information by mere observation of the interviewee, including his features, behavior, and significant facts of his environment. Practically all psychological studies relating to the interview fall into two groups. One group of studies relates to the reliability of report, testimony, or answers to questions put to the interviewee. These studies relate to the process of obtaining information through speech, giving special attention to the factors affecting its accuracy, such as the form of a question. The other group of studies relate to the reliability of judgments of character or personality traits of the interviewee as made by the interviewer and based on the interview. These studies are concerned with judgments based on information, criteria, or clues of personality gained through both speech and observation, but the tendency has been to give considerable weight to observation. In making such judgments the judge always wants to see the one judged. The desire to see the one judged is particularly noticeable in employment interviews.

One of the better general analyses of the interview is that by Woodworth. He points out that the personal equation or the fact of individual differences appears in two kinds or classes of error in interviewing. One type of error is the *variable error*. The existence of a variable error is easily detected in the mere fact of scatter of observations. Different interviewees or witnesses will report different facts; and if there is only a variable error, their statements will vary or be distributed around the true facts with the central tendency being a good picture of the true facts. If there is a *constant error*, the statements will not only vary from each other, but they will also all be away from the facts they purport to report.

The variable error is illustrated by the variation in estimates of lapse of time by different observers:

Witnesses in court may be required to testify as to the length of time elapsing between two events, say a cry of terror and the sound of a pistol. One observer reports fifteen seconds, one half a minute, one a minute. We take a rough average of these estimates, and conclude that the time must have been something like half a minute. But is there a constant error in this sort of estimation? An experiment may tell. Take out your watch before an audience, and say, "I want you each to estimate the time between the moment when I say 'Begin' and the moment when I say 'Stop.' " Allow 15 seconds to elapse, and you will find that the estimates range from perhaps 15 seconds as a lower limit to a minute or a minute and a half, with an average of about 25 to 30 seconds. There is then a large constant error, in the direction of overestimation of time, under certain conditions. Change the conditions, and you alter the amount of the constant error, and may even reverse its direction.

These tendencies to error will be illustrated again in our consideration of the judgments of character traits. The variable error appears in the divergence of opinions held by different persons in regard to a trait in any one individual. The constant error is illustrated in the tendency of individuals to overestimate

desirable traits in themselves and underestimate undesirable traits in themselves.

A common but subtle form of constant error is that which is produced by suggestion from the form of a question. It has long been known that the way in which a question is asked has an important influence on the actual correctness of the answers made to it. In legal procedure it has been found necessary to regulate the use of the "leading question." A few comparatively recent attempts have been made to discriminate clearly the various types of questions from each other and measure the influence of each type on the reliability of statements elicited by them. Muscio's investigation is the most complete.

In brief, Muscio concluded from his investigation that the poorest or most unsafe form of question was the implicative. An example used was, "Was the hair of Jones very dark?" The most reliable form of question was the subjective-direction form with neither negative nor definite article. This form related to the actual seeing or hearing of an item. An example used was, "Did you see an umbrella?" It was pointed out, however, that when one denies that he *saw* an object, he does not say that it was absent; and not being willing to deny it was present, which is common, does not imply its presence. In other studies it has been found that the free narrative report is more reliable than information gained by interrogation or cross-examination of witness.

The group of studies relating to the reliability of judgments of personality traits were not, on the whole, undertaken for specific utilization in any particular field, but their results may be applied generally in several fields. The judgment, rating, or measurement of personality traits is generally thought of as being important

in the interview for employment and for vocational guidance and placement. The process plays an important part, however, in nearly all interviews. Both the interviewer and the interviewee are judging each other in many ways in their efforts to come to an understanding of each other in any interview. The interviewee is judging the interviewer as to his motives and sincerity. The interviewer is judging the interviewee as to his intelligence, honesty, and veracity in answering the questions put to him. Throughout the interview, there is a social give-and-take process and an adjustment of the personalities in which the judgment and interpretation of each other's traits is fundamental. There is a certain amount of rivalry in this; for the one who best understands the other has that element of advantage. As Thorndike has stated, "Every human being thus tends by original nature to arrive at a status of mastery or submission toward every other human being, and even under the more intelligent customs of civilized life somewhat of the tendency persists in many men."

Thorndike has pointed out, and other investigators have found evidence for the conclusion that probably all judgments of any individual's specific personality traits are influenced by the general impression held of that person. This is a form of "constant error" in which the "halo" effect or atmosphere about an individual may influence one's judgment of him in respect to any particular trait. Thorndike concludes:

The writer has become convinced that even a very capable foreman, employer, teacher, or department head is unable to treat an individual as a compound of separate qualities and to assign a magnitude to each of these in independence of the others. The magnitude of the constant error of the halo, as we have called it, also seems surprisingly large, though we lack objective criteria by which to determine its

exact size. As a consequence science seems to demand that, in all work on ratings for qualities the observer should report the evidence, not a rating, and the rating should be given on the evidence to each quality separately without knowledge of the evidence concerning any other quality in the same individual.

It might be thought that inaccurate judgments on personal traits were caused by lack of acquaintance with the person judged. This is true to a certain extent; but familiarity has its own pitfalls. Knight has investigated the effect of the acquaintance factor upon personal judgments. He found that the factor of acquaintance "operates to make ratings more lenient, i.e., increases the over-rating, and to make ratings less critical and less analytical, i.e., increases the influence of the halo of general estimate. It is in the direction of truth to discount the ratings of judges when acquaintance has been long."

Walter Lippman has called attention to the fact that there are commonly certain "pictures in our heads" concerning the supposed appearance of individuals of a certain race, class, occupation, or social group; and these he has called "stereotypes." Rice designed an experiment to test the existence and study the nature of these stereotypes or preconceived notions of the physical appearance of members of a certain race, occupation, or social group. A group of 258 undergraduates of Dartmouth College, and 31 members of a Grange, presumably farmers, were asked to identify nine portraits. The subjects were informed that the photographs were of a bootlegger, a European premier, a bolshevik, a United States Senator, a labor leader, an editor-politician, two manufacturers, and a financier. Other groups of students were to grade the nine pictures, first, according to intelligence, second, according to craftiness. Some of

the more general conclusions from the experiment were:

1. The existence of common stereotypes concerning the appearance of various classes of persons (senators, bootleggers, etc.) is clearly indicated. These led to numerous errors of judgment.
2. The stereotypes found among students and grange members were similar, but there appeared to be a somewhat greater uniformity (consideration of judgment on the basis of a stereotype) among the latter.
3. Estimates of intelligence and craftiness, presumably based upon the features portrayed, are in reality influenced by the supposed identity of the portrait, i.e., by the stereotype of the supposed occupational or social status held in the mind of the examiner.

In the light of these findings, the interviewer should ask himself seriously how carefully he guards himself from the subtle influence of his stereotypes in judging the interviewee and in managing the interview. We might ask, also, how often an interviewee has been misjudged or arbitrarily dealt with in an interview in which preconception or prejudices growing out of stereotypes have played their mischievous part. In a fact-finding interview, the investigator can be misled by the same subtle processes.

Enough is known about interviewing to make everyone cautious about placing reliance on the information so obtained. At the same time it must be recognized that much valuable information can be obtained in no other way. Hence the importance of not only applying what is known, but also of studying further the factors affecting the interview. It is stated that the interview should always be private with no third party present; that the schedule should not be shown; that notes should not be taken during the interview; that the interviewer should be the same sex as the interviewee; that the information obtained indirectly through

informal conversation is more reliable than that obtained by direct questions, and so forth. The truth and importance of such statements must be determined in order to put social research on a firm scientific basis.

Suggestions of methods may be obtained not only from many different fields in which the interview is used, but also from the techniques in related sciences. Social workers have probably done more toward developing the interview in a practical way than any other group. Also, they have done much in applying principles from other fields. This is illustrated in Miss Richmond's "Social Diagnosis" by her applications from the law of evidence evolved by the legal profession. An application from the science of psychology is illustrated in Mrs. Sheffield's little book, *The Social Case History*. She brings

an admirable contribution from Dewey's psychology of thinking in illustrating so well how facts come to have meaning and importance in any investigation.

No engineer, physicist, or chemist would ever publish the results of research without indicating the degree of probable error. It is only in the present generation that such practice has come to be followed in psychology. Not yet have many investigators in social science accompanied their reports of studies with an index of the reliability of their data and findings. That is a professional standard toward which to work in training for social work. Students taking part in research which is held to high standards come to realize the importance of these standards, and also tend to form the habits which constitute training in scientific accuracy.

MARY E. RICHMOND, 1861-1928

Mary E. Richmond—author, editor, social worker—is recognized as the pioneer of the family case work field and the inspiration of case workers the world over. The February, 1929, issue of *The Family* has been prepared in her honor. There has been no attempt to give a full and rounded picture of her life: some of her friends have simply given a picture of her as they knew her—reflecting the variety of her interests and the many phases of her influence. Joanna C. Colcord, Hugh Auchincloss, Frances Perkins, Gordon Hamilton, Robert M. Yerkes, Frank J. Bruno are among those contributing to this issue.

LIBRARY AND WORKSHOP

Special Book Reviews by HARRY ELMER BARNES, FRANK H. HANKINS, CLARK WISSLER,
PHILLIPS BRADLEY, FLOYD N. HOUSE, MALCOLM WILLEY, AND OTHERS

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¹ Floyd N. House's *The Range of Social Theory* came from the press too late for review in this issue.
—The Editors.

THE RANGE OF SOCIAL THEORY

L. L. BERNARD

THE LITERARY BACKGROUND OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. By Geo. L. Hurst. New York: Macmillan, 1928. 163 pp. \$1.50.

THE CORRESPONDENCE OF JOHN LOCKE AND EDWARD CLARKE. By Benjamin Rand. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1927. xvi + 605 pp.

KARL MARX'S INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY. By Mandell M. Baber. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1927. x + 370 pp.

SOME ASPECTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF L. T. HOBHOUSE. By J. A. Nicholson. Urbana: University of Illinois, 1928. 86 pp. \$1.00.

THE SOCIAL THEORIES OF L. T. HOBHOUSE. By Hugh Carter. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1927. ix + 137 pp. \$1.50.

THE WORK OF VILFREDO PARETO. By G. H. Bousquet. Hanover, N. H.: The Sociological Press, 1928. 47 pp. \$0.35.

THE SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY OF WILLIAM MORRIS. By Anna A. von Helmholz-Phelan. Durham: Duke University Press, 1927. xi + 207 pp. \$3.50.

POLITICIANS AND MORALISTS OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY. By Emile Faguet. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., n.d. 317 pp. \$4.50.

NICOLÒ MACHIAVELLI THE FLORENTINE. By Giuseppe Prezzolini. New York: Brentano, 1928. ix + 257 pp. \$3.50.

VOLTAIRE, GENIUS OF MOCKERY. By Victor Thaddeus. New York: Brentano, 1928. xiii + 291 pp.

CHRISTOPHER C. ANDREWS: RECOLLECTIONS, 1829-1922. By Alice E. Andrews. Cleveland: Arthur H. Clark Co., 1928. 327 pp.

A SHORT HISTORY OF THE BRITISH WORKING-CLASS MOVEMENT. By G. D. H. Cole. New York: Macmillan, 1927. 192 + 211 pp.

HISTORY OF AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT. By Raymond G. Gettell. New York: Century Co., 1928. ix + 633 pp.

THE AMERICAN PARTY BATTLE. By Charles A. Beard. New York: Macmillan Co., 1928. ix + 150 pp.

I

All students of the history of the social sciences know that we are entering upon an era of reconstruction in which, with the use of new data and the study of background conditioning factors, it will be possible to rewrite with much greater fullness and understanding the development of explanatory theories of human social relationships. Hurst's *Literary Background of the New Testament* is one of the significant contributions to this new trend, because it undertakes to trace back to earlier literary sources much of the content of the four gospels and the other books of the New Testament. The author's investigations and comparisons have been painstaking and they have yielded a vast number of correspondences, especially with the earlier non-canonical writings. Not only do these researches throw much light upon the question of inspiration and

its sources, but they also give greater continuity to the scheme of development of Jewish social ideas of the last millennium B. C., a period now recognized by historians of social theory as productive of important results. This book is technical and of interest primarily to the student.

The same is likewise true of Rand's work on *Locke and Clarke*. The author has previously done much valuable service to the history of ideas, especially in the field of philosophy. In this instance he has collected, with much tact and industry, nearly six hundred pages of previously unpublished letters passing between the two friends named above at a period very important in the social thinking of John Locke. These letters reveal Locke not only as a genial and witty correspondent, but they also show him as active in the rôle of the philosopher influencing practical legislation through his parliamentary friend, especially the British coinage legislation. Light is also thrown by these letters upon the development of two of Locke's most important works—the *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* and *Some Thoughts Concerning Education*—the latter of which was prepared as a guide to the education of Clarke's children. The editor has very wisely introduced the letters with a biographical sketch of some seventy-five pages. There is also an excellent portrait of Locke.

II

Baber's *Karl Marx's Interpretation of History* is primarily an economic analysis done from the primary sources with a generous ear to the previously expounded doctrines of the Harvard economists. The technique of the analysis is austere and highly logical. The results are almost wholly destructive to the contributions and contentions of the great socialist thinker. This volume may well become

the conservative textbook on the economics of socialism. It rejects every one of Marx's major economic contentions and characterizes his attempt to base a philosophy of history upon the mode of production, self-interest and its manipulation, and the dialectic as fore-doomed to failure. The only saving grace of his theory of history, according to the author, was that it largely displaced even more absurd and unilateral interpretations, such as the "great man" theory. It also gave a logical principle of consistency about which the nineteenth century radicals could unite under the single banner of "scientific" socialism. The professors, however, have never been able to accept his doctrines.

Two little books—both doctors' dissertations—on Hobhouse testify to the attention which the University of London sage is now eliciting. Hobhouse's interests are almost encyclopaedic and it is not yet settled whether he shall be known as philosopher, psychologist, anthropologist, sociologist or political theorist. Nicholson deals with the philosophic aspect of his work, and perhaps this is the strongest note running through all of his writings. The author shows clearly, by means of an analysis of the major works of Hobhouse, that the latter is fundamentally a realist with his chief approach through the inductive examination of present-day facts and institutions, although he also draws inductively from the fields of anthropology and history for his data. As he has developed in method he has gone farther and farther away from the metaphysical technique of logical and aprioristic construction. Carter's temperament is less analytical and thorough and consequently his presentation of Hobhouse's *Social Theories* is less well organized. However, he does bring out the fact that Hobhouse looks forward to a reconstruction of so-

society by means of the utilization of intelligence and the accumulation of scientific data. Thus Hobhouse is not merely a speculative philosopher, nor is he even exclusively a pure scientist. He is a reconstructionist and a liberal.

The Sociological Press has placed us under obligations for the timely analysis of *The Work of Vilfredo Pareto*, by G. H. Bousquet. Although the translation is as bad as the writing of Pareto himself is reputed to be, this is one of the few sources of the sociological theories of Pareto available in English. The popularity of Pareto in certain quarters is probably due to his theory of *residues* (cumulative motivations, such as struggle for continuity and persistence of aggregates, need for action and the desires for sociability and sex expression) and *derivations* or rationalized explanations of behavior. In effect Pareto combines a theory of the wishes with neo-Freudianism. This is sufficient to secure a hearing.

III

Although a professor of English, Mrs. Phelan has caught the spirit of William Morris fairly adequately from a sociological point of view. Of course there is a vast difference between having views on social questions (which is still the privilege of everybody) and being a sociologist, and Mrs. Phelan scarcely means to stigmatize the poet and idealist Morris with the title sociologist. Her contribution is to trace, in a well-documented manner, the development of the aristocratic-esthetic-democratic ideas of Morris through his college and early working days. Then we see him take over the religious doctrines of socialism, but not the logical socialism of Marx, nor yet the Christian socialism of Maurice and Kingsley. His was rather the socialism of the old Utopians made esthetic, more Ruskin than Christian,

and more pagan than either. It was easy for him, therefore, in the latter part of his life, to turn almost wholly to artistic idealism and social day-dreaming. Morris is one of the most fascinating personalities in the history of social theory, and this volume is a fairly good introduction to that personality.

Morris had a great deal in common with six other romantic theorists of the French nineteenth century, at least as concerns their common sympathetic, speculative, aprioristic identification with the social aspects of the life which all of them sought to interpret. All of these six—Stendhal, Tocqueville, Proudhon, Sainte-Beuve, Taine, and Renan—and especially the last two, were strongly impregnated with the sympathetic motive and the artistic feeling for things. Faguet is just the man to interpret the significance and message of these six men for their times, and for ours. They did a great deal to shape the thought of the nineteenth century—much more than we are likely to realize now. If their method was different it was largely because their age and its backgrounds were different. But no sociologist who wishes to understand the present and the past can afford to forget them, or to ignore them.

IV

Sympathetic interpretation of men and their views is also an outstanding characteristic of Prezzolini's *Nicolo Machiavelli the Florentine* and of Thaddeus' *Voltaire, Genius of Mockery*. Both are brilliantly written, and both are highly impressionistic, the former the more so in each case. It is a question as to how useful such impressionistic biographies can be to the scientific historian of ideas. The style sometimes gets in the way of the understanding, and the impression made upon the reader is not infrequently

more emotional than intellectual. Perhaps the chief value of such books is to introduce the characters and their meaning in the evolution of ideas to a public which otherwise might not make their acquaintance, especially if their only avenue of approach were through austere analyses. The books are wholly undocumented, except for an occasional quotation from a letter. Consequently it is not always possible to know whether one is reading facts or merely getting the impressions of an imaginative author. Especially does one feel this to be the case in reading the *Nicolo Machiavelli*. Taken as supplementary material or as the first presentation of these two great characters to the average novel-reading public, which now has turned hungrily toward the greater realism of biography, both of these books should have a decidedly useful employment. As personality sketches they are truly fascinating.

V

We come now to two books which illustrate the growth of social theory out of practical problem situations, and the theory is perhaps none the less valuable because of this fact. The *Recollections of Christopher C. Andrews* is not a book dealing specifically with social theory, but the life of a pioneer of Minnesota who became a major general in the Union army and, during a ministry to Sweden and Norway in 1869-1877, learned a lesson about the importance of forestry conservation and culture which he endeavored to teach to the American people, and especially to the people of Minnesota (a difficult task), the remainder of his life. His educational work with regard to our forests and their importance to mankind is his contribution to social theory, and it entitles him to honorable mention here. The story of his work for an intelligent

forestry policy is interestingly told, and there is an introduction by William Watts Folwell, the first president of the University of Minnesota, and long professor of the social sciences in that institution. The volume is beautifully printed, as the Clarke books usually are.

The *Short History of the British Working-Class Movement* is not complete. Another section will be added later. The present work consists of two volumes in one, covering the period of 1789-1900. It is a history not only of the action and attempts at legislative reform and of the gradual growth in power of the working classes in England, but it is also a history of the explanatory and justificatory theory arising out of the working class movement. This type of research and writing is becoming increasingly popular and it has great advantages from the standpoint of showing the dependence of theory upon the aims and struggles of men and collectivities. In this book there is such an interrelated treatment of movement and theory of the socialist, chartist, trade union, thrift (cooperative), and social legislation (later economico-political) movements. The author is, of course, deeply sympathetic with the movements which he describes. As in most of his work he seems to have the instruction of the general reader primarily in mind. Therefore the treatment is compressed and documentation is minimized. The treatment is interesting and informative and doubtless will be useful to a large group of teachers, social workers and other intelligent readers who wish to get at the results of research without being burdened with its technique.

VI

The *History of American Political Thought* and *The American Party Battle* are by two of the hardest workers in the field of

political science in the United States. Both, and particularly Beard's, have viewpoints much broader than merely technical political science. Both writers are quite as much interested in the economic, political and social backgrounds producing political theory and movements as in the explanatory theory itself. They see theory as the product of conditions. Gettell's book is a highly systematic treatise based on a vast amount of research and thoroughly documented. Beard's volume is apparently a bird's-eye view secured from his long excursion through and over the various fields of American culture incident to the preparation of his "Rise of American Civilization," and it is popularly written, as befits a contribution to "The World Today Bookshelf."

Gettell characterizes American Political Thought as practical and optimistic, and these traits run through the whole range of its growth from colonial times to the present. He finds also that it has had its theological, legalistic, and functional phases of development. At the present time the emphasis is primarily upon the study and analysis of actual governmental practices and the popular and institutional conditions which underlie and apparently determine these practices. Everywhere the theory is considered as a product of the historical process and socio-economic situation. He does not, as the older writers did, treat the theories as personal products and under the headings of the leading men who were the mouthpieces or formulators of the written and spoken ideas. On the contrary, he writes about the political thought of the American Revolution, of the constitution, of Federalism, of the Jeffersonian era, of slavery, of territorial expansion, the Civil War and reconstruction, of industrial expansion, and of international relations. Teachers and writers are mentioned, but it is ap-

parent that they are considered as interpreters of movements which they have been able to visualize and as spokesmen of interest groups with which they were in some way identified—not as creators. In the reviewer's opinion this method of treatment greatly enhances the sociological value of the treatise, vitalizes it by rendering it dynamic and functional, although it destroys the artificial simplicity of the old personalistic treatments and therefore renders the teaching of the volume somewhat more difficult. The teacher of such a text will really have to know his subject. The thoroughness of the underlying research is commendable. The reviewer has had to go through the basic literature for other purposes and he has observed few omissions, and perhaps none of first-rate importance.

If Gettell is for the student, Beard is for the intelligent general reader, and he writes in the same easy familiar style which has made other writings of his so readable. After examining various theories of political parties, such as those of Bryce, Tacquerille, Macaulay (instinctive theory), the "sporting theory," and Madison's view that party alignments are generally on the side of economic interest, he accepts this last in general outline. With this background he traces the history of political parties down to the present, exposing the major motives (not always professed by the followers). Thus he recounts the Federalist-Republican alignment, the Jeffersonian and Whig movements, the Democratic-Republican tactics, the struggle of economic factions after the Civil War and the upheaval of the eighteen-nineties, the Rooseveltian and Wilsonian accidents, and the "return to normalcy" in the days of "healing" under the Republican administrations in these latter times. Although written in a fairly light vein the book is keenly analytical all the way through.

A HISTORY OF SOCIAL THOUGHT. By Emory S. Bogardus. Los Angeles: Jessie Ray Miller Company, 1928, 668 pp. \$4.00.

This is a greatly enlarged and much improved new edition of Professor Bogardus' well-known comprehensive manual on the history of sociological thought. The chief improvements in the new edition are the inclusion of pertinent passages from the more important source-material used in the preparation of the volume, the addition of contemporary developments to the chapters on recent phases of sociology, and the provision of topics for report and discussion at the end of each chapter. In its present form the volume is unquestionably the best general introduction to the history of social thought. Its chief merit is its comprehensive scope which gives the student a good orientation as to the whole development of social thought. It is clear and lucid in expression and should be well adapted to pedagogical purposes. It is unquestionably stronger in exposition than in reflective analysis. The chief defect of the book is the weakness and brevity of the treatment of the developments in social thought between the classical period and the age of Malthus. Some might also wish that Professor Bogardus had not purchased comprehensiveness at the expense of excessive brevity and generality in the treatment of important modern writers and schools of sociologists. Yet one cannot have everything in a book of 650 pages and this work serves a need which is not met by any other book in the English language. No student of sociology can be regarded as competent in his field unless he is acquainted with the development of the subject, and this book will serve better than any other to start him on the road towards a mastery of the history of sociology.

HARRY ELMER BARNES.
Smith College.

LA PREHISTORIE ORIENTALE. By Jacques de Morgan. Paris: Paul Geuthner, 3 vols., 1925, 1926 and 1927.

This is a posthumous work of the eminent archaeologist and ethnologist of the Collège de France, prepared for publication by Louis Germain. These volumes are the culmination of forty years of scholarly interest in the origins of oriental civilization. Their author's studies were often carried on under extremely favorable circumstances (de Morgan was director of antiquities for Egypt, 1892-97), and resulted in many notable contributions. Volume I, "Generalities" discusses questions of the origin of man, geological transformations, the glacial epochs, the similarities of the prehistoric Magdalenians and the modern Kamschatkans, prehistoric tools and their uses, the question of the unity of the human mind in relation to independent invention and cultural differences, chronology, etc.

Volume II, "L'Egypte et L'Afrique du Nord" studies first the evidences of paleolithic, neolithic and metal industries in Egypt preliminary to a lengthy development of the theory, of which de Morgan is the most notable exponent, that the origins of the culture of the Egyptian Pharaohs is to be found in Chaldea. There is in this volume an exposition of

the stone cultures of Tunis and the old-stone industries of Somaliland. The so-called "Capsian" culture of Tunis, intermediate between the old and new stone ages, constitutes one of de Morgan's special contributions to the prehistory of the Mediterranean and is one of the bases upon which rests his conviction that cultural diffusion as over against independent invention has been over-emphasized. He is particularly skeptical of the current assumption that the pattern of paleolithic culture epochs worked out for western Europe may be applied in unaltered form to the prehistoric cultural phases throughout the rest of the world.

Volume III, "L'Asie Antérieure" begins with a study of the paleolithic culture in Syria and Mesopotamia, reconstructs the colonization of Chaldea and Elam and the second pottery era of Susa, has a brief chapter on the stone ages in the Far East, devotes two long chapters to the early metal ages in northwest Asia, and concludes with a chapter on the origin of writing in the Near East. It is a work of vast erudition, wholesome skepticism, and suggestive hypotheses. Each volume is copiously and beautifully illustrated.

FRANK H. HANKINS.

Smith College.

SOCIAL ORIENTATION

J. R. STEELMAN

AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY. By Ernest R. Groves. Longmans, Green and Co., New York, 1928. 568 pp.

Among the increasingly large array of introductory texts in sociology it is pleasing to find one with a distinguishing and unifying feature. The basic theme which characterizes the present volume is that of

human experience. It is decidedly more than just another book. The attitude of approach is well stated when the author says: "The sociologist brings to his task not the faith of the mystic, not the confidence of the dreamer, but the serious commitment of the scientist who promises only that he will do his utmost to dis-

cover the facts and report them without bias to those who seek his information."

As a basis for understanding social experience there is a discussion of man and his social equipment. The nature and development of personality is viewed in relation to original human make-up and the effects of physical nature and social contacts. In analyzing social experience the author uses several well-established concepts in sociology—contact, interaction, conflict, coöperation, and communication. In a brief study of primitive life he shows the unbroken cultural chain that binds all generations. Here the author makes excellent use of anthropological material designed to interest and stimulate, rather than to overwhelm and confuse the student.

Human experience is next viewed as it centers about definite persistent interests, thus leading to the organization of social institutions. There is a discussion of the family and domestic experience, property and economic experience, the state and political experience, religious experience and the church. "The companionate," "Family life and modern pleasure-seeking," and "Education for marriage" are topics indicative of the vital and practical nature of the entire volume.

In a discussion of man and his social failures the author considers the forms and inter-relations of social problems. Lack of mental capacity, inadequacy of social culture, exploitation, social distance between groups, the quantity and quality of population, and unwise sympathy are discussed as interrelated causal factors. "In the most exacting sense of

causation," the author says, "there is no knowledge of the conditions that invariably and necessarily produce a criminal or a pauper." He likens our position, in certain respects, to that of medicine before the days of Pasteur. That this frank confession is preferable to the dogmatic vein in which many have written is doubtless the opinion of all who prefer that beginners in sociology approach the subject with a scientific attitude.

In an analysis of the resources now available for greater human satisfaction the author discusses the social significance and possibilities of play, art, science, and education. One chapter is devoted to a resume of social thought from the Greeks to Giddings. Finally he explains the necessity for specialization in the study of society and indicates the point of view and the chief contributors to the biological, the psychological, and the cultural approaches. The serious student will find the most valuable part of Dr. Groves' book to be a sixty-eight page appendix which consists of chapter-by-chapter topics for discussion, subjects for investigation, problems for analysis, and an excellent list of selected references from books and articles. The volume will doubtless appeal to a wide group of the general public interested in keeping abreast of current sociological thinking, and to teachers of orientation courses, as well as to college and normal school students in sociology. It is written in simple, clear language and is stimulating throughout, most of all perhaps because it savors of the combined wide research, teaching, and practical experience of the author, which few have the honor to claim.

THE MEASUREMENT OF POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND OPINIONS

READ BAIN

QUANTITATIVE METHODS IN POLITICS. By Stuart A. Rice. New York: A. A. Knopf, 1928. xxii + 331 pp.

This is one of the most stimulating books I have read for some time. It has no motive other than a thoroughly scientific description of political behavior. Hypotheses are presented, but they are never defended except by the found-facts and logical inferences therefrom. The author is entirely impersonal toward his "explanatory generalizations," and criticizes them as severely as any one else is likely to do. He repeatedly concludes, "Interesting—if true," "suggestive—but not proved."

The first four chapters are of great interest to all social scientists. The author clearly defines his terms but avoids all hair-splitting "final" definitions; more important, he clearly states the "Conceptual Background" (postulates) upon which his work is based. He holds that philosophical presuppositions are always present in scientific work and that it is most important that the writer should be conscious of their nature. He tries to state his own, although he is conscious that he is probably unconscious of many of them and has been unwittingly influenced by the work of others.

The function of science is to describe phenomena (15) and this requires an absolute separation of means from ends (16). The "social sciences" have been largely social ethics and moral philosophy. This results in emphasis on the "outcome of social processes" and gives rise to much "wishful thinking" (16-17). The conclusion is that the "discussion of values and goals" is desirable but that it should not be called social science; if it

is, "our science" may turn out to be mere "pious aspiration" (18-19). This sounds like sound sense to me.

There are no "identities" in natural phenomena; science treats sense perceptions "*as if* they were real and exact entities." Belief in all existents are inferences from sense experiences (24) and scientific laws are merely statistical summarizations of these (26-27) in terms of probability (28-29). These are all axioms in scientific methodology, but they are ideas which many social scientists implicitly and explicitly deny.

Case method and history are held not to be sciences, since they are concerned with unique events (35-37). Science treats unique events as identical, and thus arrives at explicit or implicit statistical generalizations regarding their behavior. These generalizations are, of course, more or less "fictional" or abstract, but experience has proved them to be very useful. This is frank pragmatism, but Mr. Rice is not frightened by the word (38-45). There is no attempt to deny the usefulness of history and case study in the attempt to understand social reality, but the claim is made that these methods become implicitly or explicitly statistical whenever they attempt to generalize or become "scientific" (47). With this I heartily agree.

The rest of the book is concerned with report and analysis of actual statistical investigation of various types of political behavior. The technical nature of much of the data prevents any review of this most fascinating and valuable portion of the book. One has a sense of adventuring into a hitherto almost untouched field. The kill is negligible, but the chase is

exciting. One sees a vision of the day when political science may become truly scientific, at least, in dealing with some types of its data.

Part Three deals with "The Content and Statistical Distribution of Attitudes." The latter term is defined as "a set toward behavior without reference to the degree of rationality" (51). He quotes approvingly, Thurstone's distinction between attitude and opinion, the first being personal and subjective, and the latter, the verbal expression of an attitude, more rational, or rationalized, in Rice's opinion. I would deny that opinions are necessarily any more rational than attitudes, however defined, and hold that attitudes should be defined as acts, not as subjective sets, or biases, or feelings, or "sum totals" of any non-perceptible "states." The views of Rice and Thurstone both violate Rice's assumption of the statistical view of a perceptual world (Chapter III) and the axiom that science deals only with sense experiences. Now as a matter of fact, Rice's researches are based upon these assumptions. Although he agrees with Thurstone's distinction between opinions and attitudes, he uses the term "attitude" to cover verbal behavior; but his researches are all based upon acts, verbal, as in the "Stereotypes" (Chapter V), or motor, as in balloting. Casting a vote, whether by voice or ballot, is an attitude; giving personal reasons for so doing is the expression of opinion, as I see it. When we can observe the actual adjustive behavior, we do not add anything to our scientific knowledge by speculating all day as to why this behavior occurred, unless we thereby obtain cues for the observation of other kinds of phenomena which may in their turn be generalized, i.e. statistically treated.

In chapter six, the hypothesis that "attitudes" are normally distributed along

a scale is tested and the conclusion reached that this is not proved although the author thinks there is "something in" it, "*apart from some distorting situation*" (p. 89). To test this hypothesis, one would apparently have to use a rational scale of equal steps similar to Thurstone's instead of the rank-order device of Allport (Cf. Thurstone, A. J. S., 33:542), and the assumed equi-distant steps of Rice (78).

Another interesting hypothesis, as yet not proved, is that political attitudes are functions of cultural areas (154). The attempt to validate this by using the data of the Non-Partizan League elections, the LaFollette campaign of 1924, and shopping areas around various cities was not conclusive but "promises to be fruitful" (155).

Another hypothesis made (193-4) is that the representative really represents his own kind of people. The results only partially confirm the theory (204-6).

In Chapters XV-XVI, indexes of cohesion and likeness and mathematical determination of blocs in small (25-30 members) voting bodies are worked out and discussed.

Part Six is concerned with "Time Variations in Political Attitude." Here there is shown graphically and mathematically the growth and decline of interest in the initiative and referendum with some discussion of non-voting (245-50); the change of Dartmouth student opinion on evolution, before and after hearing Bryan (Chapter XVIII); and the resultants of undefined stimuli in liberal, conservative and progressive opinion (XIX). Chapter XX is one of the most interesting discussions. It attempts to show the relations between party turnover and business cycles with a negative, or "not proved," conclusion. Chapter XXI shows pretty conclusively that the average age and experience of congressmen have gradually increased since the

Jacksonian period. It is suggested that this may be due to increased expectation of life, or to increased political conservatism (301). Another very interesting hypothesis is that there has been an increased tendency for political landslides with the increase of contact and communication (303-5). This was tested by plotting the "landslide tendencies" in the gubernatorial elections of New York, Ohio, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania since 1850 (315). Very definite cycles are revealed, with the landslide tendency markedly on the increase since 1880. The cycle varies from twelve to fourteen years.

I have been able to touch briefly upon only what seem to me some of the most important hypotheses. The significance of these preliminary investigations lies, not in the results obtained, but in the methods used. Mr. Rice has given both the theoretical assumptions and numer-

ous ingenious examples of the quantitative approach to the investigation of certain types of political data. I think his work shows the feasibility of this method of analysis and his theory shows the necessity for its continuation and elaboration if politics is to leave the armchair and fight the tedious battles that must be waged before it can become a real science. Sociologists can learn much from this book as to a rigidly scientific method of attacking their problems. It offers escape from the armchair and also from the confessional box and arcanum of subjective speculation. Other men than Rice can use both his data and his method and thus validate or annihilate his conclusions and interpretations. In much of what passes at present for sociological "research," this is not possible.

If the results of further investigation show his hypotheses to be false, I am sure Mr. Rice will be the first to cheer.

GLIMPSES INTO HISTORY THROUGH DIARIES

GUION GRIFFIS JOHNSON

SAMUEL SEWALL'S DIARY. Edited by Mark Van Doren. New York: Macy-Masius, 1927, 272 pp. \$2.50.
THE JOURNAL OF WILLIAM MACLAY. Introduction by Charles A. Beard. New York: Albert and Charles Boni, 1927. xix + 429 pp.

Two important diaries throwing significant light upon the periods in which they were written have recently been made available to the reading public, *Samuel Sewall's Diary*, 1675-1729, and *The Journal of William Maclay*, 1789-1791. *Samuel Sewall's Diary*, edited by Mark Van Doren, appears in the Macy-Masius American Bookshelf Series. There has long been need for an abridged and convenient publication of this significant record of New England life, which was

first published in three volumes by the Massachusetts Historical Society (1878-1882). Sewall, who was closely identified with public affairs in Massachusetts, being in 1718 Chief Justice of the Superior Court of the colony, was a slave to his diary. To it he revealed some of his most intimate affairs: his relations with his wife and their fifteen children, his business observations, his religious beliefs, and his courtships. Shortly after the death of his wife, he is found recording, "At night, when all were gone to bed; Cousin Moodey went with me into the new Hall, read the history of Rebekah's Courtship, and pray'd with me respecting my Widowed Condition;" and several months later,

"Visit Mrs. Tilly . . . ask her to come and dwell at my house. She expresses her unworthiness of such a thing with much Respect."

It is unfortunate that this edition has no index.

The journal by William Maclay, valued by every student of American history because of the flood of light which it throws upon the formative period of the United States Government, has long been out of print. This new edition, with an able introduction by Charles A. Beard, is easy to use and has an excellent index.

William Maclay, a Scotchman from the interior of Pennsylvania, served in the first Senate which saw the inauguration of the federal government under the Constitution. His journal is important not only because the Senate at that time sat behind closed doors but also because Maclay with some justice has been called the first Jeffersonian Democrat. Maclay went to the Senate expecting, as he said, "every man to act the part of a God," but instead he found "rough and rude manners, glaring folly, and the basest

selfishness apparent in almost every transaction." It is no wonder, then, that he became suspicious and too severe in his judgment. Nevertheless, his comments illuminate political issues and social customs as well as the personalities of the period.

Maclay strongly opposed all "monarchical tendencies" on the part of the Senate. He was a leader in the debate against Congress' granting titles, he bitterly fought Hamilton's treasury measures, and constantly insisted upon the necessity of this government's being operated with republican simplicity.

If Maclay did not always have words of praise for Washington, at least he respected him; but not so, the case of the vice-president. On one occasion he described him as "Bonny Johnny Adams, ever and anon mantling his visage with the most unmeaning simper that ever dimpled the face of folly." It is evident from this quotation that Maclay knew how to use the English language. For this reason alone, aside from its historical importance, his journal makes interesting reading.

THE FAR EAST

MAURICE T. PRICE

PROBLEMS OF THE PACIFIC. Proceedings of the Second Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Honolulu, (Hawaii, July 15 to 29), 1927. Edited by J. B. Condliffe. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1928. xiii + 630 pp. \$3.00.

RESIDENT ORIENTALS ON THE AMERICAN PACIFIC COAST. Their Legal and Economic Status. By Eliot G. Mears. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1928. xvi + 545 pp. \$3.00.

ORIENTAL EXCLUSION. The Effect of American Immigration Laws, Regulations, and Judicial Decisions upon the Chinese and Japanese on the American Pacific Coast. By R. D. McKenzie. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1928. viii + 200 pp. \$2.00.

WHITHER CHINA? An Economic Interpretation of Recent Events in the Far East. By Scott Nearing. New York: International Publishers Co., Inc., 1927. 225 pp. \$1.75.

THE SOUL OF CHINA. By Richard Wilhelm. Text translated by John H. Reece; poems by Arthur Waley. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, Inc., 1928. 382 pp. \$3.75.

MODERN JAPAN AND ITS PROBLEMS. By G. C. Allen. New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, n.d. (1928). 226 pp. \$3.00.

The books by Condliffe (ed.), Mears, and McKenzie exhibit the civilian Insti-

tute of Pacific Relations in its self-appointed rôle of "shock-absorber, fact-finder, and interpreter" in the Pacific Rim in the year 1927. The books by Nearing, Wilhelm, and Allen each attempt to present the dominant trends in an entire Oriental people.

The paragraphs prefacing the report of the Institute's 1927 conference, remind one of Wilson's idea of what the Versailles conference was to be, before he arrived in Europe. The book's contents consist of addresses "giving the outlook on Pacific Affairs" of each of the nine national Institute groups, a supposed summary—they were not invariably so, I understand—of about a dozen round-table discussions, and a handpicked fourth of the hundred and twenty documents presented to these discussion groups. The chief topics treated are population and food supply, industrialization and foreign investments, emigration and immigration, international education and communication, and various social and political situations of a controversial nature in the Pacific basin. To those not thoroughly familiar with these problems, the documents are, roughly, as uneven in value as the "expertness" of those discussing and even leading in the round-tables. Highly valuable objective data presented with appropriate reservations—e.g., on land utilization, population, resources, legislation, etc.—are spliced in between materials compiled and interpreted in accordance with the fervor or reticences of the super-sensitive patriot, premature analyses of complex social and political developments, or even an individual's interpretation of the aims and attitudes of an entire movement. As a "shock-absorber," the conferences relatively frank exchange of opinions was undoubtedly valuable in proportion to the openmindedness of those present; but as a collection of reliable data

presumably the result of previous scientific and historical research, the *report* has transparent limitations.

Among the few studies presented as documents by the "American Group" of the Institute, were those of Mears and McKenzie. Together they attack those immigration aspects of culture-contact between whites and Orientals on the American Pacific coast, which are most accessible to investigators. For a perspective of the basic competitive situations underlying the Asiatic immigrant's contacts as evidenced in the recent history of the Pacific, and for a conception of the general trends toward accommodation and conflict which are determined by those situations, one should turn to McKenzie's first two chapters. Then, in Mears' analysis of public documents, legal precedents, occupational statistics, and records, one will find the most reliable and comprehensive description available of the legal and economic status of *Resident Orientals on the American Pacific Coast*. Turning again to McKenzie, one may watch the latest legal machinery, the Immigration Act of 1924, at work dealing with Chinese and Japanese treaty merchant, student, visitor, and family relations in general—a case study in the limitations not only of this particular immigration law but of Occidental legal rigidity as such. Both authors show some effects of the severe handicap of a time-limit. McKenzie had to estimate Oriental attitudes by plucking cases. Mears risked more: partly for "human-interest" value, apparently, he coquettes with off-hand generalizations on the morality, wisdom, psychology, or social psychology of certain situations, and even on Oriental traits. The publishers' omission of an index, and repetition of typographical errors in the new edition of *Oriental Exclusion* are inexcusable.

Of the two books on China, one pro-

fesses to give economic fact and interpretation and the other to convey the "spirit" of a civilization. Nearing's formula is familiar, of course: foreign imperialism aligned with local capitalism is responsible for the disorganization and chaos of recent years, and the oppressed proletariat and peasantry are rising en masse under the leadership of the communists and Soviet Russia to annihilate local capitalism; thereafter Soviet China is to become the chief business and financial brains of the world revolution, thus putting an end to imperialism, also. So simple! Even so, Nearing gives a good summary of the more easily obtainable economic studies of China, and is safe until he interprets figures on labor and mass movements or presents outlines of political events wrenched from their causative factors.

The religious missionary differs from the economic missionary chiefly in the realm he idealizes. Wilhelm touches certain high points in recent Chinese history and meanders vaguely or episodically among his memories of China and Chinese thinkers. Sent to China originally to be the spiritual advisor to Germans of Tsingtao, he reacted strongly against the frictions of clashing cultures and found his satisfaction in the philos-

ophy that he heralds as the portion providentially preserved to save the Occident. Lured by his charming style, one almost forgives his exaggerations and enthusiasms.

What Nearing's volume professes to be for China, Allen's actually is, for Japan; viz., a fundamental interpretation of its recent history chiefly from the economic-political point of view. As a keen student, well-informed at first hand of the industrial, commercial, financial developments and of many related population, agricultural, and educational problems, he presents them in orderly concise form. His analysis and statement of certain psychological traits or attitudes may be questioned. But the interplay of family organization and characteristic traits on the one hand, and of the government's aggressive paternalistic direction of the whole course of development, on the other, stand out all through the book against the stark necessities of Japan's particular position and her special opportunities. He amply supports his chief contention that Japan's course of development is not western, but is a compromise between the necessities of her situation, her traditional social and psychological culture, and western industrialism.

CRIME AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE

ROY M. BROWN

THE CRIMINAL AND HIS ALLIES. By Marcus Kavanagh. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1928. 432 pp. \$3.00.

THE NEW CRIMINOLOGY. By Max Schlapp and Edward H. Smith. New York: Boni and Liveright, 1928. 325 pp.

CONDENMED TO DEVIL'S ISLAND. The Biography of an Unknown Convict. By Blair Niles. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1928. 376 pp. \$3.00.

"Frankly, this book has no concern with the reformation of criminals," de-

clares Judge Kavanagh in his preface, "the alleviation of their sufferings in prisons, or with excuses for or palliation of their misdeeds. Enough and too much is being written and done by others in that regard." He goes forth to do battle in defense of the law-abiding citizen, and against the criminal and his allies—sentimental faddists and theorists, technicalities of procedure, the professional de-

fender of the criminal, the manufacturer of fire arms, and a complacent and sleeping public opinion.

Among the sentimentalists he classifies all adherents of the positive school of penology. They are worse than mere sentimentalists; their denial of the freedom of the will is a challenge to christianity. But the most dangerous influence of the "Positivist School" lies in their contention that a large proportion of criminals are mental defectives. On the other hand "an unusually clever man, who was a policeman for many years but now for some years has been a convict in the Joliet Penitentiary—a man capable of observing, with daily opportunity for judgment—testified before the Committee on Law Enforcement of the American Bar Association, that one per cent of the criminals are of inferior intelligence, and that the great body of professional law-breakers are very bright men."

Everywhere in the book is seen the workings of a mind thoroughly unscientific in method and habits of thought, dogmatic and illogical. He proclaims himself the "practical criminologist," along with keepers of prisons and policemen, free from the sentimentality of the psychologist and the psychiatrist; and then he pens this delicious bit of practical wisdom: "I am sure that no man can be as good as a good woman. It isn't in him. No man can be as bad as a wicked woman. He hasn't the same genius for evil." He begins his chapter on the Moron, by defining the term in the ordinarily accepted meaning and then immediately assumes that the moron is a sex offender of a certain type without regard to mentality and so treats him throughout the chapter.

During a long period on the bench he has become aware of some of the defects of our court procedure, and he has observed poorly organized and administered systems

of pardon and parole. At the same time he has seen the volume of crime increase. He denounces the crooked criminal lawyers. He would eliminate from court procedure technicalities whose sole purpose is to delay. But the main remedy lies in surer and severer penalties. Punishment is the cure for crime. "Prisons may and do tame criminals, but it is the penalty of the prison and not its moral and social atmosphere which produces this result."

In the first chapter of *The New Criminology*, the authors state their thesis as follows: "We shall attempt to demonstrate that the vast majority of all criminals, misdemeanants, mental deficient and defectives are the products of bodily disorders, that most crimes come about through disturbances of the ductless glands in the criminal or through mental defects caused by endocrine troubles in the criminal's mother. The attempt will also be made to show that criminal actions are in reality reactions caused by the disturbed internal chemistry of the body."

The data presented in support of his thesis do not justify so sweeping a conclusion. The cautious student of crime and its causes, will want additional data before accepting the theory that the average criminal is merely a victim of glandular disorder. But the book is a timely challenge to the present day demand, voiced by Judge Kavanagh, for surer and severer punishment for the criminal.

Condemned to Devil's Island is the fictional biography of a burglar condemned to the French penal colony. It is based, the author assures us, on fact. It portrays the degrading and purposeless life imposed upon these prisoners and the horrors which they are willing to face in the hope of escape. It is another document in support of the indictment of organized society for its treatment of those who offend against its laws.

THE SANCTITY OF LAW. By John W. Burgess. Boston: Ginn and Company. 335 pp. \$3.00.

Dr. Burgess, that much respected professor of political science, sets for himself the task of discovering wherein the sanctity of law consists. He begins by reconstructing Blackstone's definition of law and finds law to be "a rule of conduct prescribed by the state and enforced by means of a physical penalty when necessary." The chief problem of his work is, as he states it, "to demonstrate how men have sought and struggled to find the sovereign organ or organs out of which have proceeded the rules of conduct having the force of law" in North America and in Europe since the downfall of the Roman Empire.

In the early eras of civilization men were concerned chiefly with the legitimacy of the source of law, but later they began to study the content of the law and to gauge their obedience to it by its rationality. But Dr. Burgess issues the warning that too great stress can be placed upon this factor in determining the sanctity of law and that when this occurs it will lead to anarchy.

The chapters on the World War are especially significant. The author places upon Great Britain the blame of the war by its interference in the political organization of Europe with the purpose of perpetuating the Balkanization of eastern Europe. The result of the war was to set back "the universal triumph of the real international system of genuine national states at least half a century." But he holds out the hope that "the United States of America may at some future day regard it as its own great world mission to perfect a real world unity of genuine national states."

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REVISTA DE FILOSOFIA. Buenos Aires: L. J. Rosso. Vol. XIV, Nos. 1 and 2 (January and March, 1928). \$5.00 the year (Six issues).

REVISTA DE CRIMINOLOGIA, PSIQUIATRIA Y MEDICINA LEGAL. Buenos Aires: Penitenciaría Nacional. Vol. XV, No. 89 (September-October, 1928). \$5.00 the year (Six issues).

SOCIAL FORCES acknowledges receipt, by exchange, of the two outstanding South American journals mentioned above. Both of these Reviews illustrate well the rapid advance being made in University and other cultural centers by our Latin American neighbors. The *Revista de Filosofia* is very much like our own journals of philosophy, except that it gives more attention to contemporary scientific thought and less to the history of philosophy. It is quite as much a journal in sociology as in philosophy. The two numbers here listed contain sociological articles on Tarde (by the sociologist Orgaz), on Ramos Mejia (by Veyga), and on Ingenieros (by Solari). There are articles on the philosophers Gentile, Bergson, and Spengler. There is also, among others, an article on the Importance of Justice by Professor Alfredo Colmo, who will be on the Columbia University staff a part of the coming year. Colmo is one of the ablest social thinkers in Latin America and was the first in Argentina to write a textbook in sociology (1905). This review was founded by the great Argentine leader of youth, Dr. Jose Ingenieros, and is now ably directed by Dr. Anibal Ponce.

The *Revista de Criminología* is very similar to our own Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, but runs more to social medicine, due to the fact that its editor (Dr. Osvaldo Loudet) is professor of that subject in the University of Buenos Aires and is medical director of the National Prison. The legal and social aspects of medicine have been more developed in Argentina than in the United States, and

the prison authorities and the correctional agencies generally have perhaps been more hospitable there to the utilization of the findings of psychiatry than in this country. These facts doubtless are to be explained partly by the strength of the tradition of the Italian School of Criminology in Latin America, but perhaps even more by the greater emphasis upon medical and legal education in their universities and national cultures.

It is the intention of *SOCIAL FORCES* to serve in the future as something of a mirror to the Latin American developments in the social sciences and to Latin American opinion. Frequently reviews of leading Latin American books and journals will appear in our columns.

L. L. BERNARD.

University of North Carolina.

NEW BOOKS RECEIVED

NIGGER TO NIGGER. By E. C. L. Adams. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1928. 270 pp. \$2.00.

A STANDARD CITY PLANNING ENABLING ACT. By the Advisory Committee on City planning and Zoning of the U. S. Dept. of Commerce. Washington: U. S. Govt. Printing Office, 1928. 54 pp.

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